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I. Introduction
CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN THE UNITEd States are increasingly evident and come with steep economic and social costs. The frequency and 
intensity of extreme weather events has increased in recent 
years, bringing record-breaking heat, heavy precipitation, 
coastal flooding, severe droughts, and damaging wildfires.1 
According to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA), weather-related damages in the 
United States were $60 billion in 2011, and are expected 
to be significantly greater in 2012.2
 
The mounting costs convey an unmistakable urgency 
to address climate change by reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions (GHGs). This report examines pathways for 
GHG reductions in the United States through actions 
taken at the federal and state levels without the need 
for new legislation from the U.S. Congress.
This report answers a number of key questions:
 O What are current U.S. GHG emissions? Without 
further action to reduce emissions, what are they 
projected to be in 2020 and 2035? 
 O What legal and policy tools exist under current 
federal law to achieve emissions reductions? What 
additional actions can states pursue to contribute 
to emissions reductions?
 O Which legal and policy tools at the state and 
federal levels offer the greatest potential for 
achieving emissions reductions in the near-  
and mid-term?
 O Can the U.S. meet its international commitment  
to reduce emissions 17 percent below 2005 levels 
by 2020 without new federal legislation?
 O Can the U.S. put itself on a trajectory to meet 
or exceed its long-term commitment of reducing 
emissions by more than 80 percent below 2005 levels 
by 2050, without new legislation from Congress?
The answers to these questions are set out in detail in 
the body of this report. Two significant findings stand 
out. First, it is clear the U.S. is not currently on track 
to meet its 2020 reduction pledge, however, this  
target is achievable through implementation of strong 
new federal measures to reduce emissions using 
existing legal authorities. Second, the mid-century goal 
of reducing emissions by 80 percent or more appears 
unattainable using existing authorities. New legislation 
will eventually be needed.
1.    Without new action by the U.S. Administration, greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions will increase over time. The U.S. 
will fail to make the deep emissions reductions needed 
in coming decades, and will not meet its international 
commitment to reduce GHG emissions by 17 percent  
below 2005 levels by 2020.
2.    The U.S. EPA should immediately pursue “go-getter” 
emissions reductions from power plants and natural gas 
systems using its authority under the Clean Air Act.  
These two sectors represent two of the top opportunities 
for substantial GHG reductions between now and 2035.
3.    The U.S. Administration should pursue hydrofluorocarbon 
(HFC) reductions through both the Montreal Protocol 
process and under its independent Clean Air Act authority. 
Eliminating HFCs represents the biggest opportunity for 
GHG emissions reductions behind power plants.
4.    U.S. states should complement federal actions to reduce 
emissions through state energy efficiency, renewables, 
transportation, and other actions. States can augment 
federal reductions.
5.   New federal legislation will eventually be needed, because 
even go-getter action by federal and state governments 
will probably fail to achieve the more than 80 percent 
GHG emissions reductions necessary to fend off the most 
deleterious impacts of climate change.
B o x  1  Key Conclusions and Recommendations
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Potential reductions in the United Stated were 
assessed in a 2010 WRI Report entitled Reducing 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions in the United States Using 
Existing Federal Authorities and State Action.3 This 
updated report revisits these questions, taking into 
account the latest GHG emissions information and 
recent actions taken at the federal and state levels. 
Since the publication of the last report, notable factors 
influencing U.S. GHG emissions include:
O	 Reduced global economic growth, including slower 
growth of economic output in the United States;
O	 Increased fuel switching from coal to natural gas 
in the generation of electricity; and
O	 Reduced demand for transportation fuel, partly 
as a result of higher petroleum prices, lower miles 
traveled, and more efficient vehicles.
These factors and others, including the issuance of new 
motor vehicle emissions and fuel efficiency standards 
for cars and trucks, will reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions. However, even with these factors, we project 
that total U.S. emissions will experience relatively 
modest growth over the coming decades. 
At the 2009 Conference of the Parties of the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
in Copenhagen, Denmark, President Obama made a 
commitment to reduce U.S. greenhouse gas emissions 
in the range of 17 percent below 2005 levels by 2020. 
Despite the inability of Congress to pass comprehensive 
climate change legislation, the Administration has re-
committed to the Copenhagen pledge and taken some 
steps to reduce emissions using authority under existing 
laws.4 While the Administration has reaffirmed its 
commitment to this target, it has not yet matched that 
commitment with adequate action. Though significant 
progress has been made in some areas since our 2010 
analysis, most notably with the vehicle rules, key 
opportunities, such as reductions from power plants, 
remain untapped. The fact that the U.S. remains far from 
the “go-getter” emissions trajectory laid out in our 2010 
report reinforces the urgency for taking strong action now.
Although the U.S. emissions reduction commitment  
for 2020 represents an important step toward  
reducing GHG emissions, much greater reductions  
are necessary. According to the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change, industrialized countries  
need to collectively reduce emissions between  
25 and 40 percent below 1990 levels by 2020 and 
80 to 95 percent below 1990 levels by 2050 in order 
to keep global average temperatures from increasing 
more than 2 degrees Celsius above preindustrial 
levels. This report evaluates the potential for meeting 
the 17 percent commitment and the deeper longer-
term reduction pathway necessary to avoid the worst 
impacts of climate change.
4.   Most recently, the U.S. delegation to the Conference of the Parties of 
the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change in Doha, Qatar, made 
it clear that the 17 percent pledge is not contingent on new legislation 
from Congress.
Within the bounds of what is legally and technically possible, 
the single most important factor influencing emissions 
reductions is political and policy ambition. This analysis 
considers three levels of ambition:
O	 		  Lackluster. This is low ambition and represents the 
results of actions of lowest cost or least optimistic 
technical achievement.
O	 		 Middle-of-the-Road. This is mid-level ambition and 
represents the results of actions of moderate cost and 
moderately optimistic technical achievement.
O	 		 Go-Getter. This is the highest ambition achievable 
without new congressional action. It represents the results 
of actions of higher cost or most optimistic technical 
achievement.
The term “go-getter” is not meant to suggest the actions are 
adequate to achieve U.S. reduction targets or reductions the 
science suggests are necessary to ward off the worst effects 
of climate change.
B o x  2   Ambition Matters
1.   America’s Climate Choices: Panel on Advancing the Science of Climate 
Change. National Research Council, 2010.ISBN 978-0-309-14588-6. 
Accessible at: <http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=12782>.
2.   Preliminary Info on 2012 U.S. Billion-Dollar Extreme Weather/
Climate Events. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. 
Accessible at: <http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/news/preliminary-info-
2012-us-billion-dollar-extreme-weatherclimate-events>. (Last 
accessed January 15, 2013)
3.   Accessible at: <http://www.wri.org/publication/reducing-ghg-emissions-
using-existing-federal-authorities-and-state-action>.
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Attaining even the 17 percent reduction goal will 
require new and ambitious action from the U.S. 
Administration—ambitious action that must survive 
court challenges. Real progress depends on numerous 
actions not yet taken by the U.S. Administration—
especially for stationary emissions sources like power 
plants, natural gas systems, and industry. U.S. states 
may also need to take action to fill any emissions gaps 
left by the federal government. Achieving the necessary 
mid-century reductions will almost certainly require the 
U.S. Congress to act to achieve the needed reductions.
Section II summarizes the report’s key findings, 
including the range of reductions that are possible 
and a brief description of the analytical approach. An 
examination of current emissions in the United States 
and projected emissions without new actions follows 
in Section III. Section IV summarizes the sector-by-
sector actions the federal government might take under 
existing laws. Section V summarizes potential state 
actions. Section VI sets out summary conclusions. 
Two detailed appendixes set out the assumptions and 
methodologies for the federal and state analyses. 
The picture revealed is one of significant potential 
greenhouse gas emissions reductions, provided there  
is sufficient political will to take strong action.
II.  Charting a Path Forward in the U.S. : 
Summary of Key Findings
This report identifies significant potential for GHG 
emissions reductions by the U.S. Administration under 
current laws and through state-level actions, as well as 
the limitations of current tools. The reductions actually 
achieved will depend on the level of ambition brought 
to the effort by the U.S. Administration, including 
executive agencies such as the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency. At the state level, outcomes 
will depend on the number of states that choose to 
support renewable energy, energy efficiency, and 
transportation measures, and to pursue policies that 
the federal government opts not to pursue or that go 
beyond the minimum stringency set by the federal 
government. Key findings are set out below for federal 
and state actions.5
 A.  FedeRAL GHG RedUCTIONS POSSIBLe 
WITHOUT NeW LeGISLATION
 O Only with “go-getter” ambition by the U.S. 
Administration can the United States achieve 
emissions reductions using current law that meet 
or exceed the Copenhagen commitment to reduce 
global warming pollution by at least 17 percent 
below 2005 levels by 2020.6 With middle-of-
the-road ambition, the United States will fall 
well short of its 17 percent commitment, unless 
supplemented by go-getter actions by the states.
 O Even with go-getter ambition, long-term emissions 
reductions fall short of the level of reductions 
necessary to put the United States on pace to 
reach its long-term reduction goal of reducing 
emissions 83 percent below 2005 levels by 
2050. New congressional legislation is therefore 
necessary to achieve reductions in line with what 
the international scientific community agrees is 
necessary by mid-century in order to stabilize 
global average temperatures and avert the worst 
impacts of climate change.
 O After taking action to significantly improve motor 
vehicle fuel efficiency, the U.S. Administration should 
now apply similar ambition to reducing emissions 
from a wider range of sources, such as existing power 
plants, if it is to achieve the needed reductions.
 O The greatest projected emissions reduction 
opportunities by 2020 and beyond come from four 
federal policy measures. The Administration will 
need to pursue these opportunities if the United 
States is to achieve the 17 percent reduction 
target. Those policies are:
 O standards to reduce carbon pollution from 
existing power plants (48 percent of total 
emissions gap between business-as-usual 
(BAU) and 2020 target);
6.  The U.S. commitment in Copenhagen calls for reductions in 2020 “in the 
range of 17 percent [below 2005 levels], in conformity with anticipated 
U.S. energy and climate legislation.” The U.S. submission notes that the 
ultimate goal of legislation pending at the time was to reduce emissions 
by 83 percent below 2005 levels in 2050.
5.   For data sources and an explanation of how expected emissions trends 
were compiled, please consult the appendixes. For the sake of clarity and 
brevity, sources are not provided in this summary.
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 O requirements to phase out the use of certain 
hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) (23 percent of total 
emissions gap between BAU and 2020 target);  
 O standards to reduce methane emissions from 
natural gas systems (11 percent of total emissions 
gap between BAU and 2020 target);7 and
 O actions to improve energy efficiency in the 
residential, commercial, and industrial sectors 
(8 percent of total emissions gap between 
BAU and 2020 target).  
B.  STATe ACTION COULd HeLP THe U.S. MeeT 
NeAR-TeRM PLedGe
 O States can be important contributors to efforts to 
reduce GHG emissions. If the U.S. Administration 
were to pursue policies with middle-of-the-road 
ambition, for example, states could pick up the slack 
7.   There is considerable uncertainty with regard to emissions for natural gas 
systems. The absolute magnitude of abatement opportunities is thus also 
uncertain. Nevertheless, our analysis suggests that there are important 
opportunities to reduce emissions from this sector. Those reductions are 
some of the lowest cost opportunities identified in this analysis.
and help the United States reach its goal of reducing 
emissions 17 percent below 2005 levels by 2020.
 O If the federal government pursues a lackluster 
effort, even a go-getter effort by states is unlikely 
to achieve the U.S. Administration’s 2020 
reduction goal.
 O Beyond 2020, go-getter state action combined 
with middle-of-the-road federal action falls short of 
putting the United States on track to make the mid-
century reduction target. This suggests that strong 
new federal legislative action will be needed.
C. THe STUdy IN BRIeF
This updated report represents the authors’ 
projections of the range of greenhouse gas 
emissions reductions possible if federal agencies 
and certain states implement measures to reduce 
GHG emissions. The report projects the range of 
reductions possible under current federal law based 
on a review of published analyses of technical 
feasibility. The report characterizes three emissions 
scenarios based on different levels of effort by 
federal and state actors:  “lackluster,” “middle-of-
the-road,” and “go-getter.” 
F I G U R e  1  Projected U.S. emissions under Different Federal Regulatory Scenarios
Note: The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC’s) Fourth Assessment Report (2007) indicates that industrialized countries need to collectively reduce emissions 
between 25 and 40 percent below 1990 levels by 2020 and 80 to 95 percent below 1990 levels by 2050 to keep atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases from exceeding 450 
parts per million of CO
2
e and to keep global average temperatures from increasing more than 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels. This target does not necessarily represent 
any particular country’s share. Due to modeling limitations, this figure depicts HFC consumption, which is generally thought to be equivalent to life-cycle emissions. For this and all 
other figures, we use the global warming potentials provided in IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report. There are some limited exceptions. See Appendix I for more details.
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1. Analysis of Federal Actions
The analysis of federal actions is based on a legal 
assessment of the measures the U.S. Administration, 
including key federal agencies like EPA, may take under 
existing federal laws. The federal analysis assumes no 
new legislation is adopted. Technical studies were used 
to identify the range of reductions possible within a 
given sector or subsector. The legally and technically 
feasible range of reductions was then evaluated based 
on the level of ambition necessary to achieve a particular 
point in the range. Where available, we relied more 
heavily on studies that provided a consideration of the 
costs needed to achieve a particular outcome to provide 
a sense of the federal regulatory resolve necessary to 
achieve those reductions.
Where only a low level of ambition is necessary to achieve 
a particular technically and legally feasible outcome 
within a specific sector or subsector, the outcome was 
judged to be “lackluster.” If a high level of ambition is 
necessary to achieve a particular reduction outcome 
deemed technically and legally possible, the effort 
necessary was deemed “go-getter” in our scenarios. 
“Middle-of-the-road” outcomes were those judged 
possible with moderate ambition and usually at the middle 
of the range deemed technically and legally possible.
Lackluster emissions reductions from all sectors and 
subsectors analyzed were aggregated to determine the 
lackluster emissions pathway through 2035. The same 
approach was taken for middle-of-the-road and go-
getter reductions.
2. Analysis of State Actions
The state analysis has two components: the first 
considers the impact of states taking action in the 
absence of federal action; the second considers the 
impact of states taking action in the presence of varying 
levels of federal action. In both components we examine 
the implication of states implementing the same types of 
policies modeled for the federal government, as well as 
complementary state-level actions in the transportation, 
energy efficiency, and renewables areas.
For transportation, the state scenarios consider measures 
to encourage low carbon fuels and reduce vehicle 
miles traveled. In the energy efficiency area, measures 
examined include increased electric end-use energy 
efficiency, improved building performance, and increased 
deployment of combined heat and power. For renewables, 
the analysis adds new and additional renewable energy 
policies across a certain number of states.
F I G U R e  2  Projected U.S emissions with State Action Coupled with Middle-of-the-Road Federal Action
Note: Due to modeling limitations, this figure depicts HFC consumption, which is generally thought to be equivalent to life-cycle emissions. 
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Note: Figure 3 depicts the emissions under the three federal regulatory scenarios by sector or category of sources in 2020. The bars on the left represent business-as-usual 
emissions. Emissions under the lackluster, middle-of-the-road, and go-getter scenarios are then shown moving from left to right of the business-as-usual emissions. Light-duty 
vehicle emissions initially increase in our scenarios due to assumptions about vehicle electrification and crediting rates. As shown in Figure 4, these trends reverse in later years. 
See Appendix I for more information. Due to modeling limitations, this figure depicts HFC consumption, which is generally thought to be equivalent to life-cycle emissions.
F I G U R e  3   Projected U.S. emissions in 2020 by Sector under Different Federal Regulatory Scenarios
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F I G U R e  4  Projected U.S. emissions in 2035 by Sector under Different Federal Regulatory Scenarios
Note: Figure 4 depicts the emissions under the three federal regulatory scenarios by sector or category of sources in 2035. The bars on the left represent the business-as-usual 
emissions. Emissions under the lackluster, middle-of-the-road, and go-getter scenarios are then shown moving from left to right of the business-as-usual emissions. Due to 
modeling limitations, this figure depicts HFC consumption, which is generally thought to be equivalent to life-cycle emissions.
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F I G U R e  5   U.S. Greenhouse Gas emissions by Sector and Corresponding Federal Authorities, 2010
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http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/Downloads/ghgemissions/US-GHG-Inventory-2012-Main-Text.pdf.
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U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Atmospheric Programs, 15 Apr. 2012, 
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/Downloads/ghgemissions/US-GHG-Inventory-2012-Main-Text.pdf.
U.S. Emissions by Sector and Corresponding Federal Authorities (2010)
2% HFCs
O Elimination of HFCs (EPA)
2% other T ansport tion 
2% Aircraft
O Aircraft emissions standards (EPA) 
O Operational changes to save fuel (FAA)
6% Medium- & 
Heavy-Duty Vehicles
O Same as light-duty vehicles
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6% Natural Gas Power Plants
O New Source Performance Standards and pre-construction  
     permits (EPA) 
O Energy efficiency standards (DOE/States)
O Traditional pollution regulations (EPA/States)
16% Light-Duty Vehicles
O Vehicle Corporate Average Fuel Efficiency (CAFE) standards (DOT) 
O Vehicle emissions standards under Clean Air Act (EPA)
O Renewable and/or low carbon fuel standards (EPA) 
O Vehicle miles traveled policies (States, Metropolitan Planning Organizations, Cities)
26% Coal-Fired Power Plants
O New Source Performance Standards and pre-construction permits (EPA)
O	Energy efficiency standards (DOE/States) 
O Ash disposal regulations (EPA)
O Traditional pollution regulations (EPA)
0.2% other
26% Coal-Fired Power Plants
■ New Source Performance Standards and pre-construction permits (EPA)
■ Energy efficiency standards (DOE/States) 
■ Ash disposal reg lations (EPA)
■ Traditional air regulations (EPA)
0.2% Other
7% Agriculture
■ Agricultural policies (USDA) 
■ Land management policies (DOI)
■ Federal forest lands management (USDA, USFS, DOI)
4% Other Industrial
■ New Source Performance Standards and pre-construction permits (EPA)
4% Natural Gas Systems
■ New Source Performance Standards(EPA)
■ Energy efficiency (DOE/States)
1% Coal Mining
■ New Source Performance Standards (EPA)
2% HFCs
■ Elimination of HFCs (EPA)
0.3% Adipic & Nitric Acid Manufacturing
■ New Source Performance Standards (EPA)
9% Industrial Combustion
■ New Source Performance Standards and pre-construction permits (EPA)
 ■ Energy efficiency standards (DOE)
 2% Landfills
■ New Source Performance Standards (EPA)
7% Commercial & Residential Heating Fuel
■ Energy efficiency standards (DOE) 
■ Building energy codes (States)
2% Other Transportation 
3% Off-Highway Vehicles
■ Vehicle emissions standards (EPA) 
■ Fuel standards (EPA)
2% Aircraft
■ Aircraft emissions standards (EPA) 
■ Operational changes to save fuel (FAA)
6% Medium- & Heavy-DutyVehicles
■ Same as light-duty vehicles
16% Light-Duty Vehicles
■ Vehicle Corporate Average Fuel Efficiency (CAFE) standards (DOT) 
■ Vehicle emissions standards under Clean Air Act (EPA)
■ Renewable and/or low carbon fuel standards (EPA) 
■ Vehicle miles traveled policies (States, MPOs, Cities
1% Other Power Plants
Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks: 1990–2010, 430-R-12-001, 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Atmospheric Programs, 15 Apr. 2012, 
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/Downloads/ghgemissions/US-GHG-Inventory-2012-Main-Text.pdf.
U.S. Emissions by Sector and Corresponding Federal Authorities (2010)
1  other Power Plants
Source: Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks: 1990–2010. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, April 2012. Accessible at: <http://www.epa.gov/
climatechange/emissions/usinventoryreport.html>; Clearing the Air on Shale Gas Emissions: Assessing and Reducing the Carbon Footprint of Natural Gas. James Bradbury, 
Michael Obeiter, Laura Draucker, Wen Wang, and Amanda Stevens. World Resources Institute, Working Paper, forthcoming.
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Unlike the federal analysis, many of the state measures 
modeled would require new legislation at the state 
level. Also unlike the federal scenario, whether state 
action is “lackluster”, “middle-of-the-road” or “go-
getter” is a function of how many states adopt the 
measures modeled, and in some cases the ambition  
of the policies pursued.
3.  Analysis of Federal and State Actions Together
Given that it is unlikely that federal action will occur 
without state action or that state action will occur 
without federal action, we analyzed emissions scenarios 
with both federal and state action.  States can be 
expected to continue to be active in areas of traditional 
state purview such as energy resource planning and 
energy efficiency, while also compensating for weak 
federal action. To capture this dynamic, we modeled 
varying levels of action for federal and state action.
III.  The Road the U.S. is on Now:  
Business as Usual
The reduction pathways presented in this report are 
best considered in light of current U.S. emissions, along 
with recent and future emissions trends. A snapshot 
of U.S. emissions using the most recent data available 
is presented below, together with a summary of U.S. 
emissions by key sectors and recent actions to reduce 
them by federal agencies. 
A. CURReNT U.S. eMISSIONS
In 2010 the United States emitted almost 7 billion 
metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalents (CO2e), 
which represents a decrease of about 6 percent 
below 2005 levels and a 10 percent increase over 
1990 levels. Fossil-fuel combustion was responsible 
for nearly 80 percent of U.S. emissions, with power 
plants accounting for about 40 percent of combustion 
emissions, or one-third of the total U.S. GHG inventory, 
according to EPA. The second largest contributor to 
total GHG emissions is the transportation sector, with 
approximately 30 percent of U.S. emissions. Non-CO2 
emissions and CO2 emissions that result from industrial 
processes (as opposed to combustion) represented 
approximately 22 percent of U.S. total GHG emissions.
Figure 5 shows the 2010 U.S. emissions inventory by 
sector and subsector, together with the corresponding 
federal regulatory tools available to achieve reductions 
in the sector.
B. WHAT HAPPeNS WITH NO NeW POLICIeS? 
 UNdeRSTANdING CURReNT  
 U.S. eMISSIONS TReNdS
Before discussing the reduction pathways projected 
for this report, it is important to describe the major 
emissions trends that are part of the business-as-usual 
projections. Business-as-usual emissions trends have 
shifted downward since the 2010 version of this report. 
While energy-related CO2 emissions are projected to 
rise slowly but remain below 2010 levels through 2035, 
non-CO2 emissions are projected to steadily increase 
over the same time period. The primary trends are 
noted here:
 O Current energy-related Carbon dioxide emissions 
down from 2005 Levels. In 2011 carbon dioxide 
emissions from energy sources, which account 
for nearly 80 percent of U.S. GHG emissions, 
were 8.7 percent below 2005 levels. Nearly half 
of those reductions (48 percent) came from the 
power sector. The rest of the reductions came from 
transportation (28 percent), industry (18 percent), 
and buildings (6 percent).8
 O Future energy-CO2 emissions expected to be 
Relatively Flat. Our projections suggest that if no 
future policy actions are taken, then energy-CO2 
emissions will remain approximately 10 percent 
8.  Closer than You Think: Latest U.S. CO
2
 Pollution Data and Forecasts 
Show Target Within Reach. NRDC Issue Brief. Dan Lashof. July 2012.
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below 2005 levels in 2020, and will increase 
slightly through 2035 to levels that are about  
8 percent below 2005 levels (Figure 7).
 O Those trends are driven by a number of factors, including: 
 O Falling energy demand. The economic 
slowdown experienced by the United States 
and other parts of the world over the period 
from 2008 to 2012 has led to decreased 
demand for goods and services and reduced 
energy consumption.9 Over time, this trend 
is expected to reverse as economic growth 
picks up. In addition, the industrial sector 
was affected significantly by the recent 
economic turndown and saw a decrease in 
both production and emissions. This decline 
is projected to be temporary. Manufacturing 
output is expected to accelerate from 2010 
through 2020, and emissions are projected  
to increase by 4 percent over this time.10
 O Rise of Natural Gas and Renewables. The power 
sector is shifting from coal-fired generation 
toward natural gas-fired and renewable 
generation. This trend is driven in part by 
increases in natural gas extraction, low 
natural gas prices, increasing coal prices, 
and new (non-GHG) regulations for the power 
sector. Increases in renewable generation are 
driven by state renewable standards, voluntary 
purchases of “green” energy, and decreasing 
renewable energy costs. However, gas prices 
are expected to slowly rise from current levels 
and demand for electricity is expected to rise 
18 percent by 2035 from 2010 levels.11
 O New Vehicle Rules. The transportation sector 
is expected to become less carbon-intensive, 
due in large part to high petroleum prices and 
new federal GHG emissions and fuel efficiency 
9.    Annual Energy Review 2012. Figure 1.1, Primary Energy Overview 
(Consumption). EIA, September 2012. Accessible at: <http://www.eia.
gov/totalenergy/data/annual/pdf/aer.pdf>.
10.  Annual Energy Outlook 2012 with Projections to 2035. EIA, 
June 2012. Accessible at: <http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/
pdf/0383(2012).pdf>.
11.  Annual Energy Outlook 2012 with Projections to 2035. EIA, 
June 2012. Accessible at: <http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/
pdf/0383(2012).pdf>.
standards covering light-, medium- and heavy-
duty vehicles. These gains will be partially offset 
by continued increases in vehicle miles traveled.12 
Transportation emissions are projected to 
increase 1 percent below 2011 levels by 2035.
 O Non-energy emissions on the Rise. Trends for non-
energy and non-CO2 emissions, such as natural  
gas systems, refrigerants, and landfills, show 
a likely rise. In 2010, non-energy and non-CO2 
sources accounted for about 22 percent of total 
U.S. emissions. We project that these emissions 
will increase roughly 18 percent above 2005 levels 
by 2020 and 36 percent above 2005 levels by 
2035, even after accounting for 2012 regulations 
that affect portions of natural gas systems and 
HFCs from vehicles. Those trends are driven by 
several factors, including:
 O CFCs Phased Out, HFCs Phased In. HFC 
emissions are increasing due to the phaseout 
of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and other 
ozone-depleting substances under the 
Montreal Protocol, which is intended to 
F I G U R e  7    Projected U.S. energy-Related Carbon 
Dioxide emissions if no New State or  
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2005-2011);  U.S. Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Outlook  (Years 
2012-2035)
12.  Annual Energy Outlook 2012 with Projections to 2035. EIA,  
June 2012.
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Since the 2010 report, federal agencies have taken a number 
of actions that are reducing GHG emissions. The most 
significant actions from a GHG reduction perspective are 
summarized below. These are all incorporated into our new 
business-as-usual projections. 
O	 			Passenger cars and light-duty trucks. In August 2012 
EPA and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 
(NHTSA) finalized new fuel economy and GHG standards 
for passenger cars and light-duty trucks for model years 
2017–2025. These standards equate to a fleet-wide 
average of 54.5 mpg (101 g CO2e/km) if they are met 
solely through fuel economy improvements (as opposed to 
reductions in HFC emissions from air conditioners). This is 
approximately double the fuel economy of vehicles sold in 
2010. EPA estimates that the rule will save nearly 2 billion 
tons of CO2e over the life of the program. This is in addition 
to the estimated 960 million tons of CO2e over the life of the 
prior regulations for model years 2012–2016.
O	 			Heavy-duty vehicles. In August 2011 EPA and NHTSA 
finalized the first-ever fuel efficiency and GHG emission 
standards for model year 2014 through 2018 medium- and 
heavy-duty vehicles. EPA estimates that this rule will reduce 
CO2 emissions by approximately 270 million metric tons over 
the life of vehicles sold during the 2014–2018 model years.
O	 		  Natural gas systems. In April 2012 EPA finalized four 
regulations that will reduce emissions of volatile organic 
compounds, sulfur dioxide (SO2), and air toxics from oil 
and natural gas systems. EPA estimates that the new 
standards will have the co-benefit of reducing annual 
methane emissions by an estimated 19–33 million metric 
tons of CO2e.
O	 			energy efficiency standards for new appliances.  
Between 2009 and 2011, the Department of Energy 
established 17 new standards. According to analysis 
by the Appliance Standards Awareness Project and the 
American Council for an Energy-Efficiency Economy, these 
standards are expected to save 126.2 TWh in 2025 and 
146.8 TWh in 2035.
O	 			Non-GHG regulations for power plants. EPA has also 
finalized several other non-GHG-related environmental 
regulations for power plants, most notably those for 
mercury and other air toxics. Some modeling has 
suggested that these rules could lead to the retirement  
of old, inefficient, coal-fired power plants.
B o x  3  Recent Federal Action 2010–12 protect and restore the ozone layer in the 
upper atmosphere, and the Clean Air Act. This 
trend is expected to continue as the interim 
substitutes, HCFCs, are also phased out as 
they are currently being replaced with gases 
that have a high global warming potential.
 O With the Natural Gas Boon, More Methane 
Leaks. Extraction of natural gas in the  
United States has increased by over 25 
percent over the period of 2005 to 2011 due 
to rapid development of shale gas resources.13 
Increases in natural gas extraction lead 
to larger fugitive methane emissions from 
natural gas systems. Fugitive methane 
emissions are expected to fall significantly, 
however, due to 2012 EPA regulations 
that reduce emissions of volatile organic 
13.  Monthly Energy Review. Table 1.2, Primary Energy Production by 
Source. EIA, December 2012. Accessible at: <http://www.eia.gov/
totalenergy/data/monthly/pdf/sec1_5.pdf>.
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B. eLeCTRIC POWeR
The electric sector is the largest single source of  
GHG emissions in the United States. In 2010 it made 
up 33 percent of total U.S. GHG emissions, and about  
40 percent of all carbon pollution from the combustion 
of fossil fuels. This sector also represents the single 
biggest opportunity for emissions reductions using 
existing legal and regulatory tools. 
1. Power plants
Carbon pollution from power plants can be reduced 
through the following federal regulatory authorities: 
L A C K L U S T e R M I D D L e - o F -T H e - R o A D G o - G e T T e R
existing plants Emissions reductions consistent with 
a 5 percent improvement in efficiency 
starting in 2018. 
Aggregate emissions reductions 
across all electric generators equal to 
an 18 percent reduction in emissions 
in 2021 compared to 2012 emission 
levels, and a 33 percent reduction  
in 2035. 
Aggregate emissions reduction across 
all electric generators equal to a  
38 percent reduction in emissions 
in 2021 compared to 2012 emission 
levels, and a 74 percent reduction  
in 2035.
New plants Standards initially consistent with 
EPA’s proposal (1,000 pounds of 
CO2 per megawatt-hour of output). 
Beginning in 2020, new unit 
performance improves to 570 pounds 
of CO2 per megawatt-hour by 2030.
Standards initially consistent with 
the lackluster scenario. Beginning in 
2028, new units achieve emissions 
rates equivalent to carbon capture 
and storage (CCS) with a 90 percent 
capture rate.
Standards initially consistent with 
the lackluster scenario. Beginning in 
2020, new units achieve emissions 
rates equivalent to CCS with a  
90 percent capture rate.
T A B L e  1  Projecting New Source Performance Standards for Power Plants
F I G U R e  9   Power Plant emissions
26%  Coal-Fired 
Power Plants 
6%  Natural Gas-Fired 
Power Plants
1% other Power Plants 
As a Share of U.S. Emissions in 2010
compounds, sulfur dioxide, and air toxics from 
natural gas systems. Actions to reduce those 
emissions will also reduce methane emissions 
(see Box 3 for more details).
IV.  Understanding the Federal  
Reduction Pathways
A.   ABOUT THe SeCTOR-By-SeCTOR APPROACH
This analysis is a bottom-up assessment of the 
policies and regulatory tools available to the U.S. 
Administration, through the federal executive agencies 
tasked with implementing such regulations—to 
reduce GHG emissions. The analysis began with 
an examination of the makeup of U.S. emissions 
in 2010, followed by research and analysis into 
existing laws on authority to reduce emissions. We 
reviewed available literature to determine the range 
of emissions reductions technically feasible for each 
sector or subsector. Lastly, we considered legal 
authority, technical feasibility, cost and political will 
in constructing lackluster, middle-of-the-road, and 
go-getter scenarios for each sector or subsector. 
We briefly describe the scenarios for each sector or 
subsector below, beginning with the sectors that our 
analysis indicates offer the greatest potential for 
reductions. A more detailed discussion of our federal 
methods is provided in Appendix I.
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a. Performance standards for new and existing sources 
under section 111 of the federal Clean Air Act
Under section 111 of the Clean Air Act, EPA 
may prescribe emissions limitations based on 
the “best system of emission reduction” for 
new and modified existing sources within source 
categories EPA determines cause or contribute 
significantly to air pollution that may reasonably 
be anticipated to endanger human health or 
welfare.14 To determine the “best system of 
emission reduction,” EPA considers technological 
feasibility, cost, lead time, and energy and non-air 
environmental impacts.15 In the spring of 2012 
EPA proposed new source performance standards 
(NSPS) for new power plants.
In addition, for any source category EPA regulates 
on the federal level, EPA must also promulgate 
guidelines to states to use in developing 
requirements for existing sources under section 
111(d). In regulating existing sources, states must 
determine the “best system of emission reduction” 
for existing sources while taking into account 
the same factors EPA uses to set limitations for 
new sources, and also the remaining useful life of 
existing sources.16 The form of regulations imposed 
on existing sources is not tightly prescribed in the 
statute, and EPA has previously taken the position 
that states could implement flexible, market-based 
approaches in setting standards from existing 
sources. Table I specifies our three scenarios for 
new and existing power plants under section 111.
14.   42 U.S.C. §§ 7411(a)(1) & 7411(b)(1)(A).). U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency. “Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings 
for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act.” 
Accessible at: <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2009-12-15/pdf/
E9-29537.pdf>.
15.  42 U.S.C. §§ 7411(a)(1).
16.  42 U.S.C. §§ 7411(d)(1)(B).
b. Appliance and equipment efficiency standards  
under department of energy authority 
The Department of Energy (DOE) may 
promulgate efficiency standards for consumer 
appliances and non-consumer equipment under 
authority already granted DOE in current law. 
Based on available studies, the three scenarios 
analyzed assume progressively greater reductions 
through appliance and equipment standards, 
ranging up to 364 TWh of annual savings from 
residential and commercial consumers in 2025 
and 525 TWh annual savings in 2035, with 
additional savings from industrial consumers.
C.  HydROFLUOROCARBONS
Hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), used primarily for 
refrigeration and air conditioning, represented only 
2 percent of all U.S. global warming pollution in 
2010. Despite their relatively small share of the U.S. 
emissions picture today, our analysis finds HFCs can 
provide some of the greatest reductions by 2020 
and through 2035. EPA has existing authority to 
regulate HFC consumption under Title VI of the Clean 
Air Act. EPA can phase down the use of HFCs under 
L A C K L U S T e R M I D D L e - o F -T H e - R o A D G o - G e T T e R
192 TWh savings in 2025 from the 
residential and commercial sectors, plus 
additional savings from the industrial 
sector. Annual savings remain constant 
through 2035.
212 TWh savings in 2025 and 306 TWh 
savings in 2035 from the residential and 
commercial sectors, plus additional savings 
from the industrial sector.
364 TWh savings in 2025 and 525 TWh 
savings in 2035 from the residential and 
commercial sectors, plus additional savings 
from the industrial sector. 
T A B L e  2   Appliance and equipment efficiency Standards (electric)
F I G U R e  1 0   HFC emissions
2% HFCs
As a Share of U.S. Emissions in 2010
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L A C K L U S T e R M I D D L e - o F -T H e - R o A D G o - G e T T e R
Consumption ramp-down occurs three years 
later than the schedule detailed in the joint 
North American Proposal.
Consumption is ramped-down in a manner 
consistent with the joint North American 
Proposal, which calls for an 85 percent 
reduction below 2005–2008 levels by 2033.
Consumption is ramped-down more rapidly 
than in the joint North American Proposal, 
achieving the 85 percent reduction target in 
2028, five years earlier than detailed in the 
joint North American Proposal.
T A B L e  3   emissions Reduction Schedule for Hydrofluorocarbons
L A C K L U S T e R M I D D L e - o F -T H e - R o A D G o - G e T T e R
Emissions reductions of 26 percent from 
business-as-usual starting in 2019. 
Assumes implementation of plunger lift 
systems to reduce emissions from liquids 
unloading at new and existing wells, and 
leak monitoring and repair to reduce fugitive 
emissions from production, processing, and 
compressor stations.
Emissions reductions of 37 percent from 
business-as-usual starting in 2019. 
Assumes implementation of measures 
in lackluster scenario and conversion of 
existing high-bleed pneumatic controllers 
 to low-bleed or no-bleed controllers 
to reduce emissions from production, 
processing, and transmission.
Emissions reductions of 67 percent from 
business-as-usual starting in 2019. 
Assumes implementation of measures 
in middle-of-the-road scenario, as well 
as desiccant dehydrators to reduce 
emissions during dehydration of wet gas; 
improved compressor maintenance to 
reduce emissions during processing; hot 
taps in maintenance of pipelines during 
transmission; and vapor recovery units to 
reduce emissions during storage. 
T A B L e  4   Performance Standards to Reduce emissions from Natural Gas Systems
its Significant New Alternatives Program (SNAP), 
implementing section 612 of the Clean Air Act. The 
U.S. Administration has proposed an international 
ramp-down schedule to achieve reductions worldwide 
under the Montreal Protocol. Our middle-of-the-road 
scenarios for HFCs assume this proposed ramp-down 
schedule is met in the United States. The lackluster 
scenario assumes that the same ramp-down schedule 
is implemented, but on a delayed timeline, commencing 
in 2019 instead of 2016. Meanwhile, the go-getter 
scenario assumes a more ambitious reduction schedule.17
d. NATURAL GAS SySTeMS
Global warming pollution from natural gas systems 
accounts for approximately 4 percent of U.S. 
emissions. Yet like HFCs, our analysis suggests that 
17.   Due to modeling limitations, our analysis examines changes in HFC 
consumption. In the United States, HFC consumption is roughly 
equivalent to life-cycle emissions due to low rates of capture and 
destruction.  See Appendix I for a more detailed discussion.
natural gas systems may be among the top emissions 
reduction opportunities in the near term. Similar to 
power plants, EPA can regulate natural gas systems 
by implementing emissions performance standards for 
methane under section 111 of the Clean Air Act for 
new and existing natural gas systems. They may also 
be able to achieve additional GHG emissions reductions 
F I G U R e  1 1   emissions from Natural Gas Systems
As a Share of U.S. Emissions in 2010
4% Natural Gas
    Systems
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by tightening standards for other air pollutants, 
such as volatile organic compounds and air toxics, as 
they recently did with respect to new equipment in 
the U.S. oil and gas sector. Through one or more of 
these regulatory paths, EPA could require equipment 
changes, upgrades, changes to operational practices, 
and inspection and leak prevention. Table 4 details the 
three scenarios analyzed. However, there is a great 
deal of uncertainty with regard to emissions for natural 
gas systems. This means that the absolute magnitude 
of abatement opportunities is uncertain. Nevertheless, 
our analysis identifies important opportunities to 
reduce emissions from this sector. Those reductions 
are some of the lowest cost opportunities identified 
in this analysis. See the appendix for a more detailed 
discussion of uncertainties and opportunities.
F I G U R e  1 2   Transportation emissions
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e. TRANSPORT VeHICLeS
Transportation is one of the largest sources of global 
warming pollution in the United States, accounting 
for 30 percent of the 2010 inventory. Improving 
the efficiency of motor vehicles has been a priority 
for the Obama Administration, which promulgated 
new standards to reduce emissions and raise the 
fuel efficiency of light-, medium- and heavy-duty 
vehicles. Our analysis finds that it is possible to achieve 
additional reductions from light-, medium-, and heavy-
duty vehicles. In addition, there are opportunities to 
reduce emissions of global warming pollution from 
aircraft and off-highway vehicles. 
1. Passenger vehicles
Under Title II of the Clean Air Act, EPA has the 
authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from 
new light-duty cars and trucks, and has done so already 
in two consecutive rulemakings covering vehicles sold 
through model year 2025. In conjunction with EPA’s 
rulemaking, the Department of Transportation’s National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) may 
promulgate corporate average fuel economy (CAFE) 
standards regulating the average fuel efficiency of new 
vehicles. Because standards have already been issued 
covering light-duty vehicles through model year 2025, our 
analysis focuses on the time period after 2025. Table 5 
outlines the three scenarios, with the lackluster scenario 
projecting improvements at half the rate of the previous 
standards, middle-of-the-road projecting continuation of 
the same rate of improvement, and go-getter increasing 
the rate of improvement significantly.
2. Medium- and heavy-duty vehicles
For medium- and heavy-duty vehicles, EPA has 
established emissions standards and NHTSA has 
established fuel economy standards for model years 
2014 through 2018. These standards are included 
in our business-as-usual emissions trajectory. Our 
emissions reduction scenarios pick up in model year 
2020 using the same legal authority, but making 
different assumptions about the stringency of the next 
set of standards. As shown in Table 5, our lackluster 
scenario assumes a rate of improvement that is just 
half that of the current standards through 2035, 
middle-of-the-road projects a continuation of the 
current standards through 2035, and the go-getter 
scenario considerably increases new standards to meet 
the maximum level of efficiency currently thought to  
be technically achievable in that time frame.
3. Off-Highway engines
EPA may also regulate off-highway sources of global 
warming pollution under Title II of the Clean Air Act. 
For the lackluster, middle-of-the-road, and go-getter 
scenarios, respectively, the analysis assumes new 
standards can achieve 0.9 percent, 1.8 percent, and 
2.4 percent annual improvement in the emissions rate 
for new equipment and engines from 2018 to 2035.
4. Aviation and aircraft
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) may make 
operational improvements in the air traffic control 
system that could achieve significant carbon pollution 
reductions over time. We draw our assumptions about 
operational improvements from an EPA analysis of the 
reductions possible and the FAA’s comments on that 
analysis. Our scenarios, shown in Table 5, bound the 
range of reductions estimated by EPA and FAA.
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EPA has statutory authority under Title II of the 
Clean Air Act to promulgate standards to reduce 
emissions from new and existing aircraft engines. To 
date, EPA has never exercised that authority to require 
aircraft engine manufacturers to meet standards that 
the industry association has not previously adopted 
voluntarily. Nevertheless, our go-getter scenario, 
shown in Table 5, projects the emissions reductions 
that could be achieved if EPA were to pursue this 
regulatory course of action. 
F. INdUSTRy
Emissions from industrial facilities comprised  
13 percent of U.S. global warming pollution in 2010. 
Fossil fuel combustion at industrial facilities accounts 
for 9 percent of U.S. emissions, while non-combustion 
industrial processes account for 4 percent of emissions. 
When accounting for upstream, indirect CO2 emissions 
from power plants, the industrial sector is responsible 
for 23 percent of total U.S. GHG emissions.
EPA may regulate industrial stationary sources of 
emissions through performance standards under 
section 111 of the Clean Air Act. As with power 
L A C K L U S T e R M I D D L e - o F -T H e - R o A D G o - G e T T e R
Light-duty 
vehicles
Vehicle standards continue to improve 
from 2026–2035 at roughly half the 
rate of the 2017–2025 standards 
(2 percent per year). This results 
in a 131 grams per mile emissions 
standard and a 61 mpg CAFE 
standard in 2035.
Vehicle standards continue to improve 
from 2026–2035 at roughly the same 
rate as the 2017–2025 standards 
(4 percent per year). This results 
in a 104 gram per mile emissions 
standard and a 75 mpg CAFE 
standard in 2035.
Vehicle standards continue to improve 
from 2026–2035 at 6 percent 
annually. This results in a 81 grams 
per mile and a 92 mpg CAFE standard 
in 2035.
Medium- & 
heavy-duty 
vehicles
Standards continue to improve 
through 2035 at half the rate of the 
2013–2018 standards by vehicle 
category—about a 1.3 percent 
annual improvement. 
Standards continue to improve 
through 2035 at the same rate as 
the 2013–2018 standards by vehicle 
category—about a 2.6 percent 
annual improvement. 
By 2020–2022, the medium- and 
heavy-duty fleet reduces its 
emissions rate by an average 26 
percent and by 42 percent in 2023–
2025 compared to 2010. Standards 
continue to improve annually by 1 
percent through 2035. 
off-highway From 2018 to 2035, a 0.9 percent 
annual improvement in the emissions 
rate for new equipment and engines.
From 2018 to 2035, a 1.8 percent 
annual improvement in the emissions 
rate for new equipment and engines.
From 2018 to 2035, a 2.4 percent 
annual improvement in the emissions 
rate for new equipment and engines.
Aviation Through 2035, a 0.17 percent annual 
emissions reduction from operational 
improvements via FAA’s NextGen 
Program.
Through 2035, a 0.4 percent annual 
emissions reduction from operational 
improvements via FAA’s NextGen 
Program. 
Through 2035, a 1.4 percent annual 
emissions reduction from operational 
improvements via FAA’s NextGen 
Program, plus a 2.3 percent annual 
improvement in the performance of 
new aircraft and engines.
T A B L e  5  Vehicle emissions Standards, efficiency Standards, and operational Improvements 
F I G U R e  1 3   Industrial emissions
4%  other Industrial
9%  Industrial 
Combustion
0.3%  Adipic & Nitric Acid 
Manufacturing
As a Share of U.S. Emissions in 2010
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plants, this is accomplished through EPA’s setting of 
standards for new sources and issuing regulations that 
provide states with guidelines for covering existing 
sources. New source requirements typically take the 
form of a simple emissions rate, while regulation of 
existing sources can be more flexible.
1. Fossil fuel combustion in manufacturing  
and cement kilns
As with fossil-fuel burning power plants, reducing the 
GHG emissions profile of the industrial sector can be 
accomplished through improvements to the efficiency 
of boilers, fuel switching, and use of renewable energy 
such as biomass or geothermal, among other methods. 
Additional reductions are possible if regulations require 
a manufacturing facility to capture all cost-effective 
process efficiencies across an entire operation, beyond 
the boiler. Table 6 details the three scenarios analyzed 
for projecting possible reductions from the industrial 
sector. In addition, for the middle-of-the-road and go-
getter scenarios for cement kilns, we assume emissions 
standards are used to drive reductions in process 
emissions through greater use of blended cements, 
and potentially carbon capture and storage, achieving 
reductions in process emissions of 2 percent in 2020 
and 13 percent in 2035.
2. Petroleum refineries
EPA’s advanced notice of proposed rulemaking, 
Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean 
Air Act, indicated that efficiency improvements in 
refineries are possible in the range of 10 to 20 percent. 
Some efficiency improvements are included in our 
business-as-usual projections, however. Therefore, in 
order to generate conservative estimates of emissions 
reductions, starting in 2018 we model lackluster, middle-
of-the-road, and go-getter scenarios with reductions in 
annual GHG emissions of 1, 5, and 10 percent reductions 
beyond business-as-usual projections, respectively.
3. Nitric and adipic acid manufacturing
Nitric acid is primarily used as a feedstock for 
synthetic fertilizer, and also used to produce adipic acid 
and explosives. Adipic acid is used in the production of 
nylon and is a flavor enhancer in foods. The production 
of both compounds leads to emissions of nitrous oxide, 
a potent greenhouse gas. Though nitric and adipic acid 
manufacturing makes up less than 0.5 percent of total 
U.S. global warming pollution, there are opportunities 
to achieve dramatic reductions at low cost, making it a 
good target for policy.
To reduce emissions from acid manufacturing, EPA can 
use its authority under section 111 of the Clean Air 
Act to set standards for new manufacturing plants and 
issue guidelines to states to cover existing sources. Our 
L A C K L U S T e R M I D D L e - o F -T H e - R o A D G o - G e T T e R
Fossil-fuel 
combustion in 
manufacturing 
and cement 
kilns
Emissions reductions consistent 
with a 10 percent improvement in 
combustion efficiency by boilers.
Emissions reductions consistent 
with harnessing all cost-effective 
energy efficiency across all processes 
and energy uses at manufacturing 
facilities. Emissions standards also 
drive reductions in process emissions 
from cement kilns.
Emissions reductions consistent 
with harnessing all cost-effective 
energy efficiency across the entire 
manufacturing facility. All new units 
must meet emissions rate equivalent 
to natural gas combustion. Emissions 
standards also drive reductions in 
process emissions from cement kilns.
Refineries Emissions reductions consistent 
with a 1 percent improvement in 
efficiency beyond business-as-usual 
projections.
Emissions reductions consistent 
with a 5 percent improvement in 
efficiency beyond business-as-usual 
projections.
Emissions reductions consistent 
with a 10 percent improvement in 
efficiency beyond business-as-usual 
projections.
Nitric and 
adipic acid 
manufacturing
A 13 percent reduction in emissions. A 56 percent reduction in emissions. A 75 percent reduction in emissions.
T A B L e  6  Performance Standards to Reduce Industry emissions
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lackluster, middle-of-the-road and go-getter scenarios 
project reductions of annual GHG emissions of  
13 percent, 56 percent, and 75 percent, respectively, 
compared to the business-as-usual projections.
F I G U R e  1 4   Coal Mine emissions
1%  Coal Mining
As a Share of U.S. Emissions in 2010
G. COAL MINeS
Methane emissions from coal mines represented  
1 percent of total U.S. global warming pollution 
in 2010. EPA may regulate coal mines as a source 
category under section 111 of the Clean Air Act. As 
discussed above for power plants and industry, this 
would entail EPA issuing performance standards for 
new coal mines and regulations to guide states in their 
regulation of existing coal mines. The statute does not 
prescribe the specific form of regulations applied to 
existing sources. For the lackluster, middle-of-the-road, 
and go-getter scenarios, we projected reductions from 
coal mines of 24 percent, 32 percent, and 39 percent, 
respectively, compared to business-as-usual projections.
F I G U R e  1 5   Commercial & Residential Heating emissions
7%  Commercial  
and Residential  
Heating Fuel
As a Share of U.S. Emissions in 2010
H. COMMeRCIAL ANd ReSIdeNTIAL HeATING
Carbon pollution from commercial and residential 
heating, mostly through natural gas combustion, 
accounted for 7 percent of U.S. emissions in 2010. 
This includes things such as home heating, cooking, 
and water heating. The most effective way to 
decrease emissions in this sector is to improve the 
building envelope—a path traditionally the province 
of state and local governments in the United States. 
However, the federal government can promulgate 
efficiency standards for appliances and equipment used 
to heat buildings. Based on our survey of the available 
literature, we conclude that efficiency standards 
implemented in 2015 could reduce natural gas demand 
by 126 Trillion British thermal units (TBtu) in 2025  
and 235 TBtu in 2035, reducing GHG emissions by  
6.7 million tons of CO2 in 2025 and 12.5 million tons 
CO2 in 2035 compared to business-as-usual projections. 
Due to limitations in the available literature, we project 
the same reductions level for all three scenarios.
F I G U R e  1 6   Landfill emissions
2%  Landfills
As a Share of U.S. Emissions in 2010
I. LANdFILLS
Methane emissions from landfills represented 2 percent of 
total U.S. global warming pollution in 2010. EPA already 
regulates emissions of volatile organic compounds from 
landfills under section 111 of the Clean Air Act. These 
standards provide the co-benefit of reducing methane 
emissions. EPA could either strengthen those standards or 
establish new standards for GHG emissions. The statute 
does not prescribe the form of regulations applied to 
existing sources. For the lackluster, middle-of-the-road, 
and go-getter scenarios, we projected reductions of 5 
percent, 9 percent, and 9 percent, respectively, compared 
to our business-as-usual projections. The reductions we 
L A C K L U S T e R M I D D L e - o F -T H e - R o A D G o - G e T T e R
Fossil-fuel 
combustion in 
manufacturing 
and cement 
kilns
Emissions reductions consistent 
with a 10 percent improvement in 
combustion efficiency by boilers.
Emissions reductions consistent 
with harnessing all cost-effective 
energy efficiency across all processes 
and energy uses at manufacturing 
facilities. Emissions standards also 
drive reductions in process emissions 
from cement kilns.
Emissions reductions consistent 
with harnessing all cost-effective 
energy efficiency across the entire 
manufacturing facility. All new units 
must meet emissions rate equivalent 
to natural gas combustion. Emissions 
standards also drive reductions in 
process emissions from cement kilns.
Refineries Emissions reductions consistent 
with a 1 percent improvement in 
efficiency beyond business-as-usual 
projections.
Emissions reductions consistent 
with a 5 percent improvement in 
efficiency beyond business-as-usual 
projections.
Emissions reductions consistent 
with a 10 percent improvement in 
efficiency beyond business-as-usual 
projections.
Nitric and 
adipic acid 
manufacturing
A 13 percent reduction in emissions. A 56 percent reduction in emissions. A 75 percent reduction in emissions.
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project for landfills in this report are substantially smaller 
than the reductions projected in the 2010 report. These 
differences are attributable to changes in the EPA data 
used in the analysis.
V.  Understanding the  
State Reduction Pathways
Policy action to address environmental challenges 
frequently begins at the state level, and greenhouse 
gases are no exception. States were the first to push 
ambitious emissions standards for vehicles, adopt 
greenhouse gas regulations for the power sector, and 
establish economy-wide reduction targets. Many states 
already have programs that reduce emissions from 
transportation, improve energy efficiency, and promote 
renewable generation. In the state scenarios, we 
examine what would happen if states continue to adopt 
policies that reduce their GHG footprint. 
A. ABOUT THe STATeS APPROACH
The state analysis takes a two-pronged approach. 
First, we project the potential greenhouse gas 
emissions reductions from transportation, end-use 
energy efficiency, and renewable electricity policies 
typically undertaken by states. Second, we consider the 
potential for state action in areas we also consider for 
the federal government, such as emissions standards 
for power plants and industry. This is based on the 
observation that the Constitution grants states 
broad authority to regulate their energy sources and 
emissions. States thus have the ability to implement 
many of the same policies as federal agencies.
In this analysis, the difference between lackluster and 
go-getter action at the state level is a function of the 
number and size of the states that adopt the measures 
modeled, and in some cases the ambition of the 
policies pursued. Unlike the federal analysis, in some 
cases state action would require new state legislation. 
However, we did not attempt to determine which states 
would require new legislation to implement the state 
measures and which states could implement without 
new legislation. A detailed discussion of our state 
methods is provided in Appendix II.
In addition to the direct emission reduction opportunities 
modeled here, state-level action can help trigger more 
ambitious action at the federal level. In the words of Justice 
Brandeis, states can serve as “laboratories of democracy,” 
testing out approaches that provide possible models for 
federal action. Action at the state level can also lead to 
broader support for federal action, with the most ambitious 
states helping establish a floor for federal ambition.
F I G U R e  1 7   Projected U.S emissions when States Pursue the Full Range of Policies within their Authority  
(No Federal Action)
Note: Due to modeling limitations, this figure depicts HFC consumption, which is generally thought to be equivalent to life-cycle emissions.
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B. TRANSPORTATION
As noted above, the transport sector is responsible 
for about 30 percent of GHG emissions in the United 
States, making it the second largest emitting sector 
behind power plants. State and local policies have 
traditionally played a significant role in transportation, 
and as a result we project reductions that states might 
be able to achieve in this area, including through 
policies to encourage the use of lower carbon fuels and 
reduce vehicle miles traveled.
1. Lower Carbon Fuels
States may establish requirements for the fuels 
delivered in their jurisdictions to reduce the carbon 
profile of those fuels. To project potential reductions 
through state policies that reduce the life-cycle 
emissions of transportation fuels, we do not select 
specific policies in specific states. Rather, we model 
percent improvements in the carbon profile of fuels 
generally. These general improvements in the carbon 
profile of fuels are a proxy for what is likely to be a 
diverse set of measures across numerous states. 
For modeling purposes, we assume that those policies 
further reduce the average life-cycle carbon intensity 
of transportation fuels by 1 percent per year between 
2015 and 2035. In the lackluster scenario, we assume 
this annual reduction is achieved by states accounting 
for 15 percent of total energy consumption from U.S. 
transportation fuels. In the middle-of-the-road and  
go-getter scenarios, we assume that these policies  
are pursued by states accounting for 25 percent and  
35 percent of total U.S. transportation fuel 
consumption, respectively.18 
2. Reducing Vehicle Miles Traveled
States play a big role in designing and implementing 
policies that directly impact the number of vehicle 
miles traveled. These include smart growth strategies, 
such as targeting new development near public 
transportation, favoring infill, limiting sprawl, mixed-
use development, and provision of smartly located 
affordable housing options. These strategies can be 
complemented by a variety of strategies, including 
improving and expanding public transportation options, 
bike and pedestrian pathways, car sharing, and HOV 
lanes, as well as through speed limit restrictions, 
intercity tolls, and strategies to limit driving within 
urban centers (e.g., parking restrictions).
In our lackluster and middle-of-the-road scenarios, 
we assume that states that implement policies and 
programs achieve VMT reductions of 0.5 percent 
per year beginning in 2016, leading to a 10 percent 
reduction below business-as-usual projections in 2035. 
18.   See Appendix II for context about what it would take to achieve the 
state uptake in this and the other state scenarios.
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Reduce carbon 
content of fuels by 
1 percent per year 
from 2015 to 2035
 O Low-carbon fuel 
standard
 O Clean fuel standard
 O Advanced biofuels 
standard
 O Infrastructure 
incentives
States accounting for  
15 percent of transportation 
fuel consumption 
implement measures to 
achieve a reduction.
States accounting for  
25 percent of transportation 
fuel consumption 
implement measures to 
achieve a reduction.
States accounting for  
35 percent of transportation 
fuel consumption 
implement measures to 
achieve a reduction.
Vehicle miles 
traveled reductions 
of 0.5 or 1 percent 
per year from 2016 
to 2035
 O Smart growth
 O Improved public 
transit
 O Pedestrian and 
biking infrastructure
 O Improved traffic 
systems operations
States accounting for  
15 percent of GHG 
emissions from light-
duty vehicles implement 
measures to achieve a 
reduction of 0.5 percent 
per year.
States accounting for  
25 percent of GHG 
emissions from light-
duty vehicles implement 
measures to achieve a 
reduction of 0.5 percent 
per year.
States accounting for  
35 percent of GHG 
emissions from light-
duty vehicles implement 
measures to achieve a 
reduction of 1 percent  
per year.
T A B L e  7  State Transportation Measures
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This is on the conservative end of the range found in 
the state programs under way. Therefore, in our  
go-getter scenario we assume that states reduce VMT  
1 percent per year. We assume that these policies and 
programs are implemented by states accounting for  
15, 25, and 35 percent of GHG emissions from light-
duty vehicles in our lackluster, middle-of-the-road, and 
go-getter scenarios, respectively.
C. eNeRGy eFFICIeNCy
Energy efficiency measures avoid the need to use fossil 
fuels and save consumers money, creating significant 
economic benefits.19 States are on the front lines in 
designing and implementing programs to enhance 
energy efficiency, both for end-use electricity and 
heating fuels. Our analysis projects the emissions 
reductions states may achieve implementing energy 
efficiency programs, building codes, and the increased 
penetration of combined heat and power. Each type of 
measure is outlined below. 
1. electricity Savings
States have been the primary drivers of end-use energy 
efficiency within their borders. Many states have 
implemented energy efficiency portfolio standards 
and/or other ratepayer-funded programs to fund 
energy efficiency investments. Other states have 
sought to integrate energy efficiency into the process 
for procuring new generation resources (e.g., in the 
context of long-term resource planning), so that energy 
efficiency can compete as a viable alternative to more 
traditional generating resources. 
To project potential emissions reductions from 
increased state-level energy efficiency policies, we 
made different assumptions about states with and 
without such policies. We assume that some states  
with and without existing energy efficiency targets 
adopt policies and programs that lead to electricity 
savings beginning in 2015. Both the rate of savings 
and the number of states covered varies across the 
scenarios, as shown in Table 8.
2. Natural Gas Savings
A number of states have also begun to implement 
energy efficiency programs targeted at natural gas 
consumption. These programs can resemble those for 
electricity savings, taking the form of energy efficiency 
portfolio standards or system benefit charges. As with 
the electricity savings scenarios, we assume that some 
states with targets increase those targets, and that 
some states without targets implement those targets. 
The scenarios are shown in Table 8.
3. Improving Building Performance
States and municipalities are generally responsible for 
adopting and updating state and local building energy 
codes, which apply to new construction and major 
renovations. Responsibility for enforcing these codes 
is part of the states’ police powers. In our lackluster 
scenario, we assume that states accounting for 10 
percent of the energy consumed by the building sector 
implement more ambitious building codes. In our 
middle-of-the-road and go-getter scenarios, we assume 
that states accounting for 30 and 50 percent of the 
energy consumed by the building sector implement 
more ambitious building codes, respectively.
4. Increased Penetration of Combined Heat and Power
The U.S. electricity system is designed to 
accommodate large central station power plants 
located away from the electricity customers. Fossil-
fuel generating plants operate at 30 to 60 percent 
efficiency, wasting significant energy in unused heat 
from the combustion process. Combined heat and 
power (CHP), or cogeneration, is a form of distributed 
generation located at or very near end-use customers 
that captures and puts waste heat to beneficial use.
States have been at the forefront in driving the 
spread of CHP. They have done so through a variety 
of policies, including standard interconnection rules, 
reduced standby rates, net metering policies, friendly 
air quality regulations (such as output-based emissions 
regulations), technical assistance programs, and 
various financial incentives.20  In our lackluster, 
middle-of-the-road, and go-getter scenarios, we 
assume that state action results in deployment of an 
additional 10, 20, and 40 GW of new CHP by 2025, 
respectively, beyond business-as-usual projections.21
20.  Challenges Facing Combined Heat and Power Today: A State-by-State 
Assessment. ACEEE Report Number IE111, September 2011.
21.   In the go-getter scenario, we assume that state action results in 
deployment of 27 GW of CHP in 2020, in addition to the 13 GW built 
into our business-as-usual projections. Combined, they result in CHP 
deployment consistent with the executive order target of 40 GW of new 
CHP by 2020.
19.  The Long-Term Energy Efficiency Potential: What the Evidence 
Suggests. American Council for an Energy Efficient Economy, Research 
Report E121, January 2012. Accessible at: < http://www.aceee.org/
research-report/e121>. 
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Electricity savings 
from states with  
EE targets
 O Energy efficiency 
resource standards
 O System benefit charge 
funds or other funds
 O Least-cost 
procurement 
requirements
States responsible for 
75 percent of electricity 
consumption that have 
annual energy efficiency 
targets below 1.5 percent 
increase their annual 
target to 1.5 percent from 
2015 to 2035.
States responsible for 
75 percent of electricity 
consumption that have 
annual energy efficiency 
targets below 2 percent 
increase their annual 
targets to 2 percent from 
2015 to 2035.
States responsible for 
75 percent of electricity 
consumption that have 
annual energy efficiency 
targets below 2.5 percent 
increase their annual 
targets to 2.5 percent from 
2015 to 2035.
Electricity savings 
from states without 
EE targets
States responsible for 
25 percent of electricity 
consumption achieve 
electricity savings of  
1 percent of total demand 
per year from 2015  
to 2035.
States responsible for 
25 percent of electricity 
consumption achieve 
electricity savings of  
1.5 percent of total 
demand per year from 2015 
to 2035.
States responsible for 
50 percent of electricity 
consumption achieve 
electricity savings of  
1.5 percent of total 
demand per year from  
2015 to 2035.
Natural gas savings 
from states with  
EE targets
 O Energy efficiency 
resource standards
 O System benefit charge 
funds or other funds
States responsible for  
25 percent of  natural gas 
consumption that have 
energy efficiency targets 
below 1 percent achieve 
savings of 1 percent of 
total demand per year from 
2015 to 2035.
States responsible for  
50 percent of natural gas 
consumption that have 
energy efficiency targets 
below 1 percent achieve 
savings of 1 percent of 
total demand per year from 
2015 to 2035.
States responsible for  
75 percent of natural gas 
consumption that have 
energy efficiency targets 
below 1.5 percent achieve 
savings of 1.5 percent of 
total demand per year  
from 2015 to 2035.
Natural gas savings 
from states without 
EE targets
States responsible for  
10 percent of natural 
gas consumption achieve 
natural gas savings of  
1 percent of total demand 
per year from 2015  
to 2035.
States responsible for  
25 percent of natural 
gas consumption achieve 
natural gas savings of  
1 percent of total demand 
per year from 2015  
to 2035.
States responsible for  
50 percent of natural 
gas consumption achieve 
natural gas savings of  
1.5 percent of total 
demand per year from  
2015 to 2035.
Reduced energy 
consumption  
in buildings
 O Commercial and 
residential building 
codes
 O Financial incentives
States accounting for 
10 percent of the energy 
consumed by the building 
sector implement more 
ambitious building codes.
States accounting for 
30 percent of the energy 
consumed by the building 
sector implement more 
ambitious building codes.
States accounting for 
50 percent of the energy 
consumed by the building 
sector implement more 
ambitious building codes.
Increased 
penetration of 
combined heat  
and power
 O Standard 
interconnection rules 
 O Reduced standby rates 
 O Net metering policies
 O Output-based 
emissions regulations 
State action results 
in deployment of an 
additional 10 GW of new 
CHP beyond business-as-
usual projections by 2025.
State action results 
in deployment of an 
additional 20 GW of new 
CHP beyond business-as-
usual projections by 2025.
State action results 
in deployment of an 
additional 40 GW of new 
CHP beyond business-as-
usual projections by 2025. 
T A B L e  8  State energy efficiency Measures
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d. ReNeWABLe eLeCTRICITy GeNeRATION
Similar to energy efficiency, state policies have been 
major drivers of renewable electricity generation in the 
United States. Twenty-nine states and the District of 
Columbia have renewable energy portfolio standards 
or advanced energy standards. Numerous states also 
support distributed or customer-sited renewables 
as part of their RPS or through other ratepayer-
funded programs. In order to capture the reductions 
possible from states taking new or additional action to 
increase renewable generation serving their residents, 
we assumed that a certain number of states without 
renewable energy targets add 0.5 percent renewables 
per year beginning in 2015. For those states that 
already have renewables targets, we assumed they 
continued to add 1 percent a year to those targets 
after the target is achieved. Table 9 provides details on 
differences across the scenarios.
e.  WHeN STATeS TAKe  
A MORe exPANSIVe TACK
States have broad authority to regulate energy sources 
and emissions within their boundaries. They may 
therefore implement many of the same policies that 
we ascribe to the federal government in the federal 
analysis. In determining what reductions states might 
make in the future, the analysis considers not only 
traditional state energy policies, but also scenarios in 
which states decide to approach carbon pollution more 
expansively. For example, the states participating in 
the Northeast and Mid-Atlantic Regional Greenhouse 
Gas Initiative (RGGI) have chosen to design and 
implement a multistate cap-and-trade program to 
reduce carbon pollution from power plants in their 
states. Other states could join them, or take alternative 
approaches to reducing carbon pollution from power 
plants. The most significant example of this is 
California, which has taken an expansive approach to 
reducing GHGs in its Global Warming Solutions Act of 
2006 and the regulations adopted under that law.
Because it is hard to predict which other states, if any, 
will pursue ambitious standards for greenhouse gases, 
we modeled more broad-based action by assuming a 
portion of total national emissions within each sector 
would be covered by the reduction measures analyzed 
for the federal government in section IV above. In 
the lackluster, middle-of-the-road, and go-getter 
scenarios, we assume these measures are adopted by 
states accounting for 10, 25, and 50 percent of GHG 
emissions from a given sector, respectively.
These approaches include state action for all sectors 
discussed in the federal action section, except for those 
policies that are ill-suited for state implementation. We 
deemed policies that eliminate HFCs, regulate off-highway 
vehicles, adopt appliance and equipment efficiency 
standards where federal standards already exist, or 
regulate aviation to be ill-suited to state implementation 
because they are preempted by federal law.
It is important to note that we vary both the number of 
states taking action and the level of ambition they each 
pursue. In all sectors, the level of ambition pursued is 
the same as the ambition defined in the federal scenario 
described in Section IV. Therefore, in our lackluster 
scenario for power plants, we assume states accounting 
for 10 percent of GHG emissions from the power sector 
L A C K L U S T e R M I D D L e - o F -T H e - R o A D G o - G e T T e R
Increased 
renewables 
from states 
with renewables 
targets
States responsible for 25 percent of 
electricity consumption increase their 
renewable generation by 1 percent 
annually after the last year for which 
a standard is set.
States responsible for 50 percent of 
electricity consumption increase their 
renewable generation by 1 percent 
annually after the last year for which 
a standard is set.
States responsible for 75 percent of 
electricity consumption increase their 
renewable generation by 1 percent 
annually after the last year for which 
a standard is set.
Increased 
renewables from 
states without 
renewables 
targets
States responsible for 10 percent of 
electricity consumption increase their 
renewable generation 0.5 percent 
annually beginning in 2015.
States responsible for 25 percent of 
electricity consumption increase their 
renewable generation 0.5 percent 
annually beginning in 2015.
States responsible for 50 percent of 
electricity consumption increase their 
renewable generation 0.5 percent 
annually beginning in 2015.
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implement policies equivalent to the lackluster scenario 
for federal action. In our go-getter scenario, we assume 
states accounting for 50 percent of GHG emissions from 
the power sector implement policies equivalent to the 
go-getter scenario for federal action.
VI.  Conclusion: Finding our way  
to a Low-Carbon Future
The enormous economic and social costs of climate 
disruption are increasingly evident in the United 
States. Yet the urgency conveyed by the mounting 
evidence is not yet reflected in U.S. federal and state 
actions or climate policies. The United States is not 
currently on path to meet its international pledge to 
reduce GHG emissions to 17 percent below 2005 levels 
by 2020, though it could meet this goal with go-getter 
action by the U.S. Administration under current laws. 
In order to achieve adequate mid-century reductions, 
it appears almost certain that the U.S. Congress will 
eventually have to enact new legislation aimed at 
getting deep reductions. Ultimately, a cooperative 
approach bringing together Congress, states, and 
the executive branch will be necessary for the United 
States to do its part.
States can contribute to U.S. emissions reductions, 
both through state-level transportation, energy 
efficiency, and renewables programs, as well as 
through new legislative efforts to initiate a wide array 
of other policies aimed at reducing GHGs. It appears 
unlikely that state actions alone will put the United 
States on the necessary course. However, they can help 
complement federal action, and can enable the United 
States to meet its 17 percent target if federal agencies 
fail to pursue go-getter-level action.
Key ReCOMMeNdATIONS
 O In the short term, federal agencies and the states 
should aggressively move forward with a “go-
getter” emissions reduction scenario. This will 
necessitate taking action in the following key areas 
that present the greatest opportunities for GHG 
emissions reductions through 2020:
 O EPA and the states should focus on achieving 
significant reductions in carbon pollution from 
power plants and natural gas systems.
 O For power plants, EPA should finalize 
its proposed greenhouse gas emissions 
standards for new power plants and should 
move ahead with flexible and ambitious 
standards for existing power plants. States 
should move ahead with measures to 
reduce emissions from the power sector, 
such as increasing the use of renewable 
power and cogeneration and reducing 
electricity demand.
 O For natural gas systems, EPA and 
the states should propose rules that 
address methane as a greenhouse 
gas pollutant, which can result in 
significant reduction of methane leakage 
throughout the natural gas life cycle. 
Such rules would complement the 
volatile organic compound and air toxics 
rules established in 2012 for natural 
gas systems that have the co-benefit of 
reducing methane leakage.
 O The State Department should continue to seek 
reductions in hydrofluorocarbons through 
amendments to the Montreal Protocol. But, 
in the meantime, EPA should begin reducing 
consumption in the United States using its 
authority under the Clean Air Act.
 O EPA and the states should also work to 
improve energy efficiency in the residential, 
commercial, and industrial sectors.
 O Over time, we will need to see reductions from 
all sectors, and the Administration should use 
its existing authorities to achieve go-getter-level 
reductions across the economy.
 O Even with go-getter-level action, however, 
reductions will fall short of the long-term targets 
necessary to avoid the worst impacts of climate 
disruption. As a result, congressional action will  
be necessary.
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Uncertainties associated with the methods and results of this analysis include:
O	 			Uncertainties inherent in the models. As with 
any modeling analysis of this sort, there is significant 
uncertainty in projecting the future. The analysis relies 
heavily on the Energy Information Administration’s Annual 
Energy Outlook 2012, which attempts to project energy  
and emissions trends into the future based on a number  
of assumptions, including likely fuel costs, economic 
activity, and source turnover rates. There are also 
considerable uncertainties in the estimates of fugitive 
emissions from natural gas systems. All projections are 
only as good as the assumptions that go into them and  
the quality of the data modeled. 
O	 			Regulatory impetus. As the different scenarios 
suggest, a major uncertainty in the analysis is whether 
the federal administration will carry out the regulatory 
actions in a manner sufficient to achieve the reductions 
that available studies suggest are technically feasible.  
The lackluster, middle-of-the-road, and go-getter 
scenarios stand for different levels of regulatory ambition. 
The go-getter scenario, it should be emphasized, will 
require steadfast resolve on the part of the Administration 
and the states. 
O	 			Congressional action. Federal agencies depend on  
the U.S. Congress for their budgets. In order to carry out 
a series of new regulatory actions, federal agencies will 
require sufficient resources through the annual budget 
process. In addition, it should be noted that existing 
authorities can be curtailed through new legislation.
O	 			Legal risk. The assumptions made in this analysis were 
informed by sound legal analysis and vetted with legal 
experts in the field. Nevertheless, when federal agencies 
take new actions under existing statutes, the new actions 
are often challenged in federal court on the grounds that 
the agency has exceeded the authority originally granted 
to it in the statute. It is impossible to predict with any 
precision whether the challenges will be successful.
O	 			Technological development. The results modeled 
depend in part on the development and deployment of  
new technologies over time. Indeed, many of the regulatory 
policies are technology-based and must be revised by 
federal agencies as technology progresses. If technologies 
emerge rapidly, emissions reductions are more likely. 
Conversely, if technologies are slow to appear, emissions 
reductions will slow. This uncertainty is especially 
important further out into the future.
B o x  4  Risks and Uncertainties
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B o x  S - 2  Greenhouse Gas emissions Reductions from Federal Action
The majority of potential GHG benefits come from 
actions taken in the power sector, energy efficiency 
improvements, reducing HFC consumption, and reducing 
methane emissions from natural gas systems. These 
actions represent between 80 and 93 percent of potential 
GHG reductions across all scenarios in 2020 and 2035, and 
are necessary to achieve a 17 percent reduction below 2005 
GHG emissions levels. 
F I G U R e  S - 2   Greenhouse Gas emissions Reductions  
from Federal Action, in million metric tons 
F I G U R e  S - 3   Greenhouse Gas emissions Reductions from  
Federal Action, as a percent of total reductions 
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B o x  S - 1  Greenhouse Gas emissions Reductions from State Action Coupled with Lackluster Federal Action
F I G U R e  S - 1   Projected U.S emissions with State Action Coupled  
with Lackluster Federal Action
If the U.S. Administration pursues 
a lackluster effort, go-getter state 
action will not be sufficient to make 
up the emissions gap and reduce GHG 
emissions 17 percent below 2005 
levels by 2020. However, as shown in 
Figure 2, the 17 percent GHG reduction 
goal can be achieved with a state go-
getter effort along with middle-of-the-
road federal action. State action with 
go-getter federal action is not shown, as 
it does not provide significant reductions 
above and beyond other combinations 
of state and federal action that were 
considered as a result of the way the 
scenarios are defined.
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Note: Figure depicts changes in consumption of HFCs.
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B o x  S - 3  Greenhouse Gas emissions Reductions from State Action only
Improvements in the power sector largely drive reductions 
in all of the scenarios that examine the impact of 
state actions without any new federal actions. This is 
accomplished through a combination of GHG performance 
standards, renewable and energy efficiency standards, building 
codes, and policies to promote combined heat and power. In 
our scenarios those actions can alleviate the demand for up to 
1,280 terra watt-hours of conventional sources of electricity in 
2035. This is offset to a limited extent through increased vehicle 
electrification, which increases demand by up to 66 terra watt-
hours of electricity in 2035.
States can implement many of the same types of policies as 
federal agencies. They can also take additional actions that 
increase electric efficiency, renewable electricity generation, 
building performance, and combined heat and power penetration.
However, states are less well-equipped to reduce HFC 
consumption, adopt appliance and equipment efficiency 
standards where federal standards already exist, and to drive 
reductions in GHG emissions from off-highway vehicles and 
aviation. As a result, under our scenarios, state action alone 
is insufficient to achieve the near-term and long-term GHG 
reduction targets.
F I G U R e  S - 5   Greenhouse Gas emissions Reductions  
from State Action, in million metric tons 
F I G U R e  S - 6   Greenhouse Gas emissions Reductions 
from State Action, as a percent of total 
reductions from state actions
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F I G U R e  S - 4   State Actions that Affect electricity Supply 
and Demand
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Appendix i: Federal Methods
I. Overview
This analysis projects the range of greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions reductions achievable through 
regulations and policies implemented by federal 
agencies under existing federal law and by states 
under existing or new state laws. This assessment 
builds on our 2010 report, which began by examining 
the 2008 national emissions inventory to determine 
the major sources of emissions. The 2010 report 
examined both the boundaries of existing federal law 
and evaluated the published literature to determine 
the level of emissions reductions achievable from 
sources in key sectors and subsectors. Due to the 
difficulty in predicting how federal agencies will act 
within the bounds of their legal authority, we continue 
the approach from our 2010 report, which defines 
three scenarios meant to capture a range of potential 
reductions in each sector or subsector. Reflecting the 
available literature, we have defined the scenarios 
to span a range of different costs, technological 
assumptions, and types of policies. 
Our literature survey examined government and 
independent reports. We focused on those analyses 
whose scale was translatable to our model inputs. For 
example, we focused on studies of entire industrial 
categories (such as pulp and paper) and not process 
components (such as steam cracking). We also 
relied more heavily on studies that provided some 
assessment of cost in order to provide a sense of the 
federal regulatory resolve necessary to achieve those 
reductions. Where a federal agency has provided 
preliminary estimates of the reductions achievable 
through regulatory activity, we have attempted to 
incorporate those estimates into one of the scenarios. 
This analysis contains bottom-up analyses of both 
federal and state action, assessing the total emissions 
reductions achievable through regulatory actions and 
policies sector by sector. This appendix provides a 
summary of the federal analysis. Appendix II provides 
details on the state analysis.
We calculated the emissions reductions associated 
with each scenario using an Excel-based model that 
utilizes publicly available detailed emissions reports, 
as well as outputs from a publicly available off-
the-shelf transportation model (Argonne National 
Laboratory’s VISION model). Most sectoral analyses 
were independent and did not interact with each other; 
for example, reductions in coal or natural gas demand 
from one set of policies did not affect utilization of 
those fuels in another sector. We account for changes 
in electric demand through an electric demand 
module that selectively turned units on and off in a 
predetermined manner (see Section III.C for more 
information). We also account for changes in emissions 
from refineries and natural gas systems due to changes 
in demand for petroleum products and natural gas, 
respectively.
In the pages that follow we describe the base case, 
modeling assumptions, and scenarios.
II. Base Case
The base case, or “business-as-usual” case, was 
developed using several different projections. Carbon 
dioxide (CO2) emissions from fossil fuel combustion 
come from the U.S. Energy Information’s (EIA’s) 
Annual Energy Outlook 2012 (AEO2012). Non-CO2 
emissions projections were obtained from EPA’s Draft 
Global Non-CO2 Emissions Projections Report: 1990–
2030.1 Non-energy CO2 emissions projections were 
obtained from EPA’s ADAGE model reference scenario, 
as developed for their analysis of HR 2454, the 
American Climate and Energy Security Act of 2009.2 
The base case emissions projections for natural gas 
systems come from analysis conducted for Clearing the 
Air on Shale Gas Emissions: Assessing and Reducing 
the Carbon Footprint of Natural Gas, a forthcoming 
WRI working paper that examines emissions and 
abatement opportunities for natural gas systems.3 
Base case emissions in this report are lower than the 
base case projections in our 2010 report Reducing 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions in the United States Using 
Existing Federal Authorities and State Action (see 
Figure A-1.1). This is largely due to reductions in CO2 
emissions from fossil fuel combustion, driven by a 
variety of factors, including lower natural gas prices, 
less optimistic economic projections, and new standards 
for power plants and light-, medium-, and heavy-duty 
vehicles. In addition, new standards for natural gas 
systems have reduced projections of methane emissions.
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f I g u r e  A - 1 . 1    Comparison of Base Case emissions 
Projections (2010 v. 2013 Analysis)
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A. eiA AeO2012
The AEO is updated annually and is one of the leading 
sources of economy-wide energy emissions projections 
through 2035. Data outputs are disaggregated, and 
more detailed data tables are publicly available upon 
request, making this an attractive starting point. The 
2035 timeline provides enough time to see noticeable 
impacts from unit turnover. Longer time frames would 
allow for greater unit turnover, but were not desirable 
due to the considerable uncertainty in predicting 
technological availability in future time frames. 
AEO2012 incorporates updated economic projections, 
which include a slightly lower growth in GDP through 
2035 compared to previous projections. Increases in 
the natural gas supply, along with lower natural gas 
prices, are also incorporated into this AEO. It also 
incorporates several new rules and regulations not 
included in AEO2009, which was used in our previous 
report. These include (in a side case) standards for 
light-, medium-, and heavy-duty vehicles, as well 
as several regulations affecting the power sector. 
AEO2012 is described in greater detail in the sections 
that follow. 
B.  epA’S dRAFT GLOBAL nOn-CO2 eMiSSiOnS 
pROJeCTiOnS RepORT: 1990–2030
The AEO does not generally include non-energy and 
non-CO2 emissions. Non-CO2 emission projections 
for all sources, except for natural gas and petroleum 
systems and HFC consumption, came from EPA’s 
Draft Global Non-CO2 Emissions Projections Report: 
1990–2030.4 In this report, EPA developed country-
specific emissions projections using assumptions about 
economic activity, technology development, emissions 
reduction programs and agreements, and other 
factors. Results were provided in five-year intervals. 
We estimated emissions between the five-year intervals 
by applying a linear rate of change. Emissions for 2030 
through 2035 were estimated by applying the same 
rate of change observed from 2025 to 2030.
C. AdAGe
Non-energy CO2 emissions projections come from the 
Applied Dynamic Analysis of the Global Economy 
(ADAGE) reference scenario of EPA’s modeling of 
the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 
(ACES).5 ADAGE is a dynamic computable general 
equilibrium model run by RTI International.6 ADAGE 
projects emissions in five-year intervals from 2010 to 
2050. To estimate emissions between those intervals, 
we applied a linear rate of change between intervals. 
EPA does not run the ADAGE model annually, but does 
so in response to congressional requests. For purposes 
of this report, we are using the most recent publically 
available results. 
d. AddiTiOnAL dATA SOURCeS
Base case emissions projections for natural gas 
systems come from analysis conducted for Clearing 
the Air on Shale Gas Emissions, a forthcoming WRI 
working paper that examines emissions and abatement 
opportunities for natural gas systems.7 Their base case 
projections were developed using EPA’s Inventory of 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks 20128, shale gas 
production projections from AEO2012, and emissions 
factors from Life Cycle Carbon Footprint of Shale Gas: 
Review of Evidence and Implications.9 This report only 
considers abatement opportunities from natural gas 
systems. However, because EPA’s Draft Global Non-
CO2 Emissions Projections Report: 1990-2030 lumped 
natural gas systems with petroleum systems, we also 
developed projections for petroleum systems using 
historical emissions10 and historical production data,11 
as well as projected production data.12
Base case projections for HFC consumption come from 
EPA’s Benefits of Addressing HFCs under the Montreal 
Protocol.13 Additional discussion of this approach is 
provided in Section V.C. on hydrofluorocarbons.
Aspects of the transportation analysis require 
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assumptions about the vehicle fleet, including stock 
turnover. For this part of the analysis, we used Argonne 
National Laboratory’s VISION model,14 adjusting their 
base case to incorporate the latest EPA and NHTSA 
standards for light-duty vehicles.
e.  nOTe ABOUT GLOBAL  
WARMinG pOTenTiALS
Where possible, we have attempted to provide emissions 
and consumption estimates using the latest state of 
the science, as reported in the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) Fourth Assessment 
Report. Several data sources—including EPA’s Draft 
Global Non-CO2 Emissions Projections Report: 1990-
2030—utilize the global warming potential estimates 
reported in IPCC’s Second Assessment Report. This 
is done in order to be consistent with international 
reporting standards under UNFCCC. We do not follow 
this convention, however, and instead seek to use a 
more accurate accounting of the actual global warming 
impact of the different gases. This allows for a more 
accurate accounting of the actual GHG impacts of new 
policies as well as inaction. 
Unfortunately, we could not update all gases to the 
global warming potentials reported in the Fourth 
Assessment Report. Detailed speciation is not available 
for projections of F-gases, and therefore it was 
not possible to accurately update their projections. 
Therefore, we did not update historical emissions 
for F-gases in order to remain consistent with our 
approach for projected emissions.
III. Power Plants
A.  GReenHOUSe GAS  
peRFORMAnCe STAndARdS
1. Base Case
Modeling of the electric sector was based on the 
AEO2012 reference case and utilized detailed 
AEO2012 outputs provided by the U.S. Energy 
Information Administration (EIA) that indicate annual 
capacity, generation, consumption, and emissions 
changes by technology type.15 AEO2012 projects 
that end-use efficiency will increase over time, and 
the emissions intensity of generation will decrease. 
However, it also predicts that electric demand will 
grow from 3.8 trillion kWh in 2010 to 4.7 trillion kWh 
in 2035, resulting in an increase in CO2 emissions to 
2.3 billion metric tons in 2035, which is 3 percent 
above 2010 levels.16
 
The AEO2012 reference case includes mandatory 
state renewable portfolio standards, the Northeastern 
and Mid-Atlantic Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 
(RGGI), and California Assembly Bill 32 (AB32).17 It 
also includes the Mercury and Air Toxics Standard 
(MATS) issued by the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) in December 2011, as well as the 
Cross-State Air Pollution Rule (CSAPR) finalized 
by EPA in July 2011, which reduces sulfur dioxide 
(SO2) and nitrous oxide (NOx) emissions from power 
plants. CSAPR was vacated by the Federal Circuit 
Court for the D.C. Circuit in August 2012, marking 
an inconsistency between the model assumptions and 
real-world regulatory requirements for power plants. 
EPA has petitioned for a rehearing of the CSAPR 
appeal en banc and is expected to appeal the DC 
Few performance standards for existing units have been 
issued to date, and thus far there are no such standards that 
cover greenhouse gases. In modeling the impact of any future 
standards, we made certain assumptions about the timing 
of the implementation of those standards. That timeline is 
described below. EPA announced their intention to establish 
emissions standards for existing power plants and refineries in 
December 2010. Therefore, for modeling purposes we assume 
that some of the background analysis has been done and that 
it would be possible for those standards to take effect within 
five years; that is, beginning in 2018.
B O x  A - 1  modeling new source Performance standards under section 111 of the Clean Air Act 
t I m e l I n e
1.5–2 years to adopt federal standards & guidelines to states
1–2 years for states to develop standards for existing sources
3 years for existing units to comply
total: 6-year lag
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Circuit’s decision if it stands. In the meantime, SO2 and 
NOx emissions will be regulated under the Clean Air 
Interstate Rule (CAIR), which remains in effect.
AEO2012 does not predict any new unplanned coal 
generation that does not include carbon capture and 
storage until 2030. This is consistent with trends in 
new power plant construction since the late 1990s (see 
Figure A-1.2). 
2. Lackluster Scenario for power plants
In December 2010 EPA announced they would 
establish GHG performance standards for new and 
existing power plants using their authority under 
section 111 of the Clean Air Act, and that they would 
finalize those standards by May 2012.18 In April 2012 
EPA proposed performance standards for new power 
plants. These standards have not yet been finalized, 
and thus they do not meet the necessary criteria for 
l A C k l u s t e r m I d d l e - O f -t h e - r O A d g O - g e t t e r 
Existing 
plants
NSPS are established for existing coal 
units that achieve fleet-wide average 
efficiency improvement of 5 percent 
starting in 2018. 
Standards achieve an 18 percent 
reduction in emissions in 2021 compared 
to 2012 emission levels, and a 33 
percent reduction in 2035. 
Standards achieve a 38 percent 
reduction in emissions in 2021 compared 
to 2012 emission levels, and a  
74 percent reduction in 2035.
New 
plants
EPA finalizes NSPS as proposed, which 
set a standard of 1,000 pounds of CO2 
per megawatt-hour of output. After 
eight years (2020), EPA updates these 
standards so that new unit performance 
gradually improves to 570 pounds of CO2 
per megawatt-hour in 2030.
EPA finalizes standards consistent with 
our lackluster scenario until 2028, at 
which time they establish new standards 
equivalent to CCS with a 90 percent 
capture rate.
EPA finalizes NSPS of 1,000 pounds of 
CO2 per megawatt-hour of output. In 
2020, they establish new standards 
equivalent to CCS with a 90 percent 
capture rate.
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inclusion in the base case. EPA has not yet proposed 
performance standards for existing power plants. For 
the lackluster scenario (and all subsequent scenarios), 
we assume that EPA establishes performance 
standards for new and existing fossil-fuel-fired plants. 
a. new power plants
In general, EPA’s proposed New Source Performance 
Standards (NSPS) would require new power plants 
with a base load rating more than 73 MW to meet an 
annual emissions rate of 454 kgCO2/MWh (1,000 lbs 
per MWh).19 To achieve this emissions rate, new plants 
will need to employ natural gas, carbon capture and 
storage, waste heat recovery, or possibly biomass.20 In 
all three scenarios, we assume that EPA finalizes an 
emissions standard that is equivalent to their proposed 
standards. The Clean Air Act stipulates that once 
the new standards are finalized they will apply to any 
covered source that commences construction after the 
date the draft rule was proposed. Therefore, the actual 
date of finalization is not relevant to this analysis. 
Consistent with EPA’s proposed standards for new 
units, we assume that coal plants that have already 
broken ground will not be subject to the proposed 
standards for new power plants. We therefore do not 
apply the new standards to the 9.3 GW of “planned” 
coal units in EIA’s reference case. 
The Clean Air Act requires EPA to evaluate standards 
for new units every eight years. Thus, in the lackluster 
scenario we assume that EPA updates these standards 
after eight years, and that the new standard requires 
new units to gradually improve their emissions rate so 
that they reach 570 lbs/MWh by 2030. This target is 
consistent with increasing the efficiency of a natural 
gas unit to 70 percent, a target set by the Electric 
Power Research Institute (EPRI) in their 2009 Prism/
MERGE analysis. This study identifies itself as a 
“technically and economically feasible roadmap for the 
electricity sector as it seeks to reduce its greenhouse 
gas emissions over the next few decades.”21 We assume 
EPA holds this 570 lbs per MWh emissions standard 
constant from 2030 through 2035.
As noted previously, AEO2012 does not predict any 
new unplanned coal generation that does not include 
CCS until 2030. We also note that GE has reported 
achieving 61 percent efficiency in their new combined 
cycle units, which is not required under the lackluster 
scenario until 2021.22
b. existing power plants
In the lackluster scenario, we assume that performance 
standards achieve a modest 5 percent reduction in 
the emissions rate at existing coal plants through 
efficiency improvements. The average 5 percent 
improvement rate comes from EPA’s Advanced Notice 
of Proposed Rulemaking: Regulating Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions under the Clean Air Act (ANPR) issued on 
July 11, 2008. In the ANPR, EPA noted that heat rate 
reductions of up to 10 percent are feasible at many coal-
fired power plants, and that the potential average heat 
rate reduction for the entire coal fleet would likely be 
about 5 percent.23 A 5 percent improvement in heat rate 
would reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 5 percent at 
existing coal plants. Alternatively, plants could achieve 
(or exceed) a 5 percent reduction in emissions by 
switching in whole or in part to lower carbon fuels such 
as natural gas and sustainably harvested biomass, or 
through greater use of waste heat.
The 5 percent improvement rate is assumed to be a 
fleet-wide average as some units may be able to achieve 
greater or fewer reductions. This average improvement 
rate could be realized through the establishment of unique 
standards for various subcategories of power plants.24,25
We assume that the new standards take effect in 2018.
This is one year earlier than performance standards 
for most other source categories. We believe that 
this more expedited time frame is relevant, however, 
because EPA’s December 2010 announcement about 
their development of performance standards for 
existing units (and for refineries) suggests that some of 
the regulatory analysis should already be completed.
After consulting with a variety of technical experts and 
conducting a literature review, we were unable to find a 
reliable public source that would support an assumption 
about immediately available opportunities for improving 
the efficiency of the existing natural gas fleet. As a 
result, we do not include reductions from existing gas 
plants in the reductions for the lackluster scenario.
c. Modeling notes
To model reductions achieved through these standards, 
we made use of intermediary coal modeling results for 
the AEO2012 reference case, which were furnished upon 
request from EIA.26 Those results show projected capacity, 
generation, consumption, and emissions by technology type 
for new, planned, and existing units through 2035. 
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Existing 
plants
NSPS are established for existing coal 
units that achieve fleet-wide average 
efficiency improvement of 5 percent 
starting in 2018. 
Standards achieve an 18 percent 
reduction in emissions in 2021 compared 
to 2012 emission levels, and a 33 
percent reduction in 2035. 
Standards achieve a 38 percent 
reduction in emissions in 2021 compared 
to 2012 emission levels, and a  
74 percent reduction in 2035.
New 
plants
EPA finalizes NSPS as proposed, which 
set a standard of 1,000 pounds of CO2 
per megawatt-hour of output. After 
eight years (2020), EPA updates these 
standards so that new unit performance 
gradually improves to 570 pounds of CO2 
per megawatt-hour in 2030.
EPA finalizes standards consistent with 
our lackluster scenario until 2028, at 
which time they establish new standards 
equivalent to CCS with a 90 percent 
capture rate.
EPA finalizes NSPS of 1,000 pounds of 
CO2 per megawatt-hour of output. In 
2020, they establish new standards 
equivalent to CCS with a 90 percent 
capture rate.
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We relied on the AEO2012 reference case for 
predictions of new unit construction and generation. 
We assume that all new units meet the new source 
standard applicable at the time of construction, with 
the exception of simple cycle units, which are excluded 
from EPA’s new unit standards.
For modeling purposes, the 5 percent average 
improvement was applied evenly across all existing coal-
fired units. We assumed that improving the efficiency 
of coal plants would decrease the marginal cost of 
generation, which would increase their competitiveness 
and lead to increased operation at those plants (and 
decreased generation by gas plants). This phenomenon 
has been examined by two recent studies by Resources 
for the Future, Retail Electricity Price Savings from 
Compliance Flexibility in GHG Standards for Stationary 
Sources,27 and Regulating Greenhouse Gases from Coal 
Power Plants under the Clean Air Act.28 The studies did 
not examine this precise scenario. However, based on 
conversation with the authors (Burtraw and Woerman), 
we decided that the greatest parallels were with the unit-
specific subcategorization approach they presented at 
the annual meeting of the Association of Environmental 
and Resource Economists. Therefore, we modeled a 0.83 
percent increase in coal generation as a result of the 
efficiency gains driven by the performance standards.29
3. Middle-of-the-Road Scenario for power plants 
a. new power plants
The middle-of-the-road scenario builds off the 
assumptions in the lackluster scenario, establishing an 
initial standard of 1,000 lb/MWh, and the subsequent 
improvement period, which would achieve 570 lbs 
per MWh by 2030. Before reaching that 2030 goal, 
however, we assume that EPA updates their standards 
again (eight years after the previous update), so that 
in 2028 new units are held to a standard that is 
consistent with the utilization of carbon capture and 
storage at a 90 percent capture rate. We assume that 
this emissions rate would apply to all units regardless 
of fuel type. This treatment is consistent with EPA’s 
proposed emissions standards for new power plants.
b. existing power plants
For the middle-of-the-road and go-getter scenarios, 
we assume that EPA takes a more flexible approach 
when establishing performance standards for existing 
power plants. Thus, instead of requiring source-by-
source compliance with a fixed emissions rate (as we 
did in the lackluster scenario), we assume that sources 
can comply through a range of other measures that 
reduce emissions from regulated emissions sources 
in the power sector. Such options could include fuel 
switching, low-carbon dispatch of existing power plants 
(e.g., operating a gas plant more and a coal plant less), 
increased generation by renewable sources, and energy 
efficiency, among other actions. These reductions could 
be recognized through a range of different programs 
such as fleet-wide averaging, rate-based trading 
programs, a portfolio of measures, or cap and trade.
In the middle-of-the-road scenario, we assume that 
standards take effect in 2018 and gradually improve, 
resulting in an 18 percent reduction in emissions in 
2021 compared to 2012 emission levels. We assume 
that EPA would subsequently update these standards 
in 2026, which would lead to an additional 18 percent 
reduction in emissions in 2029 compared to 2021 
emissions levels. These standards result in 33 percent 
fewer CO2 emissions from power plants in 2035 
compared to 2012.
Several recent proposals—introduced in conferences 
and meetings by academics and environmental 
organizations—have discussed potential approaches 
to regulating greenhouse gas emissions under the 
Clean Air Act. The level of reductions included here 
is comparable to a recently published proposal by the 
Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), though 
we did not model their specific proposal.30 NRDC’s 
proposal would allow for power plants to comply 
through onsite efficiency improvements, by shifting 
power generation to lower or non-emitting plants, 
and through demand-side efficiency improvements. 
However, we also note that analysis of EIA’s AEO2012 
projections of natural gas-fired plant capacity shows 
that there is sufficient slack capacity in existing 
natural gas units to achieve the initial 18 percent 
reduction entirely from re-dispatch of the existing fleet 
(i.e., increasing generation from natural gas plants 
and decreasing generation from coal plants).31 Further 
reductions of the magnitude we model through 2035, 
however, would likely require new sources of carbon-
free electricity (e.g., renewable or nuclear), increased 
deployment of carbon capture and storage, or a 
significant expansion of energy efficiency programs.
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c. Modeling notes
Note that due to the low projections of unit turnover in 
AEO2012, for modeling purposes we did not explicitly 
include additional NSPS for new units in the middle-
of-the-road scenario; instead, we assumed that more 
stringent standards for new sources will make it easier 
to achieve the reductions required under the existing 
unit standards, as new units covered by the standard 
will emit fewer GHG emissions than the units that they 
are replacing.32
4. Go-Getter Scenario for power plants
a. new power plants
Similar to the lackluster and middle-of-the-road 
scenarios for new plants, the go-getter scenario assumes 
that EPA finalizes emissions standards for new units 
that mirror their proposed standards. The go-getter 
scenario assumes that EPA updates these standards 
again in 2020 to a standard that is consistent with the 
utilization of carbon capture and storage at a 90 percent 
capture rate, eight years earlier than assumed in the 
middle-of-the-road scenario.
b. existing power plants
The go-getter scenario assumes EPA sets emissions 
standards for existing units that lead to a 38 percent 
and 74 percent reduction in energy CO2 in 2020 and 
2035 (respectively) compared to 2012. This level of 
reductions would likely require implementation of a 
flexible compliance program, such as the one described 
in the middle-of-the-road scenario. Because no NSPS 
for existing units have been proposed to date that 
cover greenhouse gases, we made the assumption that 
implementation of those standards would not start until 
2018, and that EPA would provide a three-year glide 
path before achieving the emissions reduction target.
To establish the emission targets for this scenario, 
we used carbon price modeling results from EIA. 
Specifically, we utilized a side case from EIA’s 
AEO2012 that examined the impact of an initial $25 
price on carbon starting in 2013 that increases by 5 
percent each year above inflation and reaches $35 per 
metric ton in 2020 and $73 per metric ton in 2035. 
It is clear that EPA does not have the authority to 
establish a carbon tax. These results are valuable, 
however, as they help elucidate the cost of abatement, 
and thus offer insight into the level of reductions that 
could be achieved through flexible standards under 
section 111(d).
c. Modeling notes
To model the existing standards for power plants, we 
assumed that generation and emissions would remain 
consistent with the base case (AEO2012 reference 
case) through 2017, and steadily change so that in 
2021, generation and emissions would be the same as 
those projected in EIA’s carbon price side cases. 
The go-getter scenario assumes more than 2.5 times 
more new generation capacity will be built by 2035 
compared to the base case scenario. The vast majority 
of this new capacity consists of renewable, nuclear and 
natural gas sources. The only coal units built under this 
scenario have carbon capture and storage technology 
installed. Because of the trend for installing low- or 
no-carbon emitting power units inherent under this 
scenario, for modeling purposes we did not explicitly 
include additional NSPS for new units; instead, we 
assumed that these standards help achieve the more 
flexible and ambitious existing unit standards.
5. Additional notes for power plants
In addition to performance standards for new 
and existing power plants, emissions from electric 
generation are also affected by changes in the demand 
for electricity. We account for demand changes 
resulting from a wide-range of actions in an electric 
demand module, as described in section III.C.
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B.  AppLiAnCe And eQUipMenT eFFiCienCY 
STAndARdS (eLeCTRiC)
1.  Base Case for Appliance and equipment efficiency 
Standards (electric)
The base case uses the AEO2012 reference case. The 
AEO2012 reference case assumes total electricity 
consumption in the residential sector increases over 
time, but the delivered energy per household declines 
at an average rate of 0.9 percent. About one-half of 
the decline in energy delivered per household can be 
attributed to more efficient space heating. Additional 
demand decreases for space heating is predicted to 
result from population shifts to warmer and drier 
climates. The reference case also assumes that 
despite growth in commercial floor space, improved 
commercial equipment efficiency slows the increase in 
purchased electricity through 2035.33 Between 2009 
and 2011, the Department of Energy established 17 
new equipment standards that are expected to save 
126 TWh in 2025 and 147 TWh in 2035.34
The Department of Energy may promulgate efficiency 
standards for consumer appliances and non-consumer 
equipment under existing federal law.35 The law lists 
appliances and equipment that may be the subject of 
efficiency standards, prescribes minimum standards 
for certain appliances and equipment, and also 
prescribes a process through which the Secretary of 
Energy may add additional appliances and equipment 
to those regulated.36
2. Lackluster Scenario for Appliance and equipment 
efficiency Standards (electric)
We identified three studies that quantify energy 
savings achievable through enhanced energy efficiency 
standards beyond the base case. Those three studies 
are summarized below. For the lackluster scenario, 
we chose the lowest range of energy efficiency 
improvements over the study period from all of the 
studies, which was estimated to result in 192 TWh of 
savings from the residential and commercial consumers 
in 2025, plus an additional 36 TWh of savings from the 
industrial sector. 
In The Efficiency Boom: Cashing In on the Savings 
from Appliance Standards, the American Council 
for an Energy-Efficient Economy (ACEEE) and the 
Appliance Standards Awareness Project (ASAP)37 
quantified the benefits from potential new or updated 
standards for 34 product categories that could be 
adopted within the next several years. They estimate 
that those standards could result in 212 TWh savings 
from residential and commercial consumers in 2025, 
and 306 TWh savings in 2035. Energy savings were 
calculated as reductions compared to current units, 
assuming fixed demand for the appliances. The authors 
note that many important standards are due between 
2013 and 2015. The standards included were found 
to save consumers money over the life of the product, 
with an average simple payback period of 3.3 years. 
Individual product payback periods range from less 
than a year to 10.1 years.
f I g u r e  A - 1 . 4    Power sector emissions  
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192 TWh savings in 2025 from the 
residential and commercial sectors, plus 
additional savings from the industrial 
sector. Annual savings remain constant 
through 2035.
212 TWh savings in 2025 and 306 TWh 
savings in 2035 from the residential and 
commercial sectors, plus additional savings 
from the industrial sector.
364 TWh savings in 2025 and 525 TWh 
savings in 2035 from the residential and 
commercial sectors, plus additional savings 
from the industrial sector. 
t A B l e  A - 1 . 2  Appliance and equipment efficiency standards (electric) 
3 7Appendi x i   Federal Methods
The Institute for Electric Efficiency’s (IEE)38 
study—Assessment of Electricity Savings in the 
U.S. Achievable through New Appliance/Equipment 
Efficiency Standards and Building Efficiency Codes 
(2010-2025)39— examined what IEE deemed 
“moderate” and “aggressive” efficiency improvement 
scenarios. IEE’s moderate scenario assumes existing 
efficiency standards are increased to levels consistent 
with currently available products, and efficiency 
standards are created for some appliances and 
equipment that do not currently have standards. 
The IEE moderate scenario was found to result 
in electricity savings of 228 TWh in 2025 from 
the AEO2011 reference case for the residential, 
commercial, and industrial sectors. Of those savings, 
192 TWh were projected to come from the residential 
and commercial consumers, and 36 TWh were 
projected to come from the industrial sector. The 
IEE aggressive scenario contains “more aggressive 
efficiency assumptions onto those embedded in 
the moderate case.” The IEE study concluded that 
364 TWh could be saved in 2025 compared to the 
AEO2011 reference case under the IEE aggressive 
scenario for the residential and commercial sectors. 
Another 63 TWh of savings were projected to come 
from the industrial sector.
The third study we considered was the “extended 
policies” side case from AEO2012. This side case 
“examined updates to existing efficiency standards 
for residential and commercial products as well as 
the creation of efficiency standards for products not 
currently covered.” Energy savings in this side case 
reach about 164 TWh in 2025 and nearly 280 TWh in 
2035 from the residential and commercial sectors.
For the lackluster scenario, we chose the lowest range 
of energy efficiency improvements from all of the 
studies over the entire study period, which was the 
IEE moderate scenario. This scenario estimated  
192 TWh of electricity savings in 2025 from the 
AEO2011 reference case in the residential and 
commercial sectors, and an additional 36 TWh of 
savings from the industrial sector. Applying these 
savings to the AEO reference case in 2025 results 
in a 5 percent reduction in electric demand. For this 
analysis, we assumed that standards commence in 
2015 and result in a constant increase in savings 
between 2015 and 2025.Unfortunately, 2035 results 
were not provided. In order to develop intentionally 
conservative results, we hold the reported reductions 
achievable in 2025 constant through 2035. We do 
this even though stock turnover continues, in part 
because the AEO2012 reference case continues to 
increase appliance efficiency through 2035. While 
this study compares its savings to those modeled 
in AEO2011, we assumed that the potential energy 
savings reported in these studies can be applied to the 
base case, which utilizes AEO2012.40
3. Middle-of-the-Road Scenario for Appliance and 
equipment efficiency Standards (electric)
The middle-of-the-road scenario is based on the 
middle range of energy efficiency improvements from 
the studies. Specifically, we use The Efficiency Boom: 
Cashing In on the Savings from Appliance Standards, 
which concluded that the 34 standards considered would 
save residential and commercial consumers 212 TWh in 
2025 and 306 TWh in 2035. These savings amount to 
a 5 percent and 7 percent reduction in electric demand 
in 2025 and 2035, respectively, compared to the 
AEO2012 reference case. These results are comparable 
to those found by EIA in their side case. We relied on 
The Efficiency Boom because it lists specific product 
standards and dates, so that future actions can be easily 
compared. The EIA side case also included updated 
standards as well as new standards for products not yet 
covered by efficiency standards. AEO did not provide 
this same level of detail. For purposes of this analysis, 
we assumed that standards commence in 2015 and 
result in a constant increase in savings between 2015 
and 2025 and from 2025 to 2035. The middle-of-the-
road scenario for GHG performance standards for 
industry, as detailed in Section XI, includes considerable 
efficiency gains. Therefore, to avoid double counting, we 
do not assume any additional industrial efficiency gains 
are obtained as a result of appliance and equipment 
efficiency standards for industry. This does not mean 
that equipment efficiency standards would not be 
beneficial, just that we do not consider them here to 
ensure the development of conservative emissions 
reduction estimates.
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4. Go-Getter Scenario for Appliance and equipment 
efficiency Standards (electric)
The go-getter scenario is based on the highest level of 
reductions reported in the three reports, which was the 
aggressive scenario in the IEE study. IEE’s aggressive 
scenario resulted in energy savings from equipment 
standards in the residential and commercial sectors 
of 364 TWh in 2025 from the AEO2011 reference 
case. It also resulted in 63 TWh of savings from 
industrial consumers in 2025. For the reasons outlined 
in the middle-of-the-road scenario for appliance and 
equipment efficiency standards, above, we did not 
include savings from industrial equipment standards.
We assumed that standards commence in 2015 and 
result in a constant increase in savings between 2015 
and 2025. This study did not provide 2035 results. 
However, the other study we relied on—The Efficiency 
Boom—found that electricity savings increased 
between 2025 and 2035 due to stock turnover. We 
also note that additional standards are possible after 
2020. Therefore, in our go-getter scenario, we take 
a less conservative approach to estimating savings in 
2035 than we do in the lackluster scenario. We assume 
that annual energy savings increase between 2025 and 
2035 at an annual rate consistent with the middle-of-
the-road scenario (3.7 percent per year). This results 
in 525 TWh of savings in 2035. These savings amount 
to a 9 percent and 11 percent reduction in electric 
demand in 2025 and 2035, respectively, compared to 
the AEO2012 reference case.
5. Modeling notes for Appliance and equipment 
efficiency Standards (electric)
The energy savings from increased appliance and 
equipment efficiency standards in each of the three 
scenarios was fed into the electric demand module, 
which incorporates the full range of changes to 
electricity demand due to factors such as increased 
energy demand from electrification of light-duty 
and off-highway vehicles, and reduced demand for 
electricity as a result of increased deployment of 
combined heat and power (CHP) in the industrial 
sector. For more information about the electric demand 
model, see Section III.C.
Because we relied on EIA’s AEO2012 $25 carbon tax 
scenario for the go-getter power sector generation 
projections, we had to make further adjustments to 
these efficiency savings. EIA’s scenario predicts that the 
carbon price will increase electric rates and that this will 
lead to additional energy savings beyond the AEO2012 
reference case. We assume that these savings will 
overlap with those resulting from increased appliance 
and equipment efficiency standards, and therefore 
discount them in the model. In 2035, for example, 
though the standards are predicted to result in 525 
TWh of savings, we only model 270 TWh of incremental 
efficiency savings because the carbon price scenario 
already included 255 TWh of efficiency savings.
C. eLeCTRiCiTY deMAnd 
1. Lackluster Scenario for electricity demand
In order to provide a conservative estimate of the 
benefit of policies that reduce electricity demand, 
we begin by preventing the building of the “average” 
unplanned fossil-fired unit (i.e., new units that have 
not yet commenced construction). Through most years 
this is natural gas. In later years this affects the small 
amount of new coal plants that do not have carbon 
capture and storage in the AEO reference case (less 
than 0.5 GW). Next, we turn off the “average” existing 
fossil-fired unit. We reduce CO2 emissions according 
to the average emissions rate because it is challenging 
to predict what the marginal emissions rate will be 
nationwide throughout the time frame considered. 
Furthermore, while marginal units tend to be natural 
gas in some regions of the country (such as New 
England),41 they are coal in other regions. Due to the 
predominance of coal in the system, this results in the 
retirement of about 1.5 MW of electricity from coal 
plants for every 1 MW of electricity from every gas 
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plant. We do not turn off existing renewable or nuclear 
sources, as we assume that the bulk of the capital costs 
are already sunk, and the operational costs are lower 
than fossil units.
Depending on the specific combination of state and federal 
action, we account for four types of measures, which have 
slightly different impacts on the generation mix:
•	 Those that reduce overall electricity demand  
(e.g., appliance standards and building codes);
•	 Those that generate electricity that does not get 
put onto the grid (e.g., CHP programs where the 
electricity used is predicted to be behind-the-meter);
•	 Those that increase demand (e.g., vehicle 
electrification); and
•	 Those that generate electricity that is put  
onto the grid from other clean sources  
(e.g., renewable programs).
Policies that reduce demand or that generate electricity 
that does not get put onto the grid reduce the total 
amount of electricity sold onto the grid. This can 
reduce renewable generation driven by state renewable 
mandates because those mandates are typically set 
as a percentage of total electricity sales. Most of the 
renewable energy built through 2030 in the lackluster 
scenario (which is modeled off of the AEO2012 
reference case) appears to be due to renewable 
standards. Therefore, we reduce new renewable 
generation in a manner that is proportional to the 
predicted reduction in electricity sales due to electricity 
demand reduction and programs and policies that 
generate electricity that does not get put onto the grid.
Policies that increase demand offset the impact 
of programs that reduce demand or that generate 
electricity that is not sold on the grid. In none of 
the modeled scenarios do we predict that demand 
reductions will be outstripped by electricity demand 
increase due to various policies considered.
Policies that generate electricity that is put onto the 
grid from other clean sources do not reduce total sales, 
and thus do not impact the renewable mandates. They 
do, however, reduce the demand for other sources of 
electricity, and thus affect the construction of new units 
and the operation of existing fossil units in a manner 
that is similar to policies that reduce electricity demand.
None of the scenarios shut down the lone carbon 
capture and storage project that is predicted to be built 
as this demonstration project is hardwired into the 
AEO, and is not the result of economic factors.
2. Middle-of-the-Road Scenario for electricity demand
To evaluate the middle-of-the-road scenario for 
electricity demand, we had to consider the dynamics 
of the middle-of-the-road scenario for performance 
standards for existing power plants, which is an 
amalgamation of a number of proposals being 
considered at the federal level. There are currently 
no detailed sector outputs for any of those proposals 
that display the predicted generation, consumption, 
and emissions from existing and new units by type. 
Therefore, we cannot readily turn off discrete types 
of new or existing units in response to changes 
in electricity demand. However, this may be less 
problematic than would otherwise appear. Several 
of the proposals under discussion establish a target 
emissions rate for fossil-fired power plants. Under 
such an approach, demand reductions could provide a 
benefit that is proportional to the emissions rate for 
regulated sources. In this scenario, the emissions rates 
ranged from 0.67 tons of CO2/MWh in 2021 to 0.5 
tons of CO2/MWh in 2035.
3. Go-Getter Scenario for electricity demand
The go-getter approach is based on the $25 carbon 
tax scenario from EIA’s AEO2012. Thus we have 
detailed sector outputs that allow us to follow a very 
similar process as the lackluster scenario, with one key 
difference. In this scenario renewable projects become 
cost competitive with fossil plants, and thus there is a 
three-fold increase in renewable energy development. 
Therefore, we treat new renewables the same as 
other new non-renewable resources, and prevent 
their construction on a proportional basis in response 
to reductions in demand, as long as the residual 
renewable generation meets the appropriate set of 
state renewable standards. This causes any change 
in demand to have a lower impact in terms of GHG 
emissions than it does in the lackluster and middle-of-
the-road scenarios.
EIA’s AEO2012 $25 carbon tax scenario predicts 
lower electric demand compared to their reference 
case due to higher electricity prices. We assume that 
much of that reduction will be driven by the purchase 
of more efficient appliances, and thus discount 
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electricity demand savings otherwise predicted by new 
efficiency standards for appliances and equipment.
4. Additional Modeling notes for electricity demand
The state action scenarios result in a mixture of states 
with and without carbon policies for the electric sector 
and potentially a different mix of states with and 
without state-specific policies that affect electricity 
demand. Since we do not predetermine which states 
might pursue each of these policies, and since the 
scenarios assume that up to 50 percent of states 
pursue any particular policy, we assume for modeling 
purposes that the impact of policies that affect demand 
will be shared across all states.
Because we consider increases and decreases in 
electric demand associated with a number of activities 
(e.g., electrification of light-duty vehicles and improved 
industrial energy efficiency), we do not separately 
determine CO2 emissions reductions associated 
with appliance efficiency standards. Instead, those 
reductions are included in the overall emissions 
reductions for electric generation.
Iv. transportation
A. LiGHT-dUTY VeHiCLeS
1. Base Case for Light-duty Vehicles
In August 2012 EPA and the National Highway 
Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) finalized new 
GHG emissions standards and CAFE standards for 
light-duty vehicles.42 EPA’s GHG emissions standards 
affect vehicles sold from model years 2017 through 
2025. Due to statutory limitations, NHTSA only 
finalized CAFE standards for vehicles of model years 
2017 through 2021. NHTSA also announced possible 
CAFE standards for model year 2021 through 2025 
vehicles, though finalization of those standards will 
require additional rulemaking. EPA’s standards 
establish a CO2 emissions standard of 163 grams per 
mile in model year 2025, which is equivalent to a fuel 
economy standard of 54.5 mpg (if met solely through 
fuel economy improvements). This is equivalent to a 
CAFE standard of 49.7 mpg because NHTSA considers 
only drive train improvements and does not consider 
improvements in air conditioning leakage of HFCs for 
purposes of establishing CAFE standards.43 To avoid 
double counting, we account for the HFC benefits in 
the HFC module and do not account for them in the 
figures that follow.
For the analysis, we used Argonne National 
Laboratory’s VISION model,44 which relies on the EIA 
Annual Energy Outlook 2012 and does not include 
the latest EPA and NHTSA standards for light-duty 
vehicles.45 Thus, we developed our own base case 
scenario by inputting the new federal standards into 
the VISION model. We note that EPA has the ability 
to revisit the standards for model years 2022 to 2025, 
and adjust them based on the best and most current 
information available at that time. In the base case 
scenario, however, we assumed that the standards 
through model year 2025 are achieved as outlined in the 
most recent rulemaking, and are not revised upwards 
or downwards. We further assume that the 2025 model 
year standards remain constant through 2035.
The recently finalized emissions standards for model 
years 2017 through 2025 include incentives for electric 
vehicles (EVs), plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs), 
fuel cell vehicles (FCVs), and compressed natural gas 
(CNG) vehicles. The incentives include a temporary 
per-vehicle multiplier that allows EVs, PHEVs, FCVs, 
and CNG vehicles to “count” as more than one vehicle 
in the manufacturer’s compliance calculation for model 
years 2017 through 2021. The standards also provide 
for the temporary use of an increased fuel economy 
value and a reduced GHG emissions compliance value 
in order to spur deployment of vehicles that consume 
less gasoline and emit fewer GHG emissions.46 We 
incorporate each of these credits into the model.
2. Lackluster Scenario for Light-duty Vehicles
For all of the scenarios, we relied on the Interim Joint 
Technical Assessment Report (TAR) produced by 
EPA, NHTSA, and the California Air Resource Board 
(CARB).47 The agencies analyzed four scenarios of 
future stringency for model years 2020 and 2025, 
starting with a 250 gram/mile estimated fleet-wide 
level in model year 2016 and four different levels of 
CO2 standard improvement rates: 3 percent per year, 4 
percent per year, 5 percent per year, and 6 percent per 
year. For reference, the 4 percent improvement rate 
results in a 51 mpg standard by model year 2025, while 
the 6 percent improvement rate results in a 62 mpg 
standard by model year 2025. For each of these rates of 
increased stringency, the agencies considered the effects 
of the industry following four potential “technology 
pathways.” Each of these rely on varying market 
penetrations of different sets of technology, including 
HEV, PHEV, EVs, and mass reduction. The agencies’ 
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results illustrate that a variety of technologies can be 
used to meet each of the standards.
Our lackluster scenario assumes vehicle standards 
achieve a 131 gram per mile emissions standard 
in 2035, and a 61 mpg CAFE standard.48 This is 
equivalent to a 2 percent annual improvement rate 
from 2026 through 2035, which is about half the 
rate required in the finalized standards for model 
years 2017 through 2025. The 2 percent rate of 
improvement is only applied to vehicle efficiency 
improvements and not HFCs because the opportunities 
to achieve incremental HFC benefits beyond those 
driven by the current round of standards are more 
limited. Consistent with EPA and NHTSA’s Interim 
Joint Technical Assessment Report, in all of our 
scenarios the rate of change is applied to the GHG 
emissions standards (grams per mile) and fuel 
consumption rate (gallons per mile).
We assume that under this scenario, 9 percent of the 
miles traveled by MY 2035 vehicles are powered by 
electricity. We made this assumption because we are 
unable to predict exactly how these alternative vehicles 
will penetrate the market and wanted to account for 
a range of possible outcomes. However, for modeling 
purposes, we assume that EVs reach 4 percent of sales 
by 2025. This is consistent with one of the technology 
pathways the agencies found could achieve a set of 
standards with similar stringency to those finalized in 
August. We assumed that sales would escalate over 
time, so that in 2035 EV’s accounted for 8 percent 
of total sales and PHEVs accounted for 1.5 percent 
of total sales. This is consistent with the average 
penetration rates assumed in the four scenarios 
analyzed by the agencies that achieve 62 mpg in their 
Interim Joint Technical Assessment Report.
3. Middle-of-the-Road Scenario for Light-duty Vehicles
We assume that vehicle standards continue to improve 
though 2035 at roughly the same rate as the 2017–
2025 standards (4 percent), and achieve an emissions 
standard of 104 grams of CO2 per mile traveled and a 
fleet-wide CAFE standard of 74.6 mpg in 2035. Like 
the lackluster scenario, the middle-of-the-road scenario 
assumes that EVs reach 4 percent of new vehicle sales 
by 2025. Consistent with the lackluster scenario, we 
only apply the rate of improvement to vehicle efficiency 
improvements, and do not include HFC emissions 
in those calculations because there are limited 
opportunities to achieve incremental HFC benefits 
beyond those driven by the current round of standards.
Under this scenario, the light-duty fleet achieves 
approximately 63 mpg in 2031. The TAR considered 
a scenario where roughly the same fuel economy was 
achieved in 2025, and examined several technology 
pathways for achieving that standard. For modeling 
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August 2012 Joint EPA-DOT Standards: 54.5 mpg by model year 2025 (Included in the base case)
Standards continue to improve from 
2026–2035 at roughly half the rate of the 
2017–2025 standards (2 percent). This 
results in a 131 grams per mile emissions 
standard and a 61 mpg CAFE standard by 
2035. 
Under this scenario, 9 percent of the miles 
traveled by MY 2035 vehicles are powered 
by electricity.
Standards continue to improve from 
2026–2035 at roughly the same rate as 
the 2017–2025 standards. This equates 
to about a 4 percent annual improvement 
through 2035, and results in a 104 gram 
per mile emissions standard and a 74.6 mpg 
CAFE standard. 
Under this scenario, 12 percent of the miles 
traveled by MY 2035 vehicles are powered 
by electricity.
Six percent annual improvement rate in 
emissions standards. This results in a 81 
grams per mile emissions standard and a 92 
mpg CAFE standard. 
Under this scenario, 34 percent of the miles 
traveled by MY 2035 vehicles are powered 
by electricity.
Note: CAFE standards do not include benefits from HFC emissions reductions, which EPA projects to result in credits amounting to 14.3 grams CO2 per mile in 2025. Also note 
that the rate of change for the standards is applied to the GHG emissions standards (grams per mile) and fuel consumption rate (gallons per mile).
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purposes, we assumed that EV and PHEV penetration 
would follow the average of these pathways. This 
results in EV and PHEV penetration of 8 percent and 
1.5 percent of sales in 2031, respectively, when the 
light-duty fleet reaches 62 mpg. We assume that EV 
and PHEV sales continue to increase at a constant rate 
so that in 2035, EV’s reach 10.7 percent and PHEV’s 
reach 2.5 percent of vehicle sales. In order to account 
for a wider range of possible outcomes, we assume that 
12 percent of the miles travelled by MY 2035 vehicles 
are powered by electricity.
4. Go-Getter Scenario for Light-duty Vehicles
Our go-getter scenario assumes that the EPA GHG 
emissions standard improves 6 percent per year between 
2025 and 2035. This is the highest improvement rate 
EPA and NHTSA considered in the proposed model 
year 2017–2025 standards. Consistent with the other 
scenarios, we only apply the rate of improvement to 
vehicle efficiency improvements, and do not include HFC 
emissions in those calculations because there are limited 
opportunities to achieve incremental HFC benefits 
beyond those driven by the current round of standards.
This would lead to a greenhouse gas emissions standard 
of 81 grams of CO2 per mile traveled and a CAFE 
standard of 92 mpg in 2035. For modeling purposes, 
we assume that EVs reach 14 percent of new vehicle 
sales by 2025 and 31.5 percent by 2035, and that 
PHEVs reach 2 percent of new vehicle sales by 2025 
and 4.5 percent by 2035. These rates were determined 
in a manner consistent with the middle-of-the-road 
scenario. However, instead of applying the average EV 
and PHEV penetration rate from the TAR, we applied 
the highest EV and PHEV penetration rate in 2025 
and assumed that penetration rates continued through 
2035 at a continuous rate.49 In order to account for a 
wider range of possible outcomes, we assume that  
34 percent of the miles traveled by MY 2035 vehicles 
are powered by electricity.
5. Modeling notes for Light-duty Vehicles
The VISION model allows users to edit the default fuel 
economies of light-, medium-, and heavy-duty vehicle 
categories between 2000–2100. We estimated fuel 
economies (mpg) for each major vehicle technology 
(e.g., internal combustion vehicles, EVs, PHEVs) using 
each vehicle technology’s annual sales, applicable 
incentives for EVs and PHEVs, and VISION’s assumed 
relative efficiency of vehicle types (e.g., EVs versus 
internal combustion engines).
In addition, for purposes of this analysis we made the 
following assumptions for all scenarios: 
•	 We assume that the incentives and credits for 
electric vehicles (EVs), plug-in hybrid electric 
vehicles (PHEVs), fuel cell vehicles (FCVs), and 
compressed natural gas (CNG) vehicles expire, 
or wind down, as scheduled. This results in the 
evaluation of EV and PHEV emissions on the basis 
of the GHG emissions associated with electricity 
generation, which relates to the GHG performance 
standards in place for the power sector.  
•	 PHEVs on average drive 50 percent of their 
miles using electricity, which is consistent 
with the assumptions in EPA’s Analysis of the 
Transportation Sector: Greenhouse Gas and 
Oil Reduction Scenarios,50 as well as the upper 
estimate in Argonne National Laboratory’s 
VISION 2012 AEO base case. The emissions from 
electricity associated with the operation of these 
vehicles are accounted for in the electric sector 
through increased demand. 
•	 Any differences in driving habits between EVs and 
internal combustion vehicles were not incorporated 
into the model because these trends are not 
considered in the VISION model.
•	 GHG benefits from reduced HFC emissions were 
not included in tailpipe emissions estimates, and 
instead were calculated separately in the HFC 
module.
•	 On-road mpg remains approximately 80 percent of 
the test mpg in accordance with standard practice 
and VISION model design.
•	 Consistent with common accounting practice 
and EIA’s Annual Energy Outlook, we do not 
include emissions associated with the combustion 
of biofuels in emissions estimates for light-
duty vehicles. This is commonly done due to an 
assumption that such fuels are carbon neutral. 
While recent studies suggest that this is not 
actually the case, for purposes of our analysis we 
do not include those emissions here.
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•	 Combination tractors (class 7-8): used for freight 
transportation and usually pull one or more trailers 
and emit about two-thirds of medium- and heavy-
duty CO2 emissions (Figure A-1.8);
51
•	 Vocational vehicles (class 2b-8): used for a wide 
range of purposes, including fire trucks, dump 
trucks, refuse trucks, and others;52 and 
•	 Heavy duty pick-up trucks and vans (class 2b-3): 
used mainly for work purposes, as well as shuttle 
vehicles.53,54
The EPA and NHTSA standards, however, divide these 
medium- and heavy-duty vehicle categories into 13 
subcategories, and establish vehicle GHG emissions 
and fuel consumption standards for each. Because 
the manufacturer of the vehicle can differ from the 
manufacturer of the engine, in some cases EPA 
and NHTSA established separate engine standards. 
However, these engine standards are built into the 
vehicle standards, and thus we do not separately 
consider them in our scenario development or modeling.
The rule covers vehicles sold from model years 2014 
through 2018. EPA’s standards are mandatory for 
model years 2014–2018. NHTSA’s fuel consumption 
standards, however, are voluntary for model years 
2014 and 2015 and don’t become mandatory until 
model year 2016.55 This is due to the regulatory lead-
time requirements built into the Energy Independence 
and Security Act of 2007 (EISA), which cites a need 
for “regulatory stability.”56
EPA established a separate standard for HFC leakage 
from AC systems in heavy-duty pickup trucks and vans 
as well as class 7 and 8 tractors, based on the 
f I g u r e  A - 1 . 6    fuel economy Improvements modeled  
for light-duty vehicles
f I g u r e  A - 1 . 7    tailpipe Carbon dioxide emissions  
from light-duty vehicles
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B. MediUM- And HeAVY-dUTY VeHiCLeS
1. Base Case for Medium- and Heavy-duty Vehicles
In August 2011 EPA and NHTSA finalized a joint 
rulemaking that established the first-ever standards 
for GHG emissions and fuel consumption for medium- 
and heavy- duty vehicles.
Medium-duty vehicles (class 2b-6) are defined as those 
with a gross vehicle rate between 8,500 and 26,000 
pounds, while heavy-duty vehicles (class 7-8) have a 
gross vehicle rate above 26,000 pounds. These vehicles 
are commonly divided into the following categories:
f I g u r e  A - 1 . 8    medium- and heavy-duty Carbon dioxide 
emissions by vehicle type, 2005
0% 80%40% 100%20% 60%
Heavy
-Duty 
Pickup 
Trucks 
and 
Vans
Vocational 
Vehicles
■ Combination Tractors  
Source: Final Rulemaking to Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards and Fuel Efficiency 
Standards for Medium- and Heavy-Duty Engines and Vehicles: Regulatory Impact 
Analysis, U.S. EPA and NHTSA, August 2011.
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refrigerant capacity of the installed AC system. For 
purposes of this analysis, we applied EPA’s estimated 
GHG benefits from this standard to base case emission 
projections for HFCs. Thus HFC benefits are not 
reflected in the GHG emissions projections from this 
sector shown in the figures that follow.
In the base case scenario, we assumed that the 
standards are not updated after the current regulatory 
period and thus the 2018 model year standards remain 
unchanged through 2035.
2. Lackluster Scenario for Medium-  
and Heavy-duty Vehicles
Our lackluster scenario assumes that improvement 
in the standards continues at a rate consistent with 
half the rate of improvement achieved by the recent 
standards, or on average, 1.3 percent annually.57 This 
would lead to an average fuel economy of 11 mpg and 
a GHG emissions standard of 949 grams CO2 per mile 
across all medium- and heavy-duty vehicles in 2035.58 
As a result of the standards, we estimate that medium 
and heavy-duty vehicles sold in 2035 will consume 21 
percent less fuel than vehicles sold in 2010.
The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 
(EISA) requires at least three years of “regulatory 
stability” whereby standards for medium- and heavy-
duty vehicles remain fixed. Therefore, in all three of 
the scenarios, we assume that CAFE standards are 
updated as frequently as possible, and that updates to 
the GHG emissions standards occur at the same time 
interval—once every three years.
3. Middle-of-the-Road Scenario for Medium-  
and Heavy-duty Vehicles
In the middle-of-the-road scenario, we assume that the 
standards increase at the same rate as the standards 
for model years 2014–2018 (roughly 2.6 percent 
annually). This would lead to an average fuel economy 
of 13.3 mpg and a GHG emissions standard of 781 
grams CO2 per mile across all medium- and heavy-duty 
vehicles in 2035. As a result of the standards, medium- 
and heavy-duty vehicles sold in 2035 will consume 35 
percent less fuel than vehicles sold in 2010.
4. Go-Getter Scenario for Medium-  
and Heavy-duty Vehicles
The go-getter scenario for medium-duty and most 
heavy-duty vehicles assumes that the GHG emissions 
standards improve by an average 42 percent in 
2023 across all vehicle categories compared to 2010 
vehicles. This magnitude of improvement is likely 
only possible if EPA begins to regulate trailers, which 
are not covered by current standards. We assume 
standards for 2020 to 2022 split the difference 
between the standards set in 2019 and 2023 for 
each vehicle category, which results in an average 
improvement rate of 26 percent across all vehicle 
types. We assume that emissions standards increase 
by 3 percent every three years (1 percent annually) 
thereafter. This would lead to an average fuel economy 
of 16.0 mpg (657 grams CO2 per mile) across all 
medium- and heavy-duty vehicles in 2035. As a result 
of the standards, medium- and heavy-duty vehicles sold 
in 2035 will consume 46 percent less fuel than vehicles 
sold in 2010. 
l A C k l u s t e r m I d d l e - O f -t h e - r O A d g O - g e t t e r 
Joint EPA-DOT Standards from August 2011 will improve the GHG emissions rate for vehicles by approximately 2.6 percent per year from 
2013–2019
Standards continue to improve through 2035 
at half the rate of the 2014–2018 standards 
by vehicle category. This equates to an 
average annual improvement of  
1.3 percent across all medium- and heavy- 
duty vehicles.
Standards continue to improve through 
2035 at the same rate as the 2014–2018 
standards by vehicle category. This equates 
to an average annual improvement of  
2.6 percent across all medium- and heavy-  
duty vehicles.
By 2020–2022, the medium- and heavy-
duty fleet reduces its emissions rate by an 
average 26 percent and by 42 percent in 
2023–2025 compared to 2010. Standards 
continue to improve annually by 1 percent 
through 2035.
t A B l e  A - 1 . 4  vehicle emissions and efficiency standards, medium- and heavy-duty vehicles
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The go-getter scenario for medium- and heavy-duty 
vehicles was derived from the National Academy of 
Sciences Technologies and Approaches to Reducing 
the Fuel Consumption of Medium- and Heavy-Duty 
Vehicles.59 That study examines several types of 
medium- and heavy-duty vehicles, and determines that 
they can reduce fuel consumption between 32 and 
51 percent in the 2015–2020 timeframe by utilizing 
different technologies, depending on the vehicle class 
and purpose.60 These ranges were used to develop 
average improvement rates for each of the major 
vehicle classes.
The 2020–2022 standards would reduce fuel 
consumption by an average 28 percent from 2008 levels. 
This is slightly higher than the potential fuel savings 
described in the Presidential Memorandum Regarding 
Fuel Efficiency Standards from May 21, 2010.61,62
5. Modeling notes for Medium-  
and Heavy-duty Vehicles
Our analysis relies on Argonne National Laboratory’s 
VISION 2012 model,63 which includes the latest EPA 
and NHTSA standards. The VISION model allows 
users to edit the default fuel economies of new light-, 
medium-, and heavy-duty vehicles sold from 2000 
to 2100. However, VISION breaks the fleet up into 
different categories than those used by EPA and 
NHTSA. We therefore relied on EPA’s estimated fleet-
wide fuel efficiency for model years 2010–2018 under 
the finalized standards for heavy-duty pickups and 
vans, vocational vehicles, and combination tractors to 
help inform the average improvement in fuel efficiency 
in each of the VISION vehicle categories.64 Similar to 
our approach for light-duty vehicles, we applied the 
improvement rates to the GHG emissions standards 
(grams per mile) and fuel consumption standards 
(gallons per ton-mile). These values were converted to 
fuel economy (miles per gallon) for modeling purposes. 
Figure A-1.9 shows fuel economy improvements for the 
three largest vehicle categories, which together account 
for roughly 94 percent of total GHG emissions from 
medium- and heavy-duty vehicles in 2010 and 2035.
f I g u r e  A - 1 . 9    efficiency Improvements modeled for 
medium- and heavy-duty vehicles
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account for only 6 percent of total GHG emissions in 2010.
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C. OFF-HiGHWAY MOBiLe SOURCeS
1. Base Case for Off-Highway Mobile Sources
Off-highway mobile sources include a variety of 
emissions sources such as engines and equipment 
used for agriculture (tractors and combines), 
construction (cranes and bulldozers), lawn and 
garden, and mining. There is no specific off-highway 
category in the AEO, and it is beyond the scope of 
this analysis to reconstruct this sector’s emissions 
from the ground-up. Therefore, we relied on the 
business-as-usual projections from the EPA Analysis 
of the Transportation Sector: Greenhouse Gas and 
Oil Reduction Scenarios for the base case, which 
projects that emissions from these sources will rise 
from roughly 200 mmtCO2e in 2012 to roughly 275 
mmtCO2e in 2030. 
2. Lackluster, Middle-of-the-Road, and Go-Getter 
Scenarios for Off-Highway Sources
The EPA Analysis of the Transportation Sector 
concludes that there are significant opportunities to 
reduce GHG emissions from this sector.65 In the report, 
EPA posits two greenhouse gas emissions reductions 
scenarios that are technically achievable. In this 
analysis, EPA was clear that the “illustrative example 
scenarios do not imply that EPA considers these to 
be the appropriate levels or dates for standards.”66 
However, we were unable to identify other studies to 
complement EPA’s work, and thus based all three of 
the scenarios on EPA’s study. Therefore, we made the 
lackluster scenario more conservative by modeling one-
half the reductions achieved by EPA’s least ambitious 
scenario, scenario A. The middle-of-the-road scenario 
was modeled to match EPA’s scenario A. The go-getter 
scenario was modeled to match EPA’s most ambitious 
scenario, scenario B.
Unlike the reductions for light-, medium-, and heavy-
duty vehicles, off-highway mobile sources were not 
independently modeled for this analysis, as sufficient 
information about the sources and policies is not 
available. Instead, reductions were taken directly from 
EPA’s study. These reductions were adjusted to remove 
the contribution from operational improvements 
because EPA has not mandated such operational 
improvements to date in these standards. Therefore, 
for the lackluster, middle-of-the-road, and go-getter 
scenarios, we assumed that new standards can achieve 
an additional 0.9 percent, 1.8 percent, and 2.4 percent 
annual improvement, respectively, in the emissions rate 
for new equipment and engines from 2018 to 2035.
3. Modeling notes for Off-Highway Sources
EPA’s scenarios result in emissions reductions through 
increased equipment electrification. We therefore 
estimated increased electric demand and fed that into 
the electricity demand module to capture the resulting 
increases in electricity emissions. For off-highway 
electrification, the increase in electricity demand in 
2035 is 12, 23, and 80 TWh for the lackluster, middle-
of-the-road, and go-getter scenarios, respectively. 
These increases represent 0.3 percent to 1.8 percent  
of total electricity demand in 2035 under the AEO2012 
reference case.
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0.9 percent annual improvement in the 
emissions rate for new equipment and 
engines from 2018 to 2035
1.8 percent annual improvement in the 
emissions rate for new equipment and 
engines from 2018 to 2035
2.4 percent annual improvement in the 
emissions rate for new equipment and 
engines from 2018 to 2035
f I g u r e  A - 1 . 1 0   tailpipe Carbon dioxide emissions  
 from medium- and heavy-duty vehicles
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EPA’s analysis was based on AEO2009. We were 
unable to adjust these results to account for any 
differences between AEO2012 and AEO2009 because 
the analyses do not clearly break out emissions from 
off-highway mobile sources.
f I g u r e  A - 1 . 1 1   Carbon dioxide emissions  
from Off-highway mobile sources
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d. AViATiOn
1. Base Case for Aviation
The emissions base case for aviation emissions was 
developed using projected energy use as found in the 
AEO2012 table, Transportation Sector Key Indicators 
and Delivered Energy Consumption. AEO2012 
builds in a steady improvement in energy efficiency. 
Nevertheless, emissions are expected to increase 
through 2035 due to increased miles traveled; in 2035, 
aircraft CO2 emissions are about 11 percent higher 
than 2010 levels.
2. Lackluster & Middle-of-the-Road Scenarios  
for Aviation
The FAA can reduce GHG emissions from aircraft 
by enhancing the way that air travel is managed in 
the United States. Through its Next Generation Air 
Transport Systems (NextGen), FAA is proactively 
managing aviation environmental issues with several 
programs and initiatives.67
Operational improvement scenarios were developed 
using the EPA Analysis of the Transportation Sector.68 
In this report, EPA concluded that it was possible to 
achieve operational improvements in the range of  
0.7 percent to 1.4 percent per year, but noted that the 
FAA thought that operational improvements realized 
through NextGen would only reach between 0.17 
and 0.4 percent per year. To remain conservative in 
the lackluster scenario, we modeled a 0.17 percent 
annual improvement starting in 2014. This results in 
emissions that are 3 percent below base case levels 
in 2035, but which are 7 percent greater than 2010 
levels. In the middle-of-the-road scenario, we use the 
higher range reported by FAA, 0.4 percent per year. 
This results in an 8 percent reduction in emissions 
compared to the base case in 2035, which is 2 percent 
above 2010 levels.
3. Go-Getter Scenario for Aviation
In the go-getter scenarios, we relied on the most 
ambitious estimates from the EPA Analysis of the 
Transportation Sector (scenario B), which concludes 
that it is possible to achieve a 1.4 percent annual 
operational improvement. We assume that this rate of 
change remains constant through 2035.
In addition, we assume that EPA implements GHG 
emissions standards for airplanes under Title II of 
the Clean Air Act in 2018. (Note that while EPA may 
l A C k l u s t e r m I d d l e - O f -t h e - r O A d g O - g e t t e r 
0.17 percent annual emissions reduction 
through 2035 via operational improvements 
through the FAA NextGen program. 
0.4 percent annual emissions reduction 
through 2035 via operational improvements 
through the FAA NextGen program.
1.4 percent annual operational improvement 
via FAA’s NextGen program, plus a 2.3 
percent annual improvement in the 
performance of new aircraft and engines. 
Both rates remain constant through 2035.
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implement GHG emissions standards, FAA enforces those 
standards.) This also comes from EPA’s transportation 
analysis, which concludes that by 2030, it may be possible 
to see engine improvements around 20 percent, and 
airframe weight and drag reductions between 5 and 20 
percent. They model this as a 2.3 percent per year annual 
improvement in aircraft efficiency.
EPA’s estimates are comparable to the International Civil 
Aviation Organization (ICAO) Report of the Independent 
Experts of Fuel Burn Reduction Technology Goals, which 
suggests efficiency gains of 19–25 percent (in fuel-
burn) could be achieved by 2020, and efficiency gains 
between 26 and 41 percent could be achieved by 2030.69 
In addition, the International Air Transport Association 
Technology Roadmap Report concludes that it might be 
possible to reduce emissions 23–30 percent in the 2020 
time frame, and 25–50 percent in later years.70 FAA’s 
Continuous Lower Emissions, Energy, and Noise (CLEEN) 
program has a near-term goal of a 33 percent reduction 
in fuel burn relative to current technology.71
We acknowledge that EPA has never before established 
aircraft emissions standards for any air pollutant 
that are more stringent than those set by ICAO, and 
therefore do not include aircraft standards in the 
lackluster or middle-of-the-road scenarios. However, 
the ability to establish aircraft emissions standards 
lies soundly within their authority under Title II of the 
Clean Air Act. It is worth noting that there may be 
other paths forward to achieve these improvements in 
new aircraft standards. ICAO’s Committee on Aviation 
Environmental Protection is also in the process of 
developing a new international standard for aircraft 
carbon dioxide emissions levels and is aiming for a 
2013 completion date for the standard.72
As a point of comparison, the European Union’s (EU’s) 
Emission Trading System (ETS) for aircraft requires 
a 3 percent reduction in 2005 emission levels starting 
in 2012 and a 5 percent reduction from the same base 
year from 2013 through 2020. This is comparable 
to the results for the middle-of-the-road scenario. 
In November 2012, the EU ETS proposed deferring 
participation in these emissions reductions for flights to 
and from Europe in anticipation of progress toward an 
international market-based approach to regulating GHG 
emissions from aviation by ICAO in 2013. The legislation 
still applies to all flights within and between the 30 
participating European countries within the EU ETS.73
4. Model Uncertainty for Aviation
There are uncertainties regarding projected unit 
turnover, aircraft efficiency, and demand. In addition, 
based on EPA’s analysis there appear to also be 
considerable uncertainties about the actual benefits 
from FAA’s NextGen program. All of these will impact 
actual CO2 emissions in the future.
There is no guarantee that the level of efficiency 
improvements (and thus emissions reductions) built 
into the AEO2012 will occur without regulations. 
Emissions standards on aircraft may therefore be 
necessary to capture efficiency improvements assumed 
by AEO2012, and thus in the base case as well as 
lackluster and middle-of-the-road scenarios.
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v.  non-energy CO2 and non-CO2 emissions
A. BASe CASe FOR nOn-eneRGY eMiSSiOnS
According to EPA’s latest emissions inventory, non-
energy emissions accounted for roughly 20 percent 
of 2010 emissions. Due to data limitations and an 
evolving understanding of natural gas systems, the 
base case projections for non-energy CO2 emissions and 
non-CO2 gases come from several different sources. We 
project that non-energy emissions will increase roughly 
18 percent above 2005 levels by 2020 and 36 percent 
above 2005 levels by 2035, even after accounting for 
recently finalized regulations that affect natural gas 
systems and HFCs emissions from vehicles (based on 
HFC emissions, not consumption).74
Non-CO2 gas projections for all sources except for 
natural gas systems and HFCs came from EPA’s Draft 
4 9Appendi x i   Federal Methods
Global Non-CO2 Emissions Projections Report: 1990-
2030.75 In this report, EPA developed country-specific 
emission projections using assumptions about economic 
activity, technology development, emissions reductions 
from well-established programs or international 
sector agreements, and other factors. Results were 
provided in five-year intervals. We estimated emissions 
between the five-year intervals by applying a linear 
rate of change. Emissions for 2030 through 2035 
were estimated by applying the same rate of change 
observed from 2025 to 2030.
The technical understanding of emissions from natural 
gas systems is continually evolving, particularly with 
regard to shale gas. Therefore, historical emission 
levels and base case projections utilized analysis 
conducted for a forthcoming working paper by WRI, 
Clearing the Air on Shale Gas Emissions: Assessing 
and Reducing the Carbon Footprint of Natural Gas.76 
This report builds on the synthesis of recent lifecycle 
analyses by Weber and Clavin, Life Cycle Carbon 
Footprint of Shale Gas: Review of Evidence and 
Implications,77 EPA’s Inventory of Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions and Sinks 2012,78 and AEO2012.
Because EPA’s Draft Global Non-CO2 Emissions 
Projections Report: 1990–2030 lumped natural gas 
systems with petroleum systems, we projected methane 
emissions from petroleum systems separately using 
historical emissions,79 historical production data,80 as 
well as projected production data.81      
For the base case, we rely on projections of HFC 
consumption estimated by EPA in Benefits of 
Addressing HFCs under the Montreal Protocol.82 
Consumption is roughly equal to life-cycle emissions 
due to low rates of HFC reclamation and destruction. 
The main difference is that emissions for some 
products can be delayed many years after their 
production. As discussed below, annual emissions 
estimates could be developed using more detailed 
models of equipment and products. However, those 
models and underlying data are proprietary.
Non-energy CO2 emissions projections were not 
provided in EPA’s Draft Global Non-CO2 Emissions 
Projections Report: 1990–2030, and so instead 
come from the Applied Dynamic Analysis of the 
Global Economy (ADAGE) reference scenario of 
EPA’s modeling of the American Clean Energy and 
Security Act of 2009 (ACES).83 ADAGE is a dynamic 
computable general equilibrium model run by RTI 
International.84 ADAGE projects emissions in five-year 
intervals from 2010 to 2050. To estimate emissions 
between those intervals, we applied a linear rate of 
change between intervals.
The sources of the base case projections do not present 
the same level of detail as does the AEO reference case 
for energy-related CO2 emissions. Therefore, in the 
sections that follow we simply describe the reported 
output for each of the base case emissions projections 
and where appropriate, describe any steps we took to 
adjust these projections.
B. nATURAL GAS SYSTeMS1.7  P e r f O r m A n C e
1. Base Case for natural Gas Systems
Natural gas production has increased by over 20 
percent over the past five years85 on account of rapid 
development of shale gas resources. Technology 
advancements in horizontal drilling and hydraulic 
fracturing have enabled access to vast supplies of 
natural gas deposits in shale rock formations.86 
The climate implications of shale gas development 
have been a point of particular controversy due to 
uncertainty around the methane emissions associated 
with development of shale gas wells and other portions 
of the natural gas system.
Our base case emissions projections come from analysis 
conducted for Clearing the Air on Shale Gas Emissions, 
a forthcoming WRI working paper that examines 
emissions and abatement opportunities for natural gas 
systems. Their base case projections were developed 
using EPA’s 2012 Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse 
Gas Emissions and Sinks: 1990-2010,87 shale gas 
production projections from AEO2012, and fugitive 
emissions rates from Life Cycle Carbon Footprint of 
Shale Gas: Review of Evidence and Implications.88
Our base case includes a suite of standards finalized by 
EPA in April 2012, including New Source Performance 
Standards (NSPS)89 for volatile organic compound 
(VOC) emissions and National Emissions Standards for 
Hazardous Air Pollutants (HAP) from U.S. natural gas 
systems.90 While not explicitly addressing GHGs, the 
NSPS will reduce methane emissions from natural gas 
systems by requiring “green completions” that capture 
gases leaked from wells.91 The NSPS will result in 
further reductions of GHGs and VOCs from high-bleed 
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compressors. The NSPS and emission standards for 
HAPs from storage tanks will also reduce GHGs and 
VOCs, though to a lesser extent.92
Clearing the Air on Shale Gas Emissions projects that 
the new standards will reduce methane emissions by 
approximately 65 mmtCO2e in 2020 and 85 mmtCO2e 
in 2035, and as a result total base case emissions 
(methane and carbon dioxide) will be 240 mmtCO2e in 
2020 and 250 mmtCO2e in 2035.
2. Lackluster Scenario for natural Gas Systems
Our lackluster scenario assumes that EPA implements 
regulations that require natural gas systems to employ:
1.  Plunger lift systems to reduce emissions from 
liquids unloading at new and existing wells; and
2.  Leak monitoring and repair to reduce fugitive 
emissions from production, processing, and 
compressor stations.93
These emissions control technologies are projected 
to pay for themselves within one to two years, even 
without a price on carbon.94Clearing the Air on Shale 
Gas Emissions projects that widespread adoption of 
these technologies would reduce methane emissions 26 
percent below base case projections.95 We assume that 
reductions commence in 2019. 
3. Middle-of-the-Road Scenario for natural Gas Systems
Our middle-of-the-road scenario assumes that 
EPA implements regulations that require natural 
gas systems to employ the above emissions control 
technologies—as well as conversion of existing high-
bleed pneumatic controllers to low-bleed or no-bleed 
controllers—to reduce emissions from processing 
and transmission. This technology is predicted to 
have a payback period of less than two years with a 
$20 price on carbon, and is projected to pay for itself 
within three years even without a price on carbon. 
Clearing the Air on Shale Gas Emissions projects 
that widespread adoption of these three technologies 
would reduce methane emissions roughly 37 percent 
below base case projections.96 We assume that these 
reductions commence in 2019.
4. Go-Getter Scenario for natural Gas Systems
Our go-getter scenario assumes that EPA implements 
regulations that require natural gas systems to employ 
all of the emission control technologies identified in the 
lackluster and middle-of-the-road scenarios, as well as:
1.  Hot taps to reduce emissions from pipeline 
maintenance and repair during transmission;
2.  Desiccant dehydrators to reduce emissions during 
dehydration of wet gas; 
3.  Improved compressor maintenance to reduce 
emissions during processing; and 
4.  Vapor recovery units to reduce emissions during 
storage.
The technologies were identified by the Natural 
Resource Defense Council’s Leaking Profits report as 
being both technically feasible and profitable, each 
with a payback period of less than three years under 
NRDC’s assumptions.97 Using the same methodology 
l A C k l u s t e r m I d d l e - O f -t h e - r O A d g O - g e t t e r 
EPA performance and emissions standards achieve 21-29 percent reduction in CH4 emissions compared to projections without standards 
through the use of green completions and dry seal processors
Emissions reductions of 26 percent 
from base case starting in 2019. 
Assumes implementation of plunger 
lift systems to reduce emissions from 
liquids unloading at new and existing 
wells, and leak monitoring and 
repair to reduce fugitive emissions 
from production, processing, and 
compressor stations.
Emissions reductions of 37 percent 
from base case in 2019. Assumes 
implementation of measures in 
lackluster scenario and conversion 
of existing high-bleed pneumatic 
controllers to low-bleed or no-bleed 
controllers to reduce emissions  
from production, processing,  
and transmission.
Emissions reductions of 67 percent from base case 
starting in 2019. Assumes implementation of measures 
in middle-of-the-road scenario as well as: desiccant 
dehydrators to reduce emissions during dehydration of 
wet gas; improved compressor maintenance to reduce 
emissions during processing; hot taps in maintenance of 
pipelines during transmission; and vapor recovery units 
to reduce emissions during storage. 
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and conservative assumptions as were employed in 
the WRI working paper Clearing the Air on Shale Gas 
Emissions, these emission control technologies are 
found to achieve 67 percent reduction in emissions 
from the base case projections.98 We assume that the 
standards lead to reductions beginning in 2019.
5. Modeling notes for natural Gas Systems
Emissions from natural gas systems are related to the 
amount of natural gas produced. While the AEO2012 
reference case shows the U.S. going from being a net 
importer to a net exporter of natural gas by the early 
2020s, consumption and production levels remain 
within 5 percent of each other through most of our 
study period.99 Based on this observation, in this 
analysis we employ the simplifying assumption that 
changes in natural gas demand will result in equivalent 
changes in natural gas production in the United 
States. In each of the scenarios, methane and carbon 
dioxide emissions levels were adjusted to account for 
changes in natural demand from electricity generation, 
residential and commercial appliances, and industry. 
We do not attempt to sort out the relative change in 
conventional and unconventional production. This is 
not expected to significantly impact the results, as 
we project the emissions rate for conventional and 
unconventional sources to be within 5 to 30 percent 
of one another across all scenarios.100 Across all 
scenarios, natural gas demand is not expected to 
change by more than 12 percent,101 and changes in 
upstream emissions of natural gas are estimated to 
be less than 0.1 percent of total economy-wide GHG 
emissions reductions.
6. Uncertainties for natural Gas Systems
WRI analysis of greenhouse gas emissions from natural 
gas systems relies in large part on activity data from 
EPA’s 2012 Inventory, as well as on lifecycle analyses 
that utilize data from that inventory. However, The 
American Petroleum Institute (API) and America’s 
Natural Gas Alliance (ANGA) published a joint study 
in September, 2012 that calls into question some 
of EPA’s assumptions and methodologies in the 
agency’s calculations for the largest sources of leaked 
and vented methane from natural gas systems. This 
industry-led study is noteworthy because it presents 
measurement data from 19 of the 21 largest basins 
across the U.S. Additional measurement data will be 
published over the course of the next year – including 
a study led by Environmental Defense Fund102 and 
measurement data provided to the EPA under Subpart 
W of the Greenhouse Gas Reporting Program103 – that 
will help clarify the still-murky picture of natural gas 
systems emissions.
Specifically, the API and ANGA study reports a much 
lower frequency of liquids unloading, and a much 
lower emissions factor for the venting associated with 
this process, than does EPA in the 2012 Inventory. 
API and ANGA also estimate a much lower refracture 
rate for hydraulically fractured wells than is used in 
the 2012 Inventory. 
Using the results from the API/ANGA study in place 
of the activity data from EPA’s 2012 Inventory would 
reduce historical estimates of methane and carbon 
dioxide emissions from natural gas systems, the base 
case projection of those emissions, and the reductions 
from that baseline from EPA’s existing standards 
and from our three reduction scenarios.  The baseline 
projections would be reduced by 14-21 percent from 
2020-2035. The EPA performance and emissions 
standards finalized in 2012 would achieve a 21-26 
percent reduction in methane emissions starting in 
2013 compared to projections without standards, 
compared to 21-29 percent using the 2012 Inventory. 
Likewise, implementing regulations consistent with our 
lackluster, middle-of-the-road, and go-getter scenarios 
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described above would lead to reductions in methane 
emissions from the base case between 2019 and 2035 
that are equivalent to roughly 22 percent, 35 percent, 
and 51 percent, respectively.  These compare to 26,  
37, and 67, respectively, using the 2012 Inventory. 
Using the results from the API/ANGA study, the 
federal go-getter scenario only reduces emissions  
16.3 percent below 2005 levels, and thus additional 
state (or legislative) action would be needed to achieve 
the 17 percent reduction target.
C. HYdROFLUROCARBOnS (HFCS)
1. Base Case Scenario for Hydrofluorocarbons
Emissions of HFCs have been increasing due to the 
phaseout of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and other 
ozone-depleting substances under the Montreal 
Protocol and Clean Air Act. This trend is expected to 
continue as the interim substitutes, HCFCs, are also 
phased out as they are currently being replaced with 
gases that have a high global warming potential.104 
EPA’s Draft Global Non-CO2 Emissions Projections 
Report: 1990-2030 projects that if current trends 
continue, hydroflourocarbon (HFCs) emissions will 
increase from 143 mmtCO2e in 2010 to roughly  
411 mmtCO2e in 2035.
105
EPA’s projections were developed using the Vintaging 
model, a proprietary bottom-up model of “ozone-
depleting substances (ODS) and ODS-substitute-
containing equipment and products to estimate the use 
and subsequent emissions of ODS substitutes in the 
U.S.”106 Without this model, we were unable to develop 
robust estimates of actual emissions due to changes 
in consumption. Therefore, we relied on projections 
of HFC consumption estimated by EPA in Benefits 
of Addressing HFCs under the Montreal Protocol for 
the base case.107 In this report, EPA projects that 
HFC consumption in the U.S. will increase from 300 
mmtCO2e in 2010 to roughly 580 mmtCO2e in 2035.
These projections do not, however, account for the 
HFC benefits projected from EPA’s GHG emissions 
standards for light-, medium-, and heavy-duty 
vehicles. For light-duty vehicles, EPA offers a credit 
to manufacturers that reduce HFC leakage from AC 
systems. The emissions standards for medium- and 
heavy-duty vehicles, on the other hand, establish 
specific standards for HFC leakage from heavy-duty 
pickup trucks and vans as well as combination tractors. 
We adjusted these projections using estimated HFC 
abatement from light-duty vehicles as reported in 
EPA’s OMEGA model outputs108 and from medium- 
and heavy-duty vehicles using EPA and NHTSA’s 
regulatory impact analysis (RIA).109 We assumed that 
reported lifetime reductions in HFC emissions for each 
vehicle model year corresponded to the same level 
of reductions in consumption. After accounting for 
these new regulations, we project in the base case that 
HFC consumption will only increase to 543 mmtCO2e 
in 2035 (37 mmtCO2e less than the 580 mmtCO2e 
predicted in Benefits of Addressing HFCs under the 
Montreal Protocol).
2. Lackluster, Middle-of-the-Road, and Go-Getter 
Scenarios for Hydrofluorocarbons
On May 9, 2012, the U.S. filed a joint proposal with 
Canada and Mexico to amend the Montreal Protocol. 
That proposal calls for a ramp-down of emissions of 
high global warming potential (GWP) HFCs, so that in 
2033 production and consumption of HFCs on a GWP-
weighted basis are 15 percent of base case emissions 
in the U.S. and other developed countries (specifically, 
non-Article 5 Parties). The baseline is defined as the 
average of 2005–2008 HFC consumption plus 85 
percent of the average 2005–2008 HCFC consumption. 
The proposal puts forth a separate, slightly less 
aggressive reduction schedule for developing countries 
listed under Article 5 of the Montreal Protocol (see 
Figure A-1.14).
l A C k l u s t e r m I d d l e - O f -t h e - r O A d g O - g e t t e r 
Consumption ramp-down occurs three years 
later than the schedule detailed in the joint 
North American Proposal.
Consumption is ramped-down in a manner 
consistent with the joint North American 
Proposal, which calls for an 85 percent 
reduction below 2005–2008 levels by 2033.
Consumption is ramped-down more rapidly 
than in the joint North American Proposal, 
achieving the 85 percent reduction target in 
2028, five years earlier than detailed in the 
joint North American Proposal.
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EPA’s authority for regulating emissions of ozone-
depleting substances comes from Title VI of the Clean 
Air Act. The phasedown of HFCs could be implemented 
through its Significant New Alternatives Policy (SNAP) 
program. The SNAP program implements section 612 
of the Clean Air Act, which calls for the replacement of 
ozone-depleting substances with substitutes that reduce 
the overall risk to human health and the environment. 
Under the SNAP program, EPA may restrict or 
prohibit the use of unacceptable substitutes and classify 
substitutes that are acceptable.110 In its report, Benefits 
of Addressing HFCs under the Montreal Protocol,111 EPA 
notes that the most promising options for reducing HFC 
consumption through the SNAP program include:
•	 “Substituting HFCs with low-GWP or no-GWP 
substances in a variety of applications (where 
safety and performance requirements can be met);
•	 Implementing new technologies that use, at 
installation and/or over the lifetime of the equipment, 
no or significantly lower amounts of HFCs; and,
•	 Various process and handling options—including 
the principles of refrigerant recovery and 
management implemented during the CFC 
phaseout—that reduce consumption during the 
manufacture, use, and disposal of products that 
contain or use HFCs.”
We note that Title VI provides additional authority 
to EPA to reduce HFCs beyond the SNAP program, 
including sections 608 and 609. We assume that EPA 
will either implement the ramp-down schedule after 
it is included in an international agreement, or will 
seek to achieve similar reductions through existing 
authority absent such an agreement. Because the 
reduction schedule proposed by the United States 
achieves relatively large reductions from the base case, 
and because they have signaled a strong intention to 
pursue this long-term path, in the middle-of-the-road 
scenario we assume that EPA takes action to achieve the 
reduction schedule proposed for non-Article 5 Parties.112 
In the lackluster scenario, we assume that a similar 
reduction schedule is followed, except that the reductions 
commence beginning in 2019 instead of 2016.
Our go-getter scenario assumes that EPA sets standards 
that result in a more aggressive reduction schedule so 
that an 85 percent reduction in consumption is achieved 
five years before the middle-of-the-road scenario. This 
results in a 61 percent reduction in consumption in 2020 
compared to the base case projections in the same year. 
The full schedules are detailed in Figure A-1.14.
3. Modeling notes for Hydrofluorocarbons
Using these HFC consumption-based estimates, we 
find that go-getter action for HFCs and other sectors 
will result in economy-wide U.S. GHG emissions that 
are 17 percent below 2005 levels in 2020. As noted 
above, we did not have access to the Vintaging model 
or similar models that would have allowed us to develop 
robust estimates of actual emissions due to changes in 
consumption. However, we developed a basic emissions 
model to provide rough estimates of 2020 emissions.  
This was only possible due to the relatively short time 
considered (i.e., 2020 as opposed to emissions through 
2035), as it allowed us to minimize the variables of 
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equipment turnover and recharging. The results of this 
analysis, showing economy-wide reductions in the range 
of 15 to 19 percent, were generally consistent with the 
consumption-based estimates we used in this study.113
d. COAL MineS
1. Base Case for Coal Mines
The base case utilizes EPA’s Draft Global Non-CO2 
Emissions Projections Report: 1990–2030, which 
projects methane emissions will increase from 70 
mmtCO2e in 2010 to 87 mmtCO2e in 2035.
2. Lackluster, Middle-of-the-Road, and Go-Getter 
Scenarios for Coal Mines
All scenarios assume that EPA establishes 
performance standards for new and existing coal mines 
in a manner that results in abatement of methane 
emissions consistent with the cost-effective reductions 
identified in EPA’s marginal abatement cost curves. 
For example, reductions from coal mines can be 
achieved through degasification and pipeline injection 
and through oxidation of ventilation air methane. For 
simplicity, we assumed that relatively few new coal 
mines would come online between 2012 and 2017, 
and thus do not model any reductions until 2019, the 
earliest expected date that performance standards 
could be in place for existing coal mines. Table A-1.9 
shows the level of GHG emissions reductions achieved 
under the three scenarios, and the corresponding cost 
per ton from EPA analysis.
We based our assessment of achievable emissions 
reductions using these measures on the marginal 
abatement cost curves found in EPA’s Preliminary Draft 
Global Mitigation of Non-CO2 Greenhouse Gases Report 
(March 2012).114 Marginal abatement cost curves can 
serve as a useful point of reference because EPA will 
consider the cost of abatement when setting prescribed 
emissions rates for new and existing coal mines. EPA’s 
marginal abatement curves provide cost information per 
ton of emissions reduced, and have been used by EPA 
with ADAGE emissions forecasts in various analyses. 
EPA’s Preliminary Draft Global Mitigation of Non-
CO2 Greenhouse Gases Report (March 2012) represents 
an update to their 2006 report. Their 2012 analysis 
incorporates updated mitigation technologies, labor and 
energy costs, and emissions baselines with an updated 
modeling approach.
We based the lackluster scenario on the reductions 
achievable at a cost of $5 per ton of CO2e. The middle-
of-the-road scenario was based on the reductions 
achievable at a cost of $20 per ton of CO2e. The go-
getter scenario was based on the reductions achievable 
at a cost of $61 per ton of CO2e.
The selected costs cover the range of prices that were 
considered at the federal and state level in cap-and-
trade program design.115 They also cover the range of 
prices considered in the report— Technical Support 
Document: Social Cost of Carbon Regulatory Impact 
Analysis Under Executive Order 12866, released in 
February 2010—prepared by the Interagency Working 
Group on the Social Cost of Carbon.116  The social cost of 
carbon is meant to provide an estimate of the monetized 
damages associated with the incremental emissions 
of greenhouse gases. The estimates contained in the 
report are intended to provide guidance to agencies as 
they incorporate the benefits of reducing greenhouse 
gas emissions into the cost-benefit analyses associated 
with future regulatory actions. The reported range was 
$6–$73 in 2015 and $10–$100 in 2030.
It bears noting that there may be barriers to achieving 
the full technical reduction potential for emissions 
reductions through direct regulation as compared 
to a voluntary offsets program. According to EPA’s 
inventory of coal mines for 2010, abandoned coal 
A B A t e m e n t 
C O s t 
( $ / t O n  C O 2 e )
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I n  2 0 2 0  ( P e r C e n t )
e m I s s I O n s  ( m m t C O 2 e )
 
2 0 1 0                2 0 2 0               2 0 3 5
Base Case - - 70 73 87
lackluster 5 24 percent - 55 66
middle-of-the-road 20 32 percent - 50 59
go-getter 61 39 percent - 44 53
t A B l e  A - 1 . 9  methane emissions from Coal mines
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mines (i.e., those that are not producing coal) account 
for approximately 6 percent of coal mine emissions.117 
Abandoned mines pose significant challenges to 
enforcement of standards. Therefore, we assume that 
only the 94 percent of coal mine methane that comes 
from active mines is abated in response to NSPS. This 
is consistent with EPA’s Preliminary Draft Global 
Mitigation of Non-CO2 Greenhouse Gases Report (March 
2012), which derives the abatement curves based on 
reductions of methane emissions from active mines only.
3. Uncertainties for Coal Mines
Our scenarios establish new standards for new and 
existing coal mines. EPA’s marginal abatement cost 
curves, however, do not differentiate between new 
and existing mines. They also do not show significant 
changes in abatement over time (from 2020 to 
2030). This means that the rate that new mines come 
into production should not significantly affect the 
abatement rate. Emissions will change, however, if 
production increases or decreases differently than is 
predicted by EPA. There is also uncertainty about what 
percentage of mines will be abandoned in future years. 
If that percentage increases above 6 percent, then 
emissions from this sector may increase beyond what is 
modeled here.
e. niTRiC And AdipiC ACid MAnUFACTURinG
A. Base Case for nitric and Adipic Acid Manufacturing
Nitric acid (HNO3) is primarily used as a feedstock 
for synthetic fertilizer, though it is also used in the 
production of adipic acid and explosives. Adipic acid 
(C6H10O4) is used in the production of nylon and as a 
flavor enhancer in certain foods. The manufacture of 
nitric and adipic acid generates nitrous oxide (N2O) 
as a byproduct, which according to the IPCC’s Fourth 
Assessment has a global warming potential 298 times 
that of carbon dioxide over a 100-year timeframe.118
For the base case we relied on EPA’s Draft Global 
Non-CO2 Emissions Projections Report: 1990-2030, 
estimating emissions for 2030 through 2035 by 
applying the same rate of change from 2025 to 2030.
We project that N2O emissions from nitric and adipic 
acid production will increase from 28 mmtCO2e in 
2010 to 38 mmtCO2e in 2035.
2. Lackluster, Middle-of-the-Road, and Go-Getter 
Scenarios for nitric and Adipic Acid Manufacturing
All three scenarios assume that EPA establishes 
performance standards for new and existing nitric acid 
manufacturers in a manner that results in abatement 
of N2O emissions consistent with the cost-effective 
reductions identified in EPA’s marginal abatement 
cost curves. This generally would require some form of 
catalytic reduction for nitric acid manufacturers. For 
adipic acid manufacturers, this would likely require 
thermal destruction using reducing flame burners with 
premixed methane or natural gas.119
A B A t e m e n t 
C O s t 
( $ / t O n  C O 2 e )
P e r C e n t  r e d u C t I O n 
f r O m  B A s e  C A s e  
I n  2 0 2 0  ( P e r C e n t )
e m I s s I O n s  ( m m t C O 2 e )
 
2 0 1 0                2 0 2 0               2 0 3 5
Base Case - - 28 31 38
lackluster 5 13 percent - 27 33
middle-of-the-road 20 56 percent - 14 16
go-getter 61 75 percent - 8 9
t A B l e  A - 1 . 1 0  nitrous Oxide emissions from nitric Acid and Adipic Acid manufacturing 
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For simplicity, we assumed that relatively few new 
production facilities would come online between 2012 
and 2017, and thus do not model any reductions until 
2019, the earliest expected date that performance 
standards could be in place for existing production 
facilities. Table A-1.10 shows the level of GHG 
emissions reductions achieved for both nitric and 
adipic acid facilities under the three scenarios, and 
the corresponding cost per ton from EPA analysis as 
discussed above in the coal mine section. 
3. Uncertainties for nitric and Adipic Acid Manufacturing
In this section, we model the impact of performance 
standards on new and existing units. EPA’s marginal 
abatement cost curves do not differentiate between 
new and existing units, and do not predict significant 
changes in abatement over time (from 2020 to 
2030). This means that the rate that new units come 
into production should not affect the abatement 
rate. However, if production increases or decreases 
differently than predicted by EPA, then emissions will 
change accordingly.
f I g u r e  A - 1 . 1 7   nitrous Oxide emissions from nitric and 
Adipic Acid manufacturing
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F. LAndFiLLS
1. Base Case for Landfills
For the base case, we relied on EPA’s Draft Global 
Non-CO2 Emissions Projections Report: 1990-2030, 
which projects that methane emissions from landfills 
will remain relatively constant between 2010  
(154 mmtCO2e) and 2035 (152 mmtCO2e).
2. Lackluster, Middle-of-the-Road, and Go-Getter 
Scenarios for Landfills
All three scenarios assume that EPA establishes 
performance standards for new and existing landfills 
in a manner that results in methane abatement 
consistent with the cost-effective reductions 
identified in EPA’s marginal abatement cost curves. 
Abatement at landfills is accomplished through 
methane capture and destruction. For simplicity, 
we assumed that relatively few new landfills would 
come online between 2012 and 2018, and thus do 
not model any reductions until 2019, the earliest 
expected date that performance standards could be 
in place for existing landfills. Table A-1.11 shows the 
level of GHG emissions reductions achieved under 
the three scenarios, and the corresponding cost per 
ton from EPA analysis, as discussed above in the 
coal mine section. 
Our previous analysis suggested that 44 to 74 percent 
of methane emissions from landfills could be abated 
under the three scenarios, based on data from EPA’s 
2006 release of its Global Mitigation of Non-CO2 
Greenhouse Gases report.120 EPA’s updated analysis, 
Draft Global Non-CO2 Emissions Projections Report: 
1990-2030, is thought to be more accurate as it 
includes more information on gas capture rates, 
mitigation options and costs, and labor costs. It also 
projects decreased prices for landfill methane gas, 
which reduces the benefit for methane capture.
A B A t e m e n t 
C O s t 
( $ / t O n  C O 2 e )
P e r C e n t  r e d u C t I O n 
f r O m  B A s e  C A s e  
I n  2 0 2 0  ( P e r C e n t )
e m I s s I O n s  ( m m t C O 2 e )
 
2 0 1 0                2 0 2 0               2 0 3 5
Base Case - - 154 152 152
lackluster 5 5 percent - 145 144
middle-of-the-road 20 9 percent - 139 138
go-getter 61 9 percent - 138 135
t A B l e  A - 1 . 1 1  methane emissions from landfills
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3. Uncertainties for Landfills
EPA’s marginal abatement cost curves do not 
differentiate between new and existing units, and 
predict minimal changes in abatement over time 
(from 2020 to 2030). This means that changes in the 
percentage of emissions attributable to new landfills 
(as opposed to older landfills) should not affect the 
abatement rate. However, if methane production 
increases or decreases due to changes in the quantities 
of waste going to landfills or landfill management 
practices, then emissions will change accordingly. 
vI. Industry
A. MAnUFACTURinG
1. Base Case for Manufacturing
Baseline emissions for energy-related CO2 emissions come 
from EIA’s AEO2012. Under the AEO2012 reference 
scenario, each major manufacturing sector is projected 
to see an upward trend in production.121  As a result, in 
2035 total production exceeds production levels in 2009. 
The AEO reference case assumes that overall process 
efficiency will gradually improve over time. However, 
overall energy use and emissions are forecast to increase 
in most subsectors.122 Due to mature technology and 
low turnover rates, boiler efficiency, however, remains 
relatively constant over time.123
Emissions from onsite combustion and other industrial 
processes—such as those from limestone calcination in 
the cement production process—in the manufacturing 
sector are projected to grow from 527 mmtCO2e in 
2009 to 566 mmtCO2e in 2035, amounting to a 7 
percent increase in emissions over this time period 
(roughly three-quarters of these emissions result 
f I g u r e  A - 1 . 1 8   methane emissions from landfills
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from onsite combustion, while the remainder are 
process emissions). Increases in emissions from the 
food, cement, and paper industries offset emissions 
reductions in the bulk chemical and iron and steel 
industries. More detailed sector breakdowns are 
depicted in Figure A-1.20. However, it is important 
to note that onsite combustion and other industrial 
processes account for only 62 percent of total emissions. 
The other 38 percent is due to emissions associated with 
purchased electricity (see Figure A-1.21).
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2. Lackluster Scenario for Manufacturing
In its ANPR, EPA concluded that existing industrial 
boilers could achieve efficiency improvements of 1–10 
percent, and that efficiency improvements of 10–33 
percent could be obtained by replacing an existing 
boiler with a CHP unit.124
For the lackluster scenario, we assume that EPA 
establishes performance standards for new and 
existing industrial boilers. To simplify the modeling 
of this scenario, we assume that EPA establishes 
emissions limits for new and existing industrial boilers 
that achieve a 10 percent reduction in emissions 
beyond base case projections. This was modeled as 
a 10 percent reduction in fuel use across all boilers 
and fuel types in the manufacturing sector, which 
includes food, paper, bulk chemical, glass, cement, 
iron and steel,125 aluminum, metals-based durables, 
and other manufacturing.126 A comparable level 
of emissions reductions could be achieved through 
other combinations of new unit and existing unit 
standards.127,128 Since in the early years few new units 
are expected, for simplicity we model these reductions 
starting in 2019 to account for the six-year time lag for 
developing performance standards for existing units.
3. Middle-of-the-Road Scenario for Manufacturing
According to NEMS support documentation for 
AEO2012, industrial boilers account for only 28 
percent of manufacturing heat and power energy 
consumption, excluding byproduct fuels.129 In the 
middle-of-the-road scenario, we therefore assume 
that EPA devises performance standards that account 
for the entire industrial facility and purchased 
electricity, instead of merely capturing boiler efficiency 
opportunities. This more holistic approach would 
capture efficiencies in the entire industrial process, 
thereby improving the rate of emissions per unit of 
output. This would require a slightly more expansive 
approach to performance standards than EPA has 
implemented in the past. However, it is worth noting 
that a similar approach was discussed by the Climate 
Change Working Group of the Clean Air Act Advisory 
Committee.130 Such standards could take the form 
of output-based emissions rates, or (in the case of 
existing units) through a flexible compliance program 
for industry that rewards improvements in emissions 
per unit of output.
l A C k l u s t e r m I d d l e - O f -t h e - r O A d g O - g e t t e r
fossil-fuel 
Combustion in 
manufacturing 
and Cement 
kilns
Emissions reductions 
consistent with a 10 percent 
improvement in efficiency 
beyond base case levels 
starting in 2019.
Emissions reductions consistent 
with harnessing all cost-effective 
energy efficiency across the entire 
manufacturing facility. Emissions 
standards also drive reductions in 
process emissions from cement kilns.
Emissions reductions consistent with 
harnessing all cost-effective energy efficiency 
across the entire manufacturing facility; all new 
units must meet emissions rate equivalent to 
natural gas combustion. Emissions standards 
also drive reductions in process emissions from 
cement kilns.
refineries Emissions reductions 
consistent with a 1 percent 
improvement in efficiency.
Emissions reductions consistent with 
a 5 percent improvement in efficiency.
Emissions reductions consistent with a 10 
percent improvement in efficiency.
t A B l e  A - 1 . 1 2  Performance standards to reduce Industry emissions 
f I g u r e  A - 1 . 2 1   Industrial greenhouse gas emissions  
by source, 2010
Source: Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks: 1990-2010, EPA.
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In order to gauge the additional reductions achievable 
through process efficiency improvements beyond 
those included in AEO2012, we relied on a study 
commissioned by the Department of Energy (DOE), 
Scenarios for the Clean Energy Future (CEF).131 The 
CEF study examines the effect of a suite of voluntary 
policies on reducing industrial emissions. In the CEF, 
two different policy implementation scenarios are 
analyzed: a moderate and advanced scenario. The 
CEF advanced scenario included voluntary sector 
agreements between government and industry and a 
suite of complementary policies, including expanded 
research and development and a domestic carbon 
dioxide emissions trading system with prices around $19 
per ton of carbon dioxide.132 This valuation of the impact 
of carbon dioxide emissions could be integrated into the 
development of sector-appropriate standards, whether 
they are in the form of source-specific emissions rates, 
or a more flexible compliance program.
The CEF study, which was completed in November 
2000, was based on AEO1999. In Real Prospects 
for Energy Efficiency in the United States,133 the 
National Academy of Sciences concluded that the 
percentage of reductions found in the CEF can be 
applied to more recent releases of the AEO. This was 
because “new energy efficiency opportunities arise 
each year as infrastructure and equipment ages, and 
as new and improved technologies are introduced 
into the marketplace.”134 For the middle-of-the-road 
scenario, we assumed that reductions commence in 
2019 due to the time lag for establishing standards 
on existing units through section 111(d). We then 
assumed that industrial efficiency ramps up in a linear 
manner so that in 2025 it achieves the same percent 
improvement, relative to business-as-usual projections, 
as was found in the CEF study for 2010. We assumed 
that the relative energy efficiency benefits modeled in 
the CEF study for 2020 would be achieved in 2035. 
We also assume a linear rate of change between the 
reductions modeled in 2025 and 2035. 
The built-in time lags are intended to provide the sector 
time to turn over stock and adopt improved efficiency 
measures at existing facilities. The precise amount of 
time needed to achieve these changes is uncertain, as 
the CEF analysis did not provide annual results, but 
instead presented findings at two separate intervals. 
For this scenario, we did not need to independently 
calculate unit turnover, as it is already built into the 
CEF reduction scenario. However, the CEF generally 
assumed a slightly higher unit retirement rate than 
is incorporated into the AEO, based on their own 
assessment of the retirement rates commonly observed 
across industrial classes. This level of efficiency and 
technology improvement leads to GHG emissions 
reductions of 16 mmtCO2 in 2020 and 76 mmtCO2 in 
2035 from onsite combustion above what is projected in 
the base case. It also leads to reductions in purchased 
electricity of 28 TWh (3 percent) in 2020 and 168 TWh 
(21 percent) in 2035 compared to the base case.
4. Go-Getter Scenario for Manufacturing
In the go-getter scenario, we again assume that EPA 
captures efficiencies across the entire industrial 
process by establishing equipment efficiency standards, 
sector-wide benchmark standards, or some other 
flexible compliance program for industry. This is 
modeled using the CEF improvements in the same 
manner as the middle-of-the-road scenario. In the go-
getter scenario, we also assume that EPA establishes 
emissions standards for all new combustion sources 
(not just boilers) equivalent to natural gas combustion. 
This could be accomplished through co-firing of 
biomass, use of natural gas, carbon capture and 
sequestration, or built into the reduction schedule 
of a flexible compliance program. Combined, these 
standards lead to reductions of 30 mmtCO2e in 2020 
and 97 mmtCO2e in 2035 compared to the base case 
projections in the same years. Similar to the middle-of-
the-road scenario, purchases of electricity are reduced 
by 28 TWh in 2020 and 168 TWh in 2035 compared 
to the base case.
5. Uncertainties for Manufacturing
The CEF’s considerations of cost, unit turnover, and its 
direct comparison to projected efficiency improvements 
built into the AEO make it a particularly valuable study 
for incorporation into the model. Since this study was 
published, other analyses have been completed, but 
they do not provide these same features. Nevertheless, 
some of them warrant consideration for comparative 
purposes. Of note are the series of “bandwidth” studies 
sponsored by the Department of Energy’s Industrial 
Technologies Program. These studies assess the 
amount of energy that can be saved from a particular 
industrial process and compare current average energy 
use to state-of-the-art practices and the practical 
minimum energy use. Since each of the bandwidth 
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studies was conducted independently, there are some 
inconsistencies. The studies examine state of the art/
best practice for each sector, which they generally define 
as the least energy-intensive option in current use. They 
also examine what they call the practical minimum, 
which varies somewhat between the energy required 
“assuming application of reasonable technologies such 
as heat recovery, batch preheating, etc,”135 and the 
“energy required for a typical plant after deployment 
of new process technologies developed through applied 
research and development.”136
Table A-1.13 compares the sector-specific findings of 
the bandwidth studies with energy savings modeled 
under this report’s middle-of-the-road and go-
getter scenarios. For instance, under our scenarios 
efficiency improvements from the paper and glass 
sectors are well below those that would be achieved 
if they employed the best practices identified in 
their respective bandwidth studies. Meanwhile, we 
predict that the GHG emissions reductions from the 
bulk chemical sector are between the energy savings 
identified from best practices and those identified 
with the practical minimum. Projected energy 
reductions from the iron and steel sector exceed 
the bandwidth’s practical minimum by 3 percent137 
(the practical minimum is not expected to be 
technically feasible without additional research and 
development), raising questions about the feasibility 
of achieving the level of improvement modeled for the 
iron and steel industry in the CEF. However, in Real 
Prospects for Energy Efficiency in the United States, 
the National Academy of Sciences concludes that 
significant opportunities exist to reduce energy use 
in the iron and steel sector, pointing to a McKinsey 
and Company study that found 22 percent energy 
savings were obtainable by 2020 compared to 2007 
levels, which is much greater than the 3 percent 
improvement the bandwidth study found for current 
best practices.138 Furthermore, an American Iron 
and Steel Institute study, Saving One Barrel of Oil 
per Ton,139 sets an industry-wide goal of reducing 
energy-use per ton of steel production by 39 percent 
in 2025 compared to 2003 levels. Due to this lack 
of consensus in the available literature in terms of 
potential efficiency improvements and a common 
baseline, we did not adjust the iron and steel numbers 
from those found in the CEF.
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Base 
Case
lackluster 
(10 percent 
efficiency gain 
all boilers)
middle-
of-the-
road 
(Cef) 
go-getter (Cef 
+ natural gas 
emissions rate 
for new units)
food Products NA NA 33 20 26 37 40
Paper 26 39 11 19 25 38 42
Bulk Chemical 18 71 38 27 33 37 38
glass 35 52 21 11 12 18 19
Cement NA NA 31 9 9 32 46
Iron & steel 3 31 34 33 33 37 45
Aluminum NA NA 48 25 28 47 51
Note: The bandwidth study determined baseline energy consumption for paper manufacturing using 2002 Manufacturing Energy Consumption Survey (MECS) data, plus data 
collected for the report. The bandwidth study for glass was based on data collected through surveys collected for the report prior to publication in 2007. The bandwidth study for 
steel was based on energy-use data from 2000. The bandwidth study for bulk chemicals was based on energy data collected in 2004 for the report.140
Source: Steel Industry Energy Bandwidth Study. Energetics, Inc., U.S. Department of Energy, October 2004; Chemical Bandwidth Study Exergy Analysis: A Powerful Tool for 
Identifying Process Inefficiencies in the U.S. Chemical Industry. Dickson Ozokwelu, Joseph Porcelli, and Peter Akinjiola, U.S. Department of Energy, December 2006; Industrial 
Glass Bandwidth Analysis, David Rue, James Servaites, and Warren Wolf, U.S. Department of Energy, December 2006; Pulp and Paper Industry Energy Bandwidth Study, Jacobs 
Institute of Paper Science and Technology, American Institute of Chemical Engineers, August 2006.
t A B l e  A - 1 3   energy savings and energy-related Carbon dioxide Intensity Improvements in the manufacturing sector 
(percent)
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There is considerable uncertainty in industrial unit 
turnover. Greater equipment turnover could lead to 
more significant reductions depending on the pace of 
new technology development and actual standards that 
are set for new units. Lower turnover would lead to 
fewer reductions.
There is also considerable uncertainty about the long-
term production forecast for each manufacturing 
subsector. Increased production beyond what is modeled 
in the AEO2012 could increase emissions, but may 
also signal improved economics for domestic industry 
that would allow for greater investments in efficiency 
technologies and deeper cuts in GHG emissions.
Furthermore, this study relies heavily on the CEF to 
estimate the emissions reductions achievable if plant-
wide efficiency opportunities were incorporated into GHG 
performance standards. The CEF study considers cost, 
unit turnover, and directly compares efficiency gains 
to those built into the AEO. More current assessments 
would be necessary before regulatory standards could 
be established for these sectors. New assessments would 
likely produce different estimates for each manufacturing 
sector than what we modeled here. Nevertheless, we 
believe that this analysis provides a sense of the range of 
reductions achievable through federal authority given the 
assessments currently available.
6. Modeling notes for Manufacturing
Changes in purchases of electricity are accounted for 
in the electricity demand module. Because we relied 
on EIA’s AEO2012 $25 carbon tax scenario for the 
go-getter power sector generation projections, we had 
to make adjustments to industrial efficiency savings. 
This is because the $25 carbon tax scenario includes 
industrial efficiency savings beyond those modeled in the 
AEO2012 reference case. Therefore, we incorporated 
only the benefits that occur beyond those included in the 
$25 carbon tax scenario, amounting to roughly 45 TWh 
of additional electricity savings in 2035.
Changes in natural gas consumption are accounted 
for in the natural gas demand module that adjusts 
upstream natural gas emissions to reflect downstream 
consumption patterns.
AEO2012 does not separate out new and older units in 
intermediary or final outputs for the industrial sector 
module. Therefore, we had to estimate unit turnover 
in order to account for the new unit standards in the 
go-getter scenario. Since the scenario is based on the 
CEF study, we employed the retirement rates found in 
the CEF, which are generally higher than those used in 
the AEO2012. In this analysis, modeling of new unit 
development is somewhat simplified and can lead to 
the overdeployment of new units if production rapidly 
changes for a very brief period of time. To prevent 
that from occurring, we smoothed the production 
curves upon which turnover was based. The model 
did not build out new units if it projected that sector 
production would result in a surplus supply within 
seven years of new unit construction. Seven years was 
chosen because it parallels the AEO2012 assumption 
that new units are not eligible to retire within the first 
seven years of construction.
B. CeMenT KiLnS
1. Base Case for Cement Kilns
Base case emissions for energy-related CO2 emissions 
are discussed above in Section VI.A. In 2010 CO2 
emissions from energy consumption accounted for 46 
percent of total CO2 from cement plants, while the 
remaining CO2 emissions were the result of chemical 
processes (limestone calcination) associated with 
cement production.141 In the analysis, we relied on 
ADAGE for the base case projections of non-energy 
CO2 emissions. However, ADAGE does not include 
a separate line item for cement process emissions, 
but instead folds them into a broader category 
that includes process emissions from all energy-
intensive manufacturing. Therefore, we developed 
our own projections. We determined the percentage 
of industrial process CO2 emissions attributable 
to cement production in 2010 using EPA’s 2012 
Inventory of Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks,142 
and multiplied this by AEO2012 projections. We then 
multiplied 2010 emissions by the percent change in 
cement output for all subsequent years, as obtained 
from Table 30 of AEO2012, “Cement and Lime 
Industry Energy Consumption.” Using this approach, 
we estimate that process emissions will increase from 
36 mmtCO2 in 2010 to 42.5 mmtCO2 in 2035 under 
the base case. This methodology is viable because 
AEO2012 does not increase the use of blended 
cements. Even though section 108 of the Energy 
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Policy Act of 2005 requires federally funded projects 
to increase the recovered mineral fraction in cement 
(e.g., fly ash or blast furnace slag), AEO2012 does not 
include this requirement because the proportion of 
mineral component is not specified in the legislation 
or subsequent regulations.143
2. Lackluster Scenario for Cement Kilns
In the ANPR, EPA concluded that the range of 
effectiveness of individual efficiency measures for 
existing cement plants was less than 1 percent to 
10 percent.144 EPA also notes that benchmarking 
and other studies have demonstrated that the most 
efficient new plants can use 40 percent less energy 
than older plants using wet kilns. However, AEO2012 
assumes that no new wet kilns are built and that 
all new cement plants are dry kilns,145 making this 
comparison less relevant for purposes of this analysis. 
Therefore, for the lackluster scenario, we assume that 
EPA establishes performance standards for GHGs for 
new and existing boilers at cement plants that achieve 
a 10 percent reduction in emissions beyond business-
as-usual projections, which is consistent with the 
manufacturing lackluster scenario above. Facilities 
could meet these standards through efficiency 
improvements or fuel switching.
3. Middle-of-the-Road and Go-Getter Scenarios  
for Cement Kilns
According to AEO2012, boilers are projected to only 
account for 3 percent of total energy consumption 
at cement plants in 2012. Therefore, in the middle-
of-the-road and go-getter scenarios, we assume that 
EPA requires facilities to capture emissions reduction 
opportunities in the entire industrial process that 
reduce emissions from onsite combustion and 
purchased electricity. This could be accomplished 
through output-based emission rate standards or 
through a more flexible compliance mechanism. In 
the go-getter scenario, we also assume that EPA 
establishes emissions standards for all combustion 
sources in new cement kilns (not just boilers) through 
New Source Performance Standards, and that those 
standards require an emissions rate equal to the 
emissions rate of natural gas combustion. This could 
be accomplished through co-firing of biomass, fuel 
switching, carbon capture and sequestration, or built 
into the reduction schedule of a flexible compliance 
program. We modeled the middle-of-the-road and 
go-getter scenarios for cement kilns using the same 
methodology that we employed for the manufacturing 
sector middle-of-the-road and go-getter scenarios. 
The only difference between the cement scenarios 
and the other manufacturing scenarios is that we 
also consider reductions in process emissions from 
the cement sector in our middle-of-the-road and 
go-getter scenarios. We assume that this is primarily 
accomplished through greater use of blended cements. 
Alternatively, cement kilns could comply through the 
employment of carbon capture and storage. Applying 
CEF reduction percentages based on more widespread 
use of blended cements leads to reductions in CO2 
process emissions of 2 percent in 2020 and 13 
percent in 2035. CO2 emissions reductions are 
detailed in Figure A-1.22 in the middle-of-the-road 
and go-getter scenarios
4. Uncertainties for Cement Kilns
The uncertainties detailed in the manufacturing sector 
also apply to the cement sector. We note, however, 
that there is also considerable uncertainty about the 
long-term production forecast for cement. Increased 
production beyond that modeled in AEO2012 could 
increase emissions, but may also signal improved 
economics for domestic industry that would allow for 
greater investments in efficiency technologies and 
deeper cuts in GHG emissions.
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C. peTROLeUM ReFineRieS
1. Base Case for petroleum Refineries
Base case emissions start with the AEO2012 reference 
case, which predicts that CO2 emissions from 
combustion at refineries will increase from  
268 mmtCO2 in 2012 to 323 mmtCO2 in 2035. 
However, the AEO2012 reference case does not 
include the EPA and NHTSA extension of the national 
GHG emissions and CAFE standards for model year 
2017 through 2025 light-duty vehicles, finalized 
in August 2012.146 These standards are included 
in the base case, and thus we adjusted the base 
case projections for refineries to account for this 
reduced demand for refinery products. To calculate 
the refinery emissions reductions from decreased 
refinery product demand, we used the simplifying 
assumption of treating all refinery outputs as though 
their production required the same relative energy 
input. This resulted in comparable emissions per 
unit of production. We also assumed that imports 
and domestic production would decline at a similar 
rate, and thus a 10 percent reduction in demand 
would result in a 10 percent reduction in emissions at 
refineries located in the United States. 
Using the above approach, we estimate that the existing 
standards will reduce refinery output by 5.2 percent by 
2025 and 10.7 percent by 2035 in the base case. These 
projections are comparable to the AEO side case that 
considered the proposed vehicle standards.
Our base case assumptions for the projected relative 
contribution of each refinery product for years 2009–
2035 comes from AEO2012.147 The relative reduction 
in each refinery product was based on transportation 
scenario outputs and the relative contribution from 
each transportation sector in 2010, as reported in 
EPA’s 2012 Inventory of Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
and Sinks.148
2. Lackluster, Middle-of-the-Road, and Go-Getter 
Scenarios for petroleum Refineries
In December 2010, U.S. EPA announced they would 
establish GHG performance standards for new and 
existing refineries using their authority under section 
111 of the Clean Air Act. As part of this announcement 
they established a timeline to propose standards 
by December 2011 and finalize those standards by 
November 2012.149 EPA has not met these deadlines, 
and has not yet issued proposed standards.
Therefore, in all scenarios, we assume that emissions 
from refineries are reduced by the establishment of 
performance standards for new and existing units. In 
the Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, EPA 
concludes that benchmarking data suggests that most 
existing refineries could economically improve energy 
efficiency by 10–20 percent, and that new refineries 
could be designed to be at least 20 percent more 
efficient than existing refineries.150 One recent study, 
Energy Bandwidth for Petroleum Refining Processes, 
published in 2006 by industry experts for the DOE 
Industrial Technologies Program (ITP), reviewed five 
major industrial processes that account for roughly 70 
percent of energy use in the refining sector. This study 
concluded that total energy savings of more than 35 
percent are achievable using existing “best practices 
and state-of-the-art technologies under real-world 
conditions” for these five major processes, and that 
“plant-wide refinery energy savings potential is usually 
found to be around 30 percent.”151
Also, according to a study by the National Academy 
of Sciences, Real Prospects for Energy Efficiency 
in the United States, identifying plant-wide energy 
savings of approximately 30 percent would be typical. 
However, the study also concludes that these gains will 
be offset by the use of increasingly heavier crude slates 
in the coming years, resulting in an overall increase 
in energy consumption per unit of refined product. 
To some extent these trends are being mitigated by 
recent production increases of light sweet crude oil 
from domestic shale plays.152 The specific efficiency 
improvements built into the refinery module of 
AEO2012 are confidential, making it impossible to 
examine the specific efficiency improvements built 
into its projections. According to the AEO2012 table 
Refining Industry Energy Consumption, the total 
energy consumption per unit of refinery input remains 
relatively constant from 2010 through 2030. If crude 
slates become increasingly heavy, it may be challenging 
to get additional emissions reductions beyond those 
already included in AEO2012.
Given the lack of access to the data underlying 
AEO2012 projections and the limited inferences 
that can be drawn from available data, we take a 
conservative approach to modeling the refinery sector. 
All three of the reduction scenarios are derived from 
the lower range of estimates provided for existing 
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units (i.e., 10 percent) by EPA in the ANPR. For the 
go-getter scenario, we assumed EPA would require 
existing units to reduce emissions 10 percent below 
future projected levels beginning in 2018 through 
GHG performance standards. For the middle-of-the-
road scenario, we assumed that EPA would require 
existing units to reduce emissions 5 percent below 
future projected levels, and for the lackluster scenario, 
we assumed that EPA would require existing units 
to reduce emissions 1 percent below future projected 
levels. While we assume that EPA would establish 
standards for new and existing units, we only modeled 
reductions for existing sources. This is because 
AEO2012 does not predict significant deployment of 
new refineries after 2012,153 and new development 
could be offset by reductions in demand caused by the 
transportation scenarios.
In addition, we examine GHG emissions reductions 
that result from decreased refinery operation. This 
is caused by further reductions in petroleum demand 
due to additional emissions standards for vehicles 
and industry, energy efficiency standards for home 
appliances, GHG performance standards for industry, 
and operational changes for aircraft. The model 
predicts a 4.8, 9.8, and 17.1 percent decrease in 
petroleum demand by 2035 compared to base case 
demand projections under the federal action-only 
scenarios (and even more when layering in state 
action). These demand reductions are thus major 
drivers of emissions reductions across the scenarios.
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3. Uncertainties for Refineries Scenarios
The impact of changes in crude slates is uncertain. It 
is also not entirely clear what efficiency improvements 
have been built into the AEO2012 base case for 
refineries. Little unit turnover is projected and this 
could change, making the emissions reductions 
projections too low. Under the scenarios we considered, 
which were intentionally conservative, the primary 
source of emissions reductions in 2035 was reductions 
in demand, and not NSPS for refineries. Thus, actual 
refinery emissions will vary mostly based on actual 
fuel economy standards, fuel content standards, and 
changes in vehicle miles traveled.
vII. Appliance and equipment efficiency 
standards (heating)
A.  MOdeLinG AppROACH FOR AppLiAnCe 
And eQUipMenT STAndARdS (HeATinG)
Here we focus on opportunities to reduce GHG 
emissions by increasing the efficiency of appliances 
that use fossil fuel for purposes such as home heating, 
cooking, and water heating. We note that there are 
even greater opportunities to reduce direct combustion 
of fossil fuels in residential and commercial buildings 
through improved performance of the building 
envelope. However, building code policies directly 
affecting new and existing buildings have historically 
been controlled by U.S. states and municipalities. 
These policies are explored in the state scenarios.
Natural gas consumption accounts for the vast 
majority of onsite fuel consumption for residential 
and commercial buildings. According to AEO2012, 
natural gas is expected to account for about 78 to 80 
percent of total onsite fuel consumption for residential 
and commercial buildings from 2012 through 2035. 
The next largest contributor is distillate fuel, which 
is only expected to account for about 6 to 9 percent 
of onsite fuel consumption. Due to this significant 
disparity, the energy savings primarily affect natural 
gas consumption. 
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B.  LACKLUSTeR, MiddLe-OF-THe-ROAd, And 
GO-GeTTeR SCenARiOS FOR AppLiAnCe 
And eQUipMenT STAndARdS (HeATinG)
We base our assumptions about the reductions 
achievable through increased federal standards for 
residential and commercial appliances that combust 
fossil fuels on the Efficiency Boom study, discussed in 
Section III.B. The Efficiency Boom analysis examines 
efficiency opportunities for the following residential 
appliances: boilers, clothes washers, dishwashers, and 
faucets, as well as commercial clothes washers, warm-
air furnaces, pre-rinse spray valves, and unit heaters. 
The study concludes that standards for those sources 
could reduce gas demand by 126 TBtu in 2025 and 
235 TBtu in 2035. For purposes of this analysis, we 
assumed that standards commence in 2015, and result 
in a constant increase in savings between 2015 and 
2025, and from 2025 through 2035. The net result of 
the standards is a reduction in CO2 emissions of 6.7 
mmtCO2 in 2025 and 12.5 mmtCO2 in 2035.
Opportunities for improving efficiency are also detailed 
in the AEO2011 expanded standards side case, which 
found 110 TBtu of savings in 2025 and 230 TBtu of 
savings in 2035. We rely exclusively on Efficiency 
Boom, however, as it lists specific product standards 
upon which future actions can be easily compared. No 
such list is provided for the EIA side case.
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Appendix ii: State Methods
I. State Action
This analysis seeks to understand the impact state 
actions can have on U.S. greenhouse gas emissions. It 
has two components: the first considers the impact of 
states taking action in the absence of federal action; 
the second considers the impact of states taking action 
in the presence of varying levels of federal action. In 
both components we examine the implication of states 
implementing the same types of policies modeled for 
the federal government, as well as more traditional 
state-level actions in the transportation, energy 
efficiency, and renewables areas.
This approach is based on the observation that the 
Constitution grants states broad authority to regulate 
their energy sources and emissions. Thus, states have the 
ability to implement many of the same policies as federal 
agencies. We also note that states are more likely to 
pursue these options when federal action falls short.
State-level actions generally complement federal 
authorities in transportation, energy efficiency, and 
renewable energy. Regarding transportation, the state 
scenarios consider measures to encourage low-carbon 
fuels and reduce vehicle miles traveled to complement 
federal vehicle efficiency measures. In the energy 
efficiency area, actions modeled include reduced 
energy consumption through end-use energy efficiency 
for electricity and natural gas, improved building 
performance, and increased deployment of combined 
heat and power. For renewables, the analysis adds new 
and additional renewable energy deployment across a 
certain number of states.
Unlike the federal analysis, many of the state 
actions modeled would require new legislation at 
the state level. Also unlike the federal scenario, the 
categorization of state action—whether “lackluster,” 
“middle-of-the-road,” or “go-getter”—is partially 
a function of how many states adopt the actions 
modeled. Thus a lackluster state trajectory does not 
necessarily mean that individual states have failed 
to take ambitious action. Instead, it can represent 
a scenario where a limited number of states have 
taken action and the result is that the combination of 
state actions has affected the national trajectory in a 
lackluster manner.
In the state scenarios, we do not identify specific states 
that take action. Rather, we identify percentages of the 
relevant sector that are subject to a new or expanded 
action, thus accounting for a variety of possible 
combinations of states and policies that can result in 
a similar level of GHG benefits. For example, to model 
the middle-of-the-road scenario for low-carbon fuels, 
we assume that states that account for 25 percent 
of energy consumption from transportation fuels 
reduce the carbon intensity of fuels by 1 percent per 
year beginning in 2015. This scenario, however, is not 
meant to be limited to this specific set of assumptions. 
Other combinations of numbers of states and levels 
of stringency could achieve this same “middle-of-the-
road” result. For example, the same level of reductions 
could be achieved if states that accounted for 12.5 
percent of energy consumption from transportation 
fuels reduced the carbon intensity of fuels by 2 percent 
per year. In this way, we capture a variety of possible 
combinations of policy ambition and state adoption 
levels under the same scenario.
II. Transportation
A.   diverSificAtion of fuel Mix reduceS 
the AverAge cArbon content of fuelS
1.  base case for diversification of fuel Mix 
As described in Appendix I (Sections VII.A and VII.B), 
we developed our base case assumptions for light-, 
medium-, and heavy- duty vehicles from Argonne 
National Laboratory’s “VISION 2012 AEO base case,” 
which is calibrated to the Annual Energy Outlook 
2012. However, we updated the base case to reflect 
new standards for light-duty vehicles sold through the 
2025 model year.
The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 
(EISA 2007) increases the volume of renewable fuel 
required to be blended into transportation fuel sold in 
the U.S. from nine billion gallons in 2008 to thirty-six 
billion gallons in 2022 (See Figure A-2.1). The law 
requires that the vast majority of the increase from 
current production levels come from cellulosic biofuel 
and other advanced biofuels. EISA 2007 requires EPA 
to annually estimate projected biofuel capacity for the 
following year, and if necessary adjust the production 
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mandates downward. In each of the past three years, 
EPA determined it was not possible to meet the 
annual cellulosic biofuel target and adjusted the target 
downward compared to the level mandated in the 
initial rule.1,2,3 Based on this recent history, and their 
own assessment of financial and technological barriers, 
the AEO 2012 assumes that the advanced biofuel 
targets will not be met until 2033.4 
To qualify for credit under EISA 2007, transportation 
fuels sold in the U.S. must meet specified life-cycle 
emissions thresholds, which are lower than the life-
cycle GHG emissions of conventional gasoline or diesel.5 
The statute requires EPA to account for the direct and 
indirect life-cycle emissions implications of qualifying 
biofuel production, considering all stages of fuel and 
feedstock production and distribution, including those 
emissions associated with direct and indirect land-use 
change. EPA has found that there are always life-cycle 
emissions associated with the production of biofuels. 
In contrast, AEO assumes that all biofuels are carbon 
neutral. When quantifying GHG emissions associated 
with the combustion of fuels, AEO assumes that biofuel 
emissions are offset by carbon sequestration that 
occurs during growth of the feedstock and does not 
consider emissions from land use and land-use change.6 
We did not adjust AEO’s treatment of biofuel emissions 
in developing our base case.
2.  lackluster, Middle-of-the-road, and go-getter 
Scenarios for diversification of fuel Mix
Enhanced fuel mix diversity can reduce the average 
carbon intensity of fuels, thereby reducing GHG 
emissions associated with transportation. Fuel-
mix diversification can be promoted by programs 
that promote alternative fuel production and/or 
consumption, or through the development of fueling 
station infrastructure.
Seven states have already set minimum requirements 
on the amount of renewable fuel that must be blended 
into gasoline, diesel, or both. However, these programs 
do not specify what types of renewable fuels must 
be used, thus allowing for the use of a wide range 
of biofuel feedstock, with uncertain net emissions 
implications. Louisiana and Pennsylvania have blend 
mandates for ethanol and diesel that will be triggered 
once state production reaches specified levels.8 
To date, twenty-eight states offer biofuel tax incentives 
for ethanol, biodiesel, or both.9 Idaho, North Dakota, 
South Dakota, and Wisconsin are among several states 
that offer tax incentives for development of biofuel 
infrastructure.10 In addition, Louisiana, Minnesota, 
Nebraska, North Dakota, and Virginia have already 
begun to offer programs supporting research and 
development of advanced biofuels.11 Rhode Island is 
b
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f I g u r e  A - 2 . 1   biofuel Production required by the energy Independence and Security Act of 2007
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Sources: Figure created using data from U.S. EIA’s Annual Energy Review 2011 and U.S. EIA’s Annual Energy Outlook 2012. 
7 3Appendi x i i   State Methods
actively researching and developing plans to expand 
advanced biofuel production.
Life-cycle GHG emissions intensity can vary 
considerably depending on the fuel type, sources, 
and production methods. In the Renewable Fuel 
Standard Regulatory Program Analysis completed 
in February 2010, EPA found that advanced biofuels 
can reduce life-cycle GHG emissions 40 to 90 percent 
below conventional gasoline, whereas corn ethanol 
from typical new facilities can only reduce life-cycle 
GHG emissions between 0 and 40 percent below 
conventional gasoline.12,13 
In order to guarantee a reduction in the carbon 
intensity of fuels, some states have begun to pursue 
a clean fuel standard or a low-carbon fuel standard. 
The first such standard was issued by the California 
Air Resources Board in 2009. It requires the carbon 
intensity of fuels sold in California to be reduced 
10 percent by 2020.14 Initiatives under way in the 
Pacific Northwest and Northeast and Mid-Atlantic are 
evaluating the implications of implementing similar 
types of standards.15 
In our scenarios we assume that states pursue a 
range of actions such as those described above, and 
that those policies further reduce the average carbon 
intensity of transportation fuels by 1 percent per 
year between 2015 and 2035. This rate is generally 
consistent with targets being considered in the 
Northeast, Washington, and Oregon, as well as the 
targets required under California’s Low Carbon Fuel 
Standard.16 If a similar target was adopted nationwide, 
this would reduce the carbon intensity of fuels an 
additional 6 percent in 2020 and 21 percent in 2035. 
In the lackluster scenario, we assume this annual 
reduction is achieved by states accounting for 15 
percent of energy consumption from transportation 
fuels. In the middle-of-the-road and go-getter 
scenarios, we assume that these policies are pursued 
by states accounting for 25 percent and 35 percent of 
fuel consumption, respectively. We assume these state 
actions affect both gasoline and diesel consumption.
Table A-2.2 is intended to help put these numbers into 
context. It shows that California alone accounts for 10 
percent of U.S. on-road fuel consumption, and that the 
Northeast and Pacific Northwest account for 17 percent 
and 3 percent of on-road fuel consumption, respectively. 
Meanwhile, the top five biofuel producing states (IA, 
NE, IL, MN, and IN) account for 10 percent of on-road 
fuel consumption.
T A b l e  A - 2 . 2    Motor fuel Consumption, 2010
P e r C e n T  o f  T o TA l  u . S . 
M o T o r f u e l  C o n S u M P T Io n
California 10
northeast 
(new england,  
Mid-Atlantic, De, MD)
17
Pacific northwest 3
Top 5 biofuel Producers  
(IA, ne, Il, Mn, In)
10
Source: State Energy Data System, U.S. EIA, 2012. 
The 2007 EISA established a national renewable 
fuel standard that requires increasing renewable fuel 
production through 2022, with required production 
levels in later years to be established by the EPA 
in a future rulemaking. In the scenarios that we 
consider, biofuel production does not meet or exceed 
T A b l e  A - 2 . 1   low-carbon Transportation fuel Scenarios
A C T I o n
P o l I C I e S  
A n D  P r o g r A M S 
D r I V I n g  A C T I o n
S C e n A r I o S
lackluster Middle-of-the-road go-getter 
Diversity in fuel 
mix resulting in 
lower average 
carbon content of 
fuels
•	  Low-carbon fuel 
standard
•	  Clean fuel standard
•	  Advanced biofuels 
standard
•	  Infrastructure 
incentives
States that account for 
15 percent of energy 
consumption from 
transportation fuels reduce 
carbon intensity of fuels by 1 
percent per year beginning in 
2015 through 2035. 
States that account for 
25 percent of energy 
consumption from 
transportation fuels reduce 
carbon intensity of fuels by 
1 percent per year beginning 
in 2015 through 2035.
States that account for 
35 percent of energy 
consumption from 
transportation fuels reduce 
carbon intensity of fuels by 
1 percent per year beginning 
in 2015 through 2035.
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those standards through 2022. Under all of the state 
scenarios, biofuel consumption continues to rise until 
2035, and over time even the lackluster scenario 
could lead to biofuel production levels in excess of 
the 2022 standards sometime before 2035. Note 
that the precise date the EISA’s 2022 standards are 
exceeded and the total level of biofuel consumption will 
depend on assumptions about federal agency actions 
and the impact of fuel economy standards on biofuel 
consumption. The EISA 2022 standard represents  
22 percent of total fuel consumed by light-, medium-, 
and heavy-duty vehicles in 2022 under our base case.
3. Modeling notes for diversification of fuel Mix
In our model we assume that all of the GHG reductions 
from fuel diversification are the result of increased 
biofuel consumption and are not due to state policies and 
programs promoting use of PHEVs, EVs, and natural gas 
vehicles. Deployment of PHEVs, EVs, and natural gas 
vehicles provide credit for manufacturers to meet their 
national emissions and CAFE standards. This means that 
increased deployment of these vehicles in one state can 
help a manufacturer meet the standards and therefore 
will not necessarily result in nationwide emission 
reductions.17 It is true that the current CAFE standards 
contain an incentive for biofuel vehicles. However, no such 
credit is provided under EPA’s GHG emissions standards, 
and thus increased consumption of biofuels is expected to 
lead to additional reductions in GHG emissions.
Biofuels present a modeling challenge due to the 
uncertainty about the GHG benefits they provide. 
EPA’s Renewable Fuel Standard Regulatory Program 
Analysis finds that in some cases corn ethanol 
consumption could be worse than traditional gasoline 
consumption—for instance, if the ethanol is produced 
in a dry mill fueled by coal.18 
It is beyond the scope of our analysis to directly model 
emissions from the fuel production process. Instead, we 
avoid modeling these impacts by considering only those 
state policies that are directly or indirectly responsive 
to the life-cycle impacts of fuel production (e.g., clean 
fuel standard, advanced biofuel standard).
We assume that the same states that pursue fuel 
diversification policies also pursue VMT reduction 
policies. This results in a conservative estimate of the 
benefits of these policies, since the relative impact of 
each policy will be less in the presence of the other 
policy than it would on its own.
4. uncertainties for diversification of fuel Mix
California’s LCFS is currently being challenged in 
two separate lawsuits brought by ethanol producers, 
refineries, and truckers.19 One of the rulings prevented 
California from enforcing the rule, but this injunction 
was lifted in April 2012 pending a decision on 
California’s appeal. A three-judge panel of the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals heard oral arguments in this 
case in October 2012.
For purposes of this analysis, we assume that state 
policies drive changes in the fuel mix beyond what 
is required nationally. If, however, state and federal 
policies are designed in a way that allows increased 
state consumption or production to count toward the 
federal fuel standards, then benefits of those policies 
would decrease.
b. vMt reduction
1. base case for vMt reduction
In these scenarios we only consider reductions in 
vehicle miles traveled (VMT) from light-duty vehicles. 
We use the same baseline for gasoline and diesel 
consumption for light-duty vehicles as our base case 
for diversity in fuel mix. The AEO2012 projects VMT 
to increase from 2,660 billion miles in 2010 to 3,583 
billion miles in 2035. This is a slower rate of growth 
than has been projected in previous AEOs, which can 
be attributed to rising fuel costs and the effects of the 
economic recession.20 
2.  lackluster, Middle-of-the-road, and go-getter 
Scenarios for vMt reduction
A variety of growth and land-use strategies can reduce 
VMT and contribute to GHG emissions savings.21 These 
include smart-growth strategies, such as targeting 
growth near public transportation, favoring infill, 
limiting sprawl, mixed-use development, and provision 
of affordable housing options. Growth strategies can be 
complemented by a variety of other tools to reduce VMT, 
including improving and expanding public transportation 
options, bike and pedestrian pathways, and car sharing, 
as well as through speed limit restrictions, intercity tolls, 
and strategies to limit driving within urban centers (such 
as parking restrictions).22
 
States play an important role in encouraging the 
development of smart-growth and related strategies. 
They can adopt VMT or GHG reduction targets, direct 
funding for smart growth, and work with regional 
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planning organizations to implement strategies that 
will achieve reduction goals.
Several states are in the process of implementing or 
developing smart-growth programs and policies. In 
Maryland, the Greenhouse Gas Reduction Act of 2009 
required the Maryland Department of the Environment 
to develop a plan to reduce GHG emissions 25 percent 
below 2006 levels by 2020 and to allocate reduction 
targets to lead agencies by economic sector.23 
The Maryland Department of Transportation then 
developed a plan to meet its allocated goal by adopting 
VMT reduction strategies such as improved public 
transportation, bike and pedestrian infrastructure, and 
travel demand management. According to analysis by 
the Maryland Department of Transportation, plans that 
are already currently funded are expected to reduce 
VMT by roughly 5 percent by 2020 compared to 
business-as-usual projections, or just over 0.5 percent 
per year between 2012 and 2020.24
California is pursuing a similar strategy with its 
Sustainable Communities and Climate Protection 
Act of 2008. This law directs state agencies to set 
GHG emissions targets from smart growth and other 
VMT policies and to work with metropolitan planning 
organizations (MPOs) to implement strategies 
expected to help achieve these targets.25 California’s 
Air Resources Board worked with MPOs to develop 
regionally appropriate targets. In the MPOs with the 
greatest population densities, this process resulted in 
per capita GHG emissions reduction targets of 7 to 
8 percent below 2005 levels by 2020 and 13 to 16 
percent below 2005 levels by 2035. In lower density 
MPOs, this process resulted in targets around 5 
percent below 2005 levels by 2020 and 10 percent 
below 2005 levels by 2035. In rural areas, targets are 
lower, and in some cases VMT growth will be allowed 
until after 2020. The state lacks the authority to 
require MPOs to adopt these targets or to require the 
jurisdictions therein to implement VMT strategies. The 
MPOs, however, have been able to get jurisdictions to 
participate by prioritizing transportation funding and 
streamlining administrative requirements for those 
jurisdictions implementing VMT reduction plans.26
Other states are moving forward as well. In Oregon, 
legislation directed the state Department of 
Transportation to set GHG reduction goals consistent 
with a statewide target of 10 percent below 1990 
levels by 2020, and to work with MPOs to enact 
strategies to meet those goals.27 Similar legislation in 
Washington established specific VMT reduction targets 
of 35 percent below 1990 levels by 2035, although 
later reevaluation of the target suggested 7 to 10 
percent was more realistic.28 Other states—including 
New York and Massachusetts—are developing smart-
growth and VMT reduction strategies as part of 
broader climate initiatives.29
In our lackluster and middle-of-the-road scenarios, we 
assume that states implement policies and programs 
that reduce their VMT an additional 0.5 percent 
below business-as-usual projections per year beginning 
in 2016, leading to a 10 percent reduction below 
business-as-usual projections in 2035.30 This is on the 
conservative end of the range found in current state 
programs. We assume that states accounting for 15 
percent and 25 percent of GHG emissions from light-
duty vehicles adopt programs or policies that lead to 
these annual savings in the lackluster and middle-
of-the-road scenarios, respectively. In the go-getter 
 
A C T I o n P o l I C I e S  A n D 
P r o g r A M S  
D r I V I n g  A C T I o n
S C e n A r I o S
lackluster Middle-of-the-road go-getter 
Vehicle miles 
traveled (VMT) 
reduction 
•	 Smart growth
•	 Improved public transit
•	  Pedestrian and biking 
infrastructure
•	  Improved traffic 
systems operation
States that account for  
15 percent of GHG 
emissions from light-duty 
vehicles annually reduce 
VMT 0.5 percent below base 
case projections beginning 
 in 2016 
States that account for  
25 percent of GHG 
emissions from light-duty 
vehicles annually reduce 
VMT 0.5 percent below 
base case projections 
beginning in 2016
States that account for  
35 percent of GHG 
emissions from light-duty 
vehicles annually reduce 
VMT 1 percent below base 
case projections beginning 
in 2016
T A b l e  A - 2 . 3   Vehicle Miles Traveled (VMT) Scenarios
7 6 Appendi x i i   State Methods
scenario, we assume that states reduce their VMT 1 
percent below business-as-usual projections per year 
beginning in 2016, leading to a 20 percent reduction 
in 2035.
We assume that such programs or policies are pursued 
by states accounting for 35 percent of GHG emissions 
from light-duty vehicles.
A VMT reduction of 1 percent per year is consistent 
with existing plans in California, Oregon, and New 
York. An analysis by the Urban Land Institute and 
Cambridge Systematics that looks at a similar set of 
policies finds that widespread adoption of land use 
and public transportation strategies results in GHG 
reductions of about 17 percent below baseline in 
2030.31 By comparison, if all states pursued go-getter- 
level ambition, reductions in 2030 would be 15 percent 
below baseline.
Note that the six states identified as already pursuing 
mandatory and voluntary policies above account for 
22 percent of VMT. None of these state programs 
are directly included in the AEO2012 reference case. 
Additional state VMT profiles are provided in  
Table A-2.4.
III. energy efficiency
A. electricity SAvingS
i. base case for electricity Savings
Reducing electricity demand through improved end-
use efficiency avoids the need to burn fossil fuel to 
generate electricity, thus reducing GHG emissions. 
A variety of state policies and programs already 
drive efficiency improvements, including energy 
efficiency resource standards, programs funded by 
system benefit charges, and least-cost procurement.32 
In addition, most states participating in the 
Northeastern and Mid-Atlantic Regional Greenhouse 
Gas Initiative (RGGI) also use auction revenue to fund 
electric efficiency programs.33 
As described in detail in Appendix I, Sections III.A 
and IV.A, we utilized U.S. Energy Information 
Administration’s (EIA) data for electricity demand 
in our base case. AEO2012 does not explicitly model 
state energy efficiency programs. However, programs 
in existence in 2011 and earlier are generally thought 
to be captured through recent regional electricity 
demand trends. Efficiency savings from new programs 
or existing programs that increase their incremental 
targets are generally expected to be additional to those 
modeled in the AEO reference case.34 
Because AEO2012 does not model state-specific 
projections, we had to develop electricity demand 
projections for each U.S. state and the District of 
Columbia. This was done using historical electricity 
demand data for each state from EIA’s State Energy 
Data System35 and regional annual electricity demand 
growth rates from the AEO2012 reference case.
T A b l e  A - 2 . 4    Top 15 States According to light-Duty 
Vehicle Miles Traveled (VMT), 2010  
STATe VMT (billions)
PerCenT of  
ToTAl u.S. VMT
California* 323 11
Texas 234 8
Florida 196 7
New York* 131 4
Ohio 112 4
Georgia 112 4
Illinois 106 4
North Carolina 102 3
Pennsylvania 100 3
Michigan 98 3
Virginia 82 3
Indiana 76 3
New Jersey 73 3
Missouri 71 2
Tennessee 70 2
Washington* 57 2
Maryland* 56 2
Massachusetts* 54 2
Oregon* 33 1
Source: Bureau of Transportation Statistics, State Transportation 
Statistics, Table 5-3. 
Note: Asterisks indicate states with VMT reduction plans. States shaded 
gray are not in the top 15 of light-duty VMT but are listed here for reference 
because they have existing reduction plans.
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2.  lackluster, Middle-of-the-road, and go-getter 
Scenarios for electricity Savings
Twenty-four states covering 60 percent of electricity 
demand currently have energy savings targets, which 
range from 0.3 to 2.4 percent savings per year.36 An 
ACEEE analysis of twenty states with energy efficiency 
resource standards (EERS) in place in 2009 and 
2010 found that states are generally on track toward 
meeting their efficiency goals.37,38 
Under each scenario, we assume that some states 
without existing energy efficiency targets adopt 
policies and programs that lead to electricity savings 
beginning in 2015 (see FigureA-2.2). In the lackluster 
scenario, we assume that states accounting for 25 
percent of electricity consumption not covered by 
an energy efficiency target achieve savings of 1 
percent per year. In our middle-of-the-road scenario, 
we assume that states accounting for 25 percent of 
electricity consumption not covered by an energy 
efficiency target achieve savings of 1.5 percent per 
year. In our go-getter scenario, we assume that states 
accounting for 50 percent of electricity consumption 
not covered by an energy efficiency target adopt 
policies and programs that lead to electricity savings of 
1.5 percent per year.
Under each scenario, we also assume that some states 
with existing energy efficiency targets adopt policies 
and programs that lead to additional electricity savings 
above these targets beginning in 2015. In our lackluster 
scenario, we assume that 75 percent of states with 
energy efficiency targets below 1.5 percent achieve 
electricity savings of 1.5 percent per year. In the middle-
of-the-road scenario, we assume that 75 percent of 
states with energy efficiency targets below 2 percent 
achieve electricity savings of 2 percent per year. In the 
go-getter scenario, we assume that 75 percent of states 
with an energy efficiency target below 2.5 percent 
achieve electricity savings of 2.5 percent per year.
For additional context for these scenarios, see Table 
A-2.6, which provides a list of the top electricity 
consumers by state.
3. Modeling notes for electricity Savings
For purposes of our analysis we only examined the 
incremental benefit of new targets. A list of existing 
state targets was obtained from ACEEE’s 2012 State 
Energy Efficiency Scorecard.39
 
Typically, energy efficiency targets do not apply to all 
electricity sales within a state. In some states, targets 
apply only to investor-owned utilities (IOUs), in others 
T A b l e  A - 2 . 5  electricity Savings Scenarios
 
A C T I o n P o l I C I e S  A n D 
P r o g r A M S  
D r I V I n g  A C T I o n
S C e n A r I o S
lackluster Middle-of-the-road go-getter 
Electricity 
savings from 
states with EE 
targets •	  Energy efficiency 
resource standards
•	  System benefit 
charge funds or 
other funds
•	  Least-cost 
procurement 
requirements
States responsible for 
75 percent of electricity 
consumption that have 
existing annual energy 
efficiency targets below 
1.5 percent achieve annual 
efficiency savings of 1.5 
percent per year beginning 
in 2015 through 2035.
States responsible for 
75 percent of electricity 
consumption that have 
existing annual energy 
efficiency targets below 
2 percent achieve annual 
efficiency savings of  
2 percent per year beginning 
in 2015 through 2035.
States responsible for 
75 percent of electricity 
consumption that have 
an existing annual energy 
efficiency target below  
2.5 percent achieve annual 
efficiency savings of  
2.5 percent per year beginning 
in 2015 through 2035.
Electricity 
savings from 
states without 
EE targets
States responsible for 
25 percent of electricity 
consumption achieve 
efficiency savings of 1 
percent per year beginning 
in 2015 through 2035.
States responsible for 
25 percent of electricity 
consumption achieve 
efficiency savings of  
1.5 percent per year beginning  
in 2015 through 2035.
States responsible for 
50 percent of electricity 
consumption achieve efficiency 
savings of 1.5 percent per  
year beginning in 2015  
through 2035.
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targets apply only to utilities with large numbers 
of customers, while other states apply targets to 
varying combinations of IOUs, municipal utilities, 
and cooperatives.40 On average, 13 percent of sales 
are not included by existing targets. To account for 
this, we adjusted the electricity savings by the percent 
of electricity sales covered. In the case of states 
with existing targets, we applied historical coverage 
percentages estimated by ACEEE (2012).41 For those 
states without existing targets, we assumed that the 
percent of electricity sales covered was equal to  
the average percentage covered in states with  
existing targets.
We summed the incremental electricity savings for 
all states and incorporated the total savings into our 
electric demand module, which calculates the resulting 
greenhouse gas benefits (see Appendix I, Section V for 
more information).
For purposes of this analysis we assumed that these 
energy efficiency gains would be incremental to the 
other policies considered in our state and federal 
scenarios. Thus we assume that these benefits are in 
addition to savings from improved building codes and 
increased deployment of combined heat and power 
systems. We note that some states count combined 
heat and power (CHP) toward their energy efficiency 
standards,42 and some states may allow other 
policies and programs to count under their energy 
efficiency goals. However, we believe our approach 
helps readers to more clearly identify the potential 
gains from any particular set of actions than would 
otherwise be possible.
b. nAturAl gAS efficiency
1. base case for natural gas efficiency
Efficiency improvements in residential, commercial, and 
industrial systems provide GHG benefits by reducing 
demand for fossil fuels. As described in greater detail 
below, a number of states have efficiency programs in 
place that specifically target natural gas consumption.43 
Our base case relies on U.S. Energy Information 
Administration’s (EIA) data for natural gas demand. 
AEO2012 does not explicitly model state energy 
efficiency programs. However, programs in existence in 
2011 and earlier are generally thought to be captured 
through recent regional natural gas demand trends.44 
Because AEO2012 does not model state-specific 
projections, we had to develop natural gas demand 
projections for each U.S. state and the District of 
Columbia. This was done using historical natural gas 
demand data for each state from EIA’s State Energy 
Data System45 and regional annual natural gas demand 
growth rates from the AEO2012 reference case.
2.  lackluster, Middle-of-the-road, and go-getter 
Scenarios for natural gas efficiency
Eleven states covering 34 percent of natural gas 
demand currently have natural gas savings targets, 
most of which range from 0.5 to 1.5 percent savings of 
total natural gas demand per year (see Figure A-2.3).46 
1 Under each scenario, we assume that some states 
f I g u r e  A - 2 . 2     existing State energy efficiency 
resource Standards and Scenario 
Assumptions (percent) 
Source: Figure created using data from American Council for an Energy-Efficiency 
Economy’s The 2012 State Energy Efficiency Scorecard, October 2012.
Note: We do not assume all the states pictured reach the scenario targets. Rather, 
we assume that only some states will take action. See Table A-2.5 for details. Texas 
had an electricity efficiency standard at the time of publication, but was treated 
as a state without a target for modeling purposes because its target is relatively 
low (about 0.2 percent of demand). This approach results in a more conservative 
estimate of total electricity savings than if Texas were treated as a state with an 
existing target.
MD
AZ
VT
NY
RI
HI
MA
IL
MN
IN
CO
WA
IA
OH
MI
OR
CA
NM
PA
WI
AR
NC
NV
0 0.5 1 1.5 2.52
 
■ Existing Target
Maximum Target in 2035   
S
T
A
T
e
S
 w
IT
h
 e
x
IS
T
In
g
 T
A
r
g
e
T
S
A n n u A l  P e r C e n T  S A V I n g S
A l l  o T h e r  
S T A T e S 
7 9Appendi x i i   State Methods
T A b l e  A - 2 . 7  natural gas efficiency Scenarios  
A C T I o n P o l I C I e S  A n D 
P r o g r A M S  
D r I V I n g  A C T I o n
S C e n A r I o S
lackluster Middle-of-the-road go-getter 
Natural gas 
savings from 
states with  
EE targets
•	  Energy efficiency 
resource standards
•	  System benefit charge 
funds or other funds
States responsible for  
25 percent of  natural gas 
consumption that have 
energy efficiency targets 
below 1 percent achieve 
savings of 1 percent of 
total demand per year from 
2015 to 2035.
States responsible for  
50 percent of natural gas 
consumption that have 
energy efficiency targets 
below 1 percent achieve 
savings of 1 percent of 
total demand per year from 
2015 to 2035.
States responsible for  
75 percent of natural gas 
consumption that have 
energy efficiency targets 
below 1.5 percent achieve 
savings of 1.5 percent of 
total demand per year from 
2015 to 2035.
Natural gas 
savings from 
states without 
EE targets
States responsible for  
10 percent of natural 
gas consumption achieve 
natural gas savings of  
1 percent of total demand 
per year from 2015 to 2035.
States responsible for  
25 percent of natural 
gas consumption achieve 
natural gas savings of  
1 percent of total demand 
per year from 2015 to 2035.
States responsible for  
50 percent of natural 
gas consumption achieve 
natural gas savings of  
1.5 percent of total demand 
per year from 2015 to 2035.
T A b l e  A - 2 . 6  largest electricity Consumers, 2010  
C o V e r e D  b Y  A n  e l e C T r I C  e f f I C I e n C Y  S T A n D A r D u n C o V e r e D  b Y  A n  e l e C T r I C  e f f I C I e n C Y  S T A n D A r D
State
Demand  
(trillion btu)
Percent of  
covered sales State
Demand  
(trillion btu)
Percent of  
uncovered sales
CA 882 14 TX 1223 19
OH 526 8 FL 789 12
PA 508 8 GA 480 8
IL 494 8 VA 388 6
NY 493 8 TN 353 6
NC 465 7 KY 319 5
IN 362 6 AL 310 5
MI 354 5 MO 294 5
WA 308 5 LA 290 5
AZ 249 4 SC 281 4
WI 235 4 NJ 270 4
MN 231 4 OK 197 3
MD 223 3 MS 170 3
MA 195 3 KS 138 2
CO 181 3 WV 109 2
Source: State Energy Data System, U.S. EIA, 2012.
8 0 Appendi x i i   State Methods
without existing energy efficiency targets adopt policies 
and programs that lead to savings in natural gas 
demand beginning in 2015. In the lackluster scenario, 
we assume that states accounting for 10 percent of 
natural gas consumption not covered by an energy 
efficiency target achieve savings of 1 percent per 
year. In our middle-of-the-road scenario, we assume 
that states accounting for 25 percent of natural gas 
consumption not covered by an energy efficiency target 
achieve savings of 1 percent per year. In our go-getter 
scenario, we assume that states accounting for 50 
percent of natural gas consumption not covered by an 
energy efficiency target adopt policies and programs 
that lead to savings of 1.5 percent per year.
Under each scenario, we also assume that some states 
with existing energy efficiency targets adopt policies 
and programs that lead to additional natural gas 
savings above these targets beginning in 2015. In our 
lackluster scenario, we assume that 25 percent of 
states with energy efficiency targets below 1 percent 
achieve savings of 1 percent beginning in 2015. In 
the middle-of-the-road scenario, we assume that 50 
percent of states with energy efficiency targets below 
1 percent achieve savings of 1 percent. In the go-getter 
Scenario, we assume that 75 percent of states with 
an energy efficiency target below 1.5 percent achieve 
savings of 1.5 percent.
For additional context for these scenarios, see Table 
A-2.8, which provides a list of the top natural gas 
consumers by state.
3. Modeling notes for natural gas efficiency
While AEO2012 does not explicitly model state energy 
efficiency programs, programs in existence in 2011 and 
earlier are generally thought to be captured through 
recent regional natural gas demand trends. Efficiency 
savings from new programs or existing programs 
that increase their incremental targets are generally 
expected to be additional to those modeled in the AEO 
reference case.Therefore, we only modeled incremental 
benefits from new targets. We obtained the list of 
existing state targets from ACEEE’s 2012 State 
Energy Efficiency Scorecard.48 
f I g u r e  A - 2 . 3   existing natural gas efficiency  
Targets and Scenario Assumptions  
IL
MN
NY
RI
MA
IA
MI
AR
CA
OR
■ Existing Target
Maximum Target in 2035   
0 0.2 1.60.4 0.80.6 1.0 1.2 1.4
A n n u A l  P e r C e n T  S A V I n g S
S
T
A
T
e
S
 w
IT
h 
e
x
IS
T
In
g
 T
A
r
g
e
T
S
Source: Figure created using data from American Council for an Energy-Efficiency 
Economy’s The 2012 State Energy Efficiency Scorecard, October 2012.
Note: We do not assume all the states pictured reach the scenario targets. Rather we 
assume that only some states will take action. See Table A-2.7 for details. Wisconsin 
and Colorado had natural gas savings targets at the time of publication, but were 
treated as states without targets in order to generate more conservative modeling 
results. Wisconsin’s targets were defunded in 2011. Colorado sets annual targets 
commensurate with funding levels and these targets have been historically low 
(approximately 0.1 percent of demand). 
Typically, natural gas targets apply to all commercial, 
residential, and industrial sales within a state.49 
However, in our middle-of-the-road and go-getter 
scenarios, we already account for industrial efficiency 
gains through industrial standards. To avoid double 
counting of these benefits, we do not include natural 
gas savings from the industrial sector in either of 
these two scenarios. Rather, we apply the efficiency 
gains described in these scenarios to commercial and 
residential sales only, and assume that the programs 
will affect virtually all of those sales. The lackluster 
scenario for industrial policies only targets boiler 
efficiency improvements, and results in considerably 
less efficiency gains. Therefore we assume it would be 
possible to achieve additional efficiency improvements 
at industrial sources through natural gas efficiency 
programs in our lackluster scenario. We assume that 
the targets will affect nearly 100 percent of sales 
in the applicable customer class (i.e., residential, 
commercial, and in some cases industrial).
A l l  o T h e r  
S T A T e S 
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T A b l e  A - 2 . 8  largest Consumers of natural gas in Commercial, residential, and Industrial Sectors, 2010  
C o V e r e D  b Y  A  n A T u r A l  g A S  e f f I C I e n C Y  T A r g e T n o T  C o V e r e D  b Y  A  n A T u r A l  g A S  e f f I C I e n C Y  T A r g e T
Demand  
(trillion btu)
Percent of sales  
covered by a target
Demand 
(trillion btu)
Percent of sales not  
covered by a target
California 1546 31 Texas 2000 18
Illinois 869 17 Louisiana 1143 10
New York 772 15 Ohio 733 7
Michigan 618 12 Pennsylvania 587 5
Minnesota 375 8 Indiana 495 5
Iowa 256 5 New Jersey 460 4
Massachusetts 248 5 Colorado 397 3
Arkansas 167 3 Oklahoma 367 3
Oregon 125 3 Georgia 352 3
Rhode Island 36 1 Wisconsin 330 3
Source: State Energy Data System, U.S. EIA, 2012.
Note: Although Colorado and Wisconsin have natural gas savings targets in place, we treat them as though they do not have targets in order to generate more conservative 
modeling results. Wisconsin’s targets were defunded in 2011. Colorado sets annual targets commensurate with funding levels and these targets have been historically low 
(approximately 0.1 percent of demand).
c.  reduced energy conSuMption  
in buildingS
1.  base case for reduced energy consumption  
in buildings
Our base case relies on the AEO2012 reference case. 
AEO2012 estimated that residential and commercial 
buildings accounted for 40 percent of total U.S. energy 
consumption and 73 percent of U.S. electricity use in 
2010. These percentages rise to 41 percent of total 
U.S. energy consumption and 78 percent of U.S. 
electricity consumption in 2035. The majority of GHG 
emissions associated with buildings are the result 
of electricity use, which accounts for 78 percent of 
emissions in the commercial sector, and 74 percent of 
emissions in the residential sector. AEO2012 projects 
that even though population will increase 25 percent by 
2035, energy use from buildings will only increase by 9 
percent due to improvements in appliance and building 
shell efficiency.
Building codes provide a vehicle for establishing 
minimum efficiency standards for new buildings and 
major renovations. Building codes have historically 
been controlled by U.S. states and municipalities. As 
a result, the stringency of commercial and residential 
building codes they have adopted varies considerably 
(see Figures A-2.4 and A-2.5). It is also worth noting 
that the benefit of building codes varies to some extent 
from state to state depending on enforcement.50 
 The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 
2009 attempted to raise the level of standards across 
the United States by making state funding for the 
State Energy Program contingent upon states adopting 
the IECC 2009 codes for new residential buildings and 
ASHRAE 90.1-2007 for new commercial buildings. 
However, a number of states have not yet adopted 
these new codes. AEO2012 assumes that all states 
will adopt these new codes by 2017. The AEO2012 
reference case does not model explicit adoption of 
additional building codes, although other economic and 
policy drivers (such as appliance standards) may lead 
to additional efficiency improvements.
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2.  lackluster, Middle-of-the-road, and go-getter 
Scenarios for reduced energy consumption  
in buildings
In our lackluster scenario, we assume that 10 percent 
of the electricity consumed by the building sector 
is covered by more ambitious building codes. In our 
middle-of-the-road and go-getter scenarios, we assume 
that 30 and 50 percent of the electricity consumed 
by the building sector is covered by more ambitious 
building codes.
Those building codes and the assumed electric 
energy savings achievable through their adoption 
are based on the Institute for Electric Efficiency’s 
(IEE’s) Assessment of Electricity Savings in the 
U.S. Achievable through New Appliance/Equipment 
Efficiency Standards and Building Efficiency Codes 
(2010-2025).51 This paper quantifies reductions 
associated with “moderate” and “aggressive” 
scenarios of new building code adoption. Those 
scenarios are as follows:
•   Residential buildings: The moderate scenario 
assumes that IECC 2012 goes into effect in 2015, 
followed by IECC 2015 in 2019, with savings of 25 
percent and 45 percent compared to IECC 2006. 
The aggressive scenario uses the same assumptions 
as the moderate case until 2024, when it is 
assumed that a new code, with energy savings of 
60 percent, goes into effect.
•   Commercial buildings: The moderate scenario 
assumes the 2007 ASHRAE standards go into 
effect in 2013, followed by the 2010 ASHRAE in 
2015, and 2013 ASHRAE in 2018, with savings of 
15 percent, 20 percent, and 40 percent compared 
to the 2004 ASHRAE standards. The aggressive 
scenario uses the same assumptions until 2024, 
when it is assumed that a new ASHRAE standard 
with savings of 50 percent goes into effect.
Since IEE does not consider natural gas savings, we 
use the natural gas savings projected from building 
codes in the AEO2011 expanded standards and codes 
case. This equates to 210 trillion Btu of energy savings 
in 2025 (1 percent of total building consumption) 
and 450 trillion Btu of energy savings (2 percent of 
consumption) in 2035. The building code adoption 
f I g u r e  A - 2 . 5  Commercial building Codes
   Meets or exceeds  
ASHRAE Standard  
90.1-2010 or equivalent
   ASHRAE Standard 90.1-2007
   ASHRAE Standard 90.1-2004
   No statewide code or precedes 
ASHRAE Standard 90.1-2004
Note: Building Code Maps adapted from the Online Code and Advocacy Network 
(OCEAN) (http://energycodesocean.org/code-status as of November 9, 2012).
f I g u r e  A - 2 . 4  residential building Codes 
   Meets or exceeds 2012 
IECC or equivalent
   Meets or exceeds 2009 
IECC or equivalent
   Meets or exceeds 2006 
IECC or equivalent
   No statewide code or 
precedes 2006 IECC
Note: Building Code Maps adapted from the Online Code and Advocacy Network 
(OCEAN) (http://energycodesocean.org/code-status as of November 9, 2012).
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T A b l e  A - 2 . 9  building Code Scenarios
 
A C T I o n P o l I C I e S  A n D 
P r o g r A M S  
D r I V I n g  A C T I o n
S C e n A r I o S
lackluster Middle-of-the-road go-getter 
Reduced energy 
consumption in 
buildings
•	  Commercial and 
residential building codes
•	 Financial incentives
States that account for 10 percent 
of energy consumption in residential 
and commercial buildings phase in 
increasingly ambitious building codes 
through 2035. Generally, residential 
codes increase from IECC2009 to 
IECC2015 and commercial codes 
increase from 2004 ASHRAE 90.1 to 
2013 ASHRAE 90.1.
States that account 
for 30 percent of 
energy consumption 
in residential and 
commercial buildings 
phase in increasingly 
ambitious building codes 
through 2035.
States that account 
for 50 percent of 
energy consumption 
in residential and 
commercial buildings 
phase in increasingly 
ambitious building 
codes through 2035.
schedule and associated energy savings in our analysis 
are considerably more ambitious than the AEO2011 
expanded standards52 and codes side case, driving 
roughly double the level of electricity savings.53 This 
suggests that actual natural gas savings associated 
with adoption of the building code improvements 
assumed in our scenario would likely be considerably 
larger than we estimate here. We assume that there is 
minimal overlap between the natural gas savings due to 
improved building codes and energy efficiency programs 
for natural gas. This is because building codes affect 
new buildings and major renovations, while efficiency 
programs typically affect only existing buildings.
3.  Modeling notes for reduced energy consumption  
in buildings
The IEE report only provides electricity savings for 
2025. We therefore estimated savings by assuming a 
linear rate of growth from 2015 through 2025. For 
years 2026–35, we extrapolated the national annual 
electricity savings by applying an assumed incremental 
benefit, based on the results of the moderate and 
aggressive scenarios of the IEE paper.54 
We calculated electricity savings for each scenario 
by discounting the annual totals according to the 
percentage of states adopting the IEE building code 
schedule as described in Table A-2.9. We incorporated 
the total savings into our electric demand module, which 
incorporates changes in electricity demand resulting 
from a variety of federal regulations and state actions 
(see Appendix I, Section V, for more information).
d.  increASed coMMerciAl And 
induStriAl coMbined heAt And 
power (chp) cApAcity
1.  base case for increased commercial and industrial 
combined heat and power (chp)
Conventional electricity generation wastes one-half to 
two-thirds of the embodied energy of fuel, by releasing 
it as unused heat.55 Combined heat and power (CHP) 
systems put that wasted heat energy to work, by 
simultaneously generating electricity and steam in 
a single system. This allows for considerable energy 
savings, thus reducing GHG emissions.56 
Our base case relies on total electricity demand and 
energy CO2 emissions projections from the AEO2012 
reference case. AEO2012 projects 13 GW of new CHP 
capacity by 2020 and 36 GW of new capacity by 2035. 
This represents a growth of 144 percent from the  
25 GW of CHP projected to be installed in 2012.
2.  lackluster, Middle-of-the-road, and go-getter 
Scenarios for increased commercial and industrial 
combined heat and power (chp)
Annual additions of CHP have slowed since 2006 in 
part because of market uncertainty and the financial 
crisis, among other factors. However, there is emerging 
recognition of the environmental and economic benefits 
of CHP at the federal and state levels.57 For instance, 
a recent executive order set an ambitious (but non-
binding) national goal to deploy 40 GW of new CHP 
capacity by the end 2020.58 The Department of Energy 
is currently working with states to realize this goal.
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State policies and programs that can facilitate CHP 
deployment include standard interconnection rules, 
reduced stand-by rates, net metering policies, friendly 
air quality regulations such as output-based emissions 
regulations, feed-in tariffs, and technical assistance 
programs. Financial incentives—including tax 
credits, loans, and loan guarantees—can help ease 
financial uncertainty and encourage investment in 
CHP. These programs and incentives tend to be most 
effective, however, when paired with mechanisms that 
help overcome grid access issues such as developing 
interconnection standards for CHP.59 
In a number of states, regulatory policies have not yet 
been revised to support distributed generation. High 
standby rates, which power consumers must pay in 
order to remain connected to the grid when they are 
not drawing power, offset otherwise positive economics 
for CHP systems. Net-metering policies that allow CHP 
operators to sell excess generation back to the grid can 
be very helpful, but are not yet widespread. In addition, 
utility acceptance of CHP interconnection varies widely 
across the states.
ICF International’s Effect of a 30 Percent Tax Credit 
on the Economic Potential for Combined Heat and 
Power provides the most robust state-level assessment 
of the technical potential for CHP for all 50 states, and 
thus serves as the basis for all three of our scenarios. 
In generating these estimates, ICF limits CHP system 
size to the site’s average electric demand, thus 
avoiding the need to deal with the challenges of selling 
electricity onto the grid.
T A b l e  A - 2 . 1 0  Combined heat and Power (ChP) Scenarios
A C T I o n P o l I C I e S  A n D  P r o g r A M S  
D r I V I n g  A C T I o n
S C e n A r I o S
lackluster Middle-of- the-road go-getter 
Increased installation 
of industrial and 
commercial combined 
heat and power (CHP) 
systems 
•	  Financial incentives, such  
as tax credits, loans, and loan 
guarantees
•	  Standard interconnection rules
•	  Reduced stand-by rates
•	  Net metering policies
•	  Output-based emissions 
regulations
 State action 
results in 
deployment of an 
additional 10 GW 
of new CHP by 
2025.
State action 
results in 
deployment of 
an additional 
20 GW of new 
CHP by 2025.
State action results in deployment 
of an additional 40 GW of new CHP 
by 2025. When coupled with the 
new CHP modeled in AEO2012 (13 
GW by 2020), this results in CHP 
deployment consistent with the 
Executive Order target of 40 GW of 
new CHP by 2020. 
In our lackluster, middle-of-the-road, and go-getter 
scenarios, we assume that state action results in 
deployment of an additional 10, 20, and 40 GW of new 
CHP by 2025. This is roughly 7.5, 15, and 30 percent 
of the technical potential identified by ICF. Such 
improvements could be achieved if states accounting 
for 15, 30, and 60 percent of total technical potential 
adopted policies that led them to develop new CHP 
units (above and beyond those modeled in AEO2012) 
that represent half of their technical potential. In 
the lackluster and middle-of-the-road scenarios, we 
assume that policies are implemented in 2015 and 
that CHP deployment phases in linearly through 2025. 
Thereafter it plateaus, so that no additional CHP is 
deployed between 2026 and 2035. In the go-getter 
scenario, we assume that this ramp-up occurs more 
rapidly so that 27 of the 40 GW are built by 2020. 
When coupled with the 13 GW of new CHP already 
predicted to be built in AEO2012, this enables the U.S. 
to meet the 40 GW target established by the August 
2012 executive order. Figure A-2.6 shows technical 
potential by state, and is intended to help provide some 
context for these assumptions.
3.  Modeling notes for increased commercial and 
industrial combined heat and power (chp)
We assume that all of the new CHP detailed in the 
scenarios above is in addition to what is modeled in 
the AEO2012 reference case. We note that even in 
our go-getter scenario we build 40 GW of additional 
CHP. When coupled with the 36 GW of new capacity 
AEO2012 predicts in 2035, this equates to 58 percent 
of the technical potential identified by ICF. However, 
we note that the AEO currently falls far short of recent 
ICF estimates of existing CHP capacity, estimating 
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only 30 GW of capacity in 2011, compared to the  
82 GW of CHP capacity estimated in the ICF study.60 
CHP leads to electricity savings by providing on-
site electric generation and displacing electricity 
that would otherwise be obtained from the grid. The 
impact of displacing that electricity is calculated by 
our electricity demand module, described in detail 
in Appendix I, Section V. Consistent with the ICF 
study, we assume that CHP units that produce cooling, 
heating, and power use half of their thermal output to 
displace electricity production for cooling and half to 
displace onsite fuel consumption.
CHP deployment tends to result in increased on-site fuel 
consumption. We estimate both the electricity savings 
and net increase in onsite fuel consumption using 
the documented assumptions and findings from ICF 
International’s Effect of a 30 Percent Tax Credit on the 
Economic Potential for Combined Heat and Power.61 
We assume that all new CHP units and retired or 
refurbished units use 100 percent natural gas.62 
While a few industries are expected to increase use 
of coal and coal-to-liquid fuel, this will likely be offset 
by the greater amount of biomass, waste heat, and 
renewables used in other key industries.63
IV.  Increased generation  
from renewable Sources
A.  bASe cASe for increASed generAtion 
froM renewAble SourceS
Increased renewable generation can result from a 
variety of state programs, such as renewable portfolio 
standards, alternative energy standards, feed-in or 
other special tariffs, and other types of financial 
incentives. Renewable portfolio standards (RPS) specify 
a percentage of electricity generation (or sales) that 
must be met by renewable or other alternative sources. 
Such standards are in place in twenty-nine states and 
the District of Columbia, which together account for 
approximately 64 percent of electricity demand.
RPSs have successfully driven renewable development 
in those states that have adopted them. Analysis by 
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory found that all 
but three states were within 90 percent of their targets 
in 2009 and 2010.64 Most states—including those 
without RPSs—encourage renewable development 
through tax incentives, grants and loans, and technical 
assistance programs.65
 
Our electricity demand projections rely on EIA’s 
AEO2012, which includes all existing mandatory 
renewable electricity targets. AEO2012 projects that 
340 TWh of new renewable electric generation will be 
built between 2009 and 2035, with an average growth 
rate of 2 percent in renewables per year, so that 
renewables account for approximately 14 percent of 
generation in 2020.
T A b l e  A - 2 . 1 0  Combined heat and Power (ChP) Scenarios
A C T I o n P o l I C I e S  A n D  P r o g r A M S  
D r I V I n g  A C T I o n
S C e n A r I o S
lackluster Middle-of- the-road go-getter 
Increased installation 
of industrial and 
commercial combined 
heat and power (CHP) 
systems 
•	  Financial incentives, such  
as tax credits, loans, and loan 
guarantees
•	  Standard interconnection rules
•	  Reduced stand-by rates
•	  Net metering policies
•	  Output-based emissions 
regulations
 State action 
results in 
deployment of an 
additional 10 GW 
of new CHP by 
2025.
State action 
results in 
deployment of 
an additional 
20 GW of new 
CHP by 2025.
State action results in deployment 
of an additional 40 GW of new CHP 
by 2025. When coupled with the 
new CHP modeled in AEO2012 (13 
GW by 2020), this results in CHP 
deployment consistent with the 
Executive Order target of 40 GW of 
new CHP by 2020. 
f I g u r e  A - 2 . 6   Combined heat and Power  
Technical Potential 
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Source: Effect of a 30 Percent Tax Credit on the Economic Potential for Combined 
Heat and Power, ICF International, October 2010.
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b.  lAckluSter, Middle-of-the-roAd, And 
go-getter ScenArioS for increASed 
generAtion froM renewAble SourceS
Under each scenario, we assume that some states with 
existing renewable standards increase these targets by 
1 percent per year beginning the year after the target 
is reached. We choose a 1 percent annual gain because 
it represents the most common annual gain required by 
mature state programs (see Figure A-2.7).
Under each scenario, we also assume that some states 
without existing renewable targets increase renewable 
generation by 0.5 percent annually beginning in 2015. 
This is one-half the rate of change we model for states 
that already have renewable standards in place. In the 
lackluster scenario, we assume that this improvement 
occurs in states that account for 10 percent of 
electricity consumption in the cohort of states without 
existing renewable standards. In the middle-of-the-
T A b l e  A - 2 . 1 2  largest electricity Consumers, 2010  
C o V e r e D  b Y  A  r e n e w A b l e  T A r g e T n o T  C o V e r e D  b Y  A  r e n e w A b l e  T A r g e T
State
Demand  
(trillion btu)
Percent of sales 
covered by a target State
Demand  
(trillion btu)
Percent of sales  
covered by a target
TX 1223 15 FL 789 17
CA 882 11 GA 480 10
OH 526 6 VA 388 8
PA 508 6 IN 362 8
IL 494 6 TN 353 8
NY 493 6 KY 319 7
NC 465 6 AL 310 7
MI 354 4 LA 290 6
WA 308 4 SC 281 6
MO 294 4 OK 197 4
 
T A b l e  A - 2 . 1 1  renewable uptake Scenarios
 
A C T I o n P o l I C I e S  A n D 
P r o g r A M S  D r I V I n g 
A C T I o n S
S C e n A r I o S
lackluster Middle-of-the-road go-getter 
Increased 
renewables 
from 
states with 
renewables 
targets
•	  Renewable portfolio 
standards 
•	  Alternative energy 
standards
•	 Feed-in tariffs
•	 Financial incentives 
States responsible for 
25 percent of electricity 
consumption increase their 
renewable generation by  
1 percent annually after  
the last year for which a 
standard is set.
States responsible for 
50 percent of electricity 
consumption increase their 
renewable generation by  
1 percent annually after 
the last year for which a 
standard is set.
States responsible for 
75 percent of electricity 
consumption increase their 
renewable generation by  
1 percent annually after  
the last year for which  
a standard is set.Increased 
renewables 
from states 
without 
renewables 
targets
States responsible for 
10 percent of electricity 
consumption increase their 
renewable generation  
0.5 percent annually 
beginning in 2015.
States responsible for 
25 percent of electricity 
consumption increase their 
renewable generation  
0.5 percent annually 
beginning in 2015.
States responsible for 
50 percent of electricity 
consumption increase their 
renewable generation  
0.5 percent annually 
beginning in 2015.
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f I g u r e  A - 2 . 7   existing State renewable Targets and 
Scenario Assumptions
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Source:  Figure created using data from the Database of State Incentives for 
Renewables and Efficiency (DSIRE), downloaded September 2012.
Note: Solid bars represent existing renewable targets and hashed bars represent 
the maximum new renewable energy that could be deployed in any particular state 
in 2035 if they increase their renewables at the designated rate (i.e., 1 percent or 
0.5 percent). As discussed above, we do not assume that each state experiences this 
level of incremental renewable generation, but instead assume that a fraction of 
the states achieve this level of incremental renewable generation. Further note that 
Texas and Iowa have absolute rather than percent targets. Texas’ 5,880 MW by 
2015 target is calculated as an approximate percentage of electricity demand for 
ease of display. Iowa’s 105 MW target is not displayed here because the target date 
(2000) is earlier than what is considered here.
To confirm that the assumptions in our scenarios are 
technically achievable, we compared the maximum 
(undiscounted) renewables penetration for each 
state with its technical potential as calculated by 
the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL). 
In most states, the maximum level of renewables 
penetration does not exceed 2 percent of the state’s 
technical potential.
c.  Modeling noteS for increASed 
generAtion froM renewAble SourceS
AEO aggregates renewable electricity targets by North 
American Electric Reliability Corporation region, and 
does not provide individual state targets.67 Therefore, 
we estimated incremental renewable generation state-
by-state due to their renewable standards, using our 
estimated electricity demand baseline for each state (see 
Section II.C. of Appendix II above for details),68 and 
annual RPS targets by state for the years 2005–35 from 
the DSIRE Renewables Database.69
Since our scenarios do not choose what states take action, 
when modeling we assumed each state took action, 
but discounted the incremental renewable gains by the 
assumed implementation level. In some states, renewable 
targets can be met in part through energy efficiency 
improvements. Due to the significant energy efficiency 
increases across all three of our scenarios, we assumed 
that those energy efficiency limits would be met, thereby 
reducing the level of renewable energy obtained due to 
programs in those states.
Most existing renewable targets, and those established 
in our scenarios, are tied to demand (e.g., Colorado 
requires that 30 percent of electricity sales will be met 
with renewables by 2020). Therefore, estimates of the 
GHG benefits from renewable programs must take into 
account the impacts of reduced electricity consumption 
from energy efficiency programs. Incremental renewable 
generation for each of our scenarios was calculated by 
comparing the total projected new renewable generation 
to the original renewable uptake projected under our base 
case scenario. The greenhouse gas benefits from the new 
renewable development were calculated using our electric 
demand module. For more information see Appendix I, 
Section V.
road and go-getter scenarios, we assume that increases 
to 25 percent and 50 percent, respectively. Note that 
the same level of benefit achieved by states without a 
current standard can be achieved if half the number of 
states pursues the same level of ambition as we assume 
in states that already have renewable standards (i.e., 
increase renewable generation by 1 percent per year). 
For context, see Table A-2.12, which provides a list of 
the top electricity consumers.
A l l  o T h e r  
S T A T e S 
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V.  States Implement Policies Modeled  
for federal Action
States have broad authority to regulate energy sources 
and emissions within their boundaries. States may 
therefore implement many of the same policies that we 
ascribe to the federal government in the federal analysis, 
with some exceptions. In this approach we assume that 
states pursue the same “lackluster,” “middle-of-the-
road,” and “go-getter” policies that are considered in 
the federal scenarios. Consistent with our other state 
policies, we do not assume, however, that all states 
pursue such action. Instead, we assume that these 
policies are pursued by states accounting for 10, 25, and 
50 percent of GHG emissions from those sources. These 
approaches include state action for all sectors discussed 
in the federal action section, except for those policies 
that are ill-suited for state implementation. We deemed 
policies that eliminate HFCs, regulate off-highway 
vehicles, adopt appliance and equipment efficiency 
standards where federal standards already exist, or 
regulate aviation to be ill-suited to state implementation 
because they are preempted by federal law. It is 
important to note that one implication of modeling 
state-level ambition off of federal ambition for these 
sectors is that the state scenarios provide the greatest 
incremental benefit when they are coupled with a less 
ambitious federal policy.
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